Monday, December 18, 2017

What are properties?

A difficult metaphysical question is what makes something be a property rather than a particular.

In general, heavy-weight Platonism answers the question of what makes x be F, when being F is fundamental, as follows: x instantiates the property of Fness.

It is hard to see what could be more fundamental on Platonism than being a property. So, a heavy-weight Platonist has an elegant answer as to what makes something be a property: it instantiates the second-order property of propertyhood.

5 comments:

Christopher Michael said...

Properties (as contemporary analytic metaphysicians use the word) are universals. So properties are either substantial essences (being human) or accidents (being red). Where's the mystery?

Alexander R Pruss said...

Doesn't the problem come back? What's an accident? What's a substantial essence?

Heath White said...

Isn't there a "third man" problem with your solution? What makes "being a property" a property? Aren't we off on a regress?

Alexander R Pruss said...

It participates in propertyhood, no?

Heath White said...

If we explain the concept 'property' in terms of 'participation' and 'propertyhood' I do not think that is a lot of progress. Maybe just me....