An interesting question is whether a prohibition on discrimination with respect to a determinable P by itself prohibits discrimination against groups with respect to patterns or distributions of P in groups.
If so, then it would be the case that:
a prohibition of racial discrimination by itself prohibits discrimination against multi-racial groups
a prohibition of gender discrimination by itself prohibits discrimination against same-gender couples.
But here would be a more surprising up-shot:
- a prohibition of P-based discrimination by itself prohibits discrimination against groups lacking P-diversity.
After all, lack of P-diversity is just a pattern of P-distribution (akin to same-gender couple, except that same-gender couples are by definition pairs while groups lacking P-diversity will often have more than two members). But that prohibiting P-based discrimination prohibits discrimination against groups lacking P-diversity seems implausible. After all, criticism is one of the forms of adverse treatment that when based on a protected characteristic will constitute discrimination. But it seems absurd to suppose that a prohibition on discrimination with respect to P also prohibits criticism of groups for lacking P-diversity.
If this is right, then a prohibition on discrimination against groups exhibiting particular patterns or distributions of the protected characteristic does not follow from a prohibition on discrimination on the basis of that characteristic, but requires a separate step. Sometimes, of course, that separate step is a no-brainer, as in the case of moving from prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race to prohibiting discrimination against multi-racial groups (including couples).
Let me add that I am neither a social nor a legal philosopher, so it may be that this has already been well-established or thoroughly refuted in the literature.
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