Monday, January 13, 2020

Pacifism and casuistry

Pacficists who think that all lethal violence is wrong have a moral imperative to think creatively about ways in which the innocent can be protected from assault without recourse to lethal violence. These creative ways will be both preventative and reactive, and may be technological, physical (e.g., martial arts training), verbal, spiritual, self-sacrificial (e.g., hunger strikes), etc. Moreover, the pacifist needs to engage in careful philosophical discrimination to determine the boundaries of the concept of lethal violence (e.g., does it allow the use of Double Effect to engage in violent acts that are foreseen but not intended to cause death?) in order to figure out which actions of defending the innocent are permissible. The duty to engage in such thought comes from our duty to protect the vulnerable and to provide moral guidance for our neighbor.

I am not a pacifist about lethal violence. But I am, to coin a phrase, a pacifist about lying: I think lying is always wrong. Nor am I alone: pacifism about lying is the predominant Catholic position. Those of us who are pacifists about lying need to do the same thing as the pacifists about lethal violence: we need to think creatively about ways in which the innocent can be protected from assault without recourse to lying. This will involve both preventative and reactive approach, and will be of a broad variety of kinds. And we need to engage in careful philosophical discrimination. Our duty to do all this comes from our duties to the vulnerable and to our neighbor.

The tradition of casuistry about speech involving such concepts as mental reservation has been much maligned. But whatever one may think about the detailed ideas from that tradition, one has to remember that this tradition is an outgrowth of the duty to protect the vulnerable, while remaining within the confines of pacifism about lying. One should see engagement in this tradition as akin to a pacifist about lethal violence studying non-lethal martial arts.

14 comments:

Walter Van den Acker said...

Alex

The only morally permissible reason to not be a pacifist about lethal violence is if there are cases in which lethal violence is inevitable (in order to defend the innocent, e.g.)

But that would also hold for lying, unless lying is somehow more evil than taking a human life. But that would, IMO , be a complete perversion of morality.

And this also raises the question whether a world in which lethal violence is inevitable is really a world we would expect if it is true that an omnibenevolent God actively creates and sustains it.

steve said...

"Those of us who are pacifists about lying need to do the same thing as the pacifists about lethal violence: we need to think creatively about ways in which the innocent can be protected from assault without recourse to lying."

But what if those are irreconcilable priorities? What gives?

Alexander R Pruss said...

Walter:

Consequentialism is false. The fact that an action A is less evil than an action B does not imply that it is permissible to do A in order to prevent B. For instance, one murder is less evil than two, but it is not permissible to do one murder to prevent two.

Steve:

As Kant would say, the duty to protect the innocent from assault is only an imperfect duty. In particular, one is only required to protect the innocent from assault when there is a morally permissible means available. And pacifists about lying think that lying is not a morally permissible means.

steve said...

Alex,

Is your position on the intrinsic evil of lying based on Catholic theology or moral intuition? If the latter, what makes the moral intuition about the lying more compelling than the moral intuition about protecting the innocent? In case of conflicting intuitions, what's the tiebreaker?

If your position is based on Catholic theology, although that's the majority position in Catholic moral theology, it's not dogma or de fide teaching that I'm aware of. So why treat that as an unquestionable given?

Walter Van den Acker said...

Alex

This has nothing to do with consequentialism. Of course the fact that A is less evil than B does not in and out of itself imply that it's permissible to do A to prevent B, but your position concerning lying and lethal violence seems to imply that lethal violence is sometimes permissible while lying isn't. If both are equally evil, then that simply cannot be true.

Alexander R Pruss said...

Walter:

I missed your point. You're right of course. I think that sometimes lethal violence isn't evil at all.

Steve:

I guess most of my credence in pacifism about lying comes from the Christian tradition which is quite strict on the point. The Christian tradition is sufficiently clear that I think we can say that this was taught by the ordinary Magisterium, and probably infallibly so.

This is not just a Catholic thing. One of the big criticisms of Jesuits by early Anglicans was their willingness to practice mental reservation, precisely in cases where the Jesuits were doing so to avoid lethal persecution by the English state. Both sides in this debate agreed that lying was wrong, but they disagreed on what counted as lying.

And Scripture has lots of condemnations of lying.

Finally, it's hard to square a permission of lying in some cases with the idea--embedded extremely firmly in Christian attitudes to the martyrs--that it is always wrong to deny Christ.

That said, I also have secular arguments. It is important for our social practices that we be able to rely on people's words even when innocent lives are at stake. For instance, politicians shouldn't lie to get elected, even if they think that their policies will save innocent lives (e.g., by reducing poverty). Similarly, if we people are permitted to lie to save innocent lives, then *no matter how high the integrity of the witness* we shouldn't trust someone providing an alibi in court in a capital case to someone they believe on other grounds to be innocent, for if lying to save innocent lives is permissible, then the witness could be doing just that.

Walter Van den Acker said...

Alex

But in reality we are not able to fully rely on people's words. Despite the prohibition of lying people lie anyway.
And in reality we generally don't just trust someone providing an alibi.
There is a reason why people have to swear or promise to tell the truth in court. If we could trust nobody would ever lie, that wouldn't be necessary.

If lying is the only way to save a life, lying is not only permissible, but morally obligatory.

steve said...

Alex,

Thanks for the detailed reply. Much could be said but I'll confine myself to one observation: the appeal to trust cuts both ways. For instance, a friend trusts another friend to cover for him if he gets into trouble for no good reason. He doesn't regard someone as a dependable friend if that individual didn't have his back when needed. There are circumstances under which friends are expected to lie for each other. I'm not saying to cover for wrongdoing. Rather, in an unjust world, it's quite possible to get into trouble for doing the right thing.

If, of course, you think lying is intrinsically wrong, then that's not a justification, but I'm just addressing the appeal to trust on its own grounds.

steve said...

It's true that all things being equal, denying Christ is a grave sin (apostasy). That is, however, subject to moral complexities. Take the controversial film Silence. If a Christian publicly renounces Christianity to protect the innocent, and his disavowal is disingenuous, then that's morally and spiritually different. You can still say that's wrong, but it's wrong for a different reason.

Alexander R Pruss said...

Walter:

If it's sometimes permissible to lie, it's sometimes permissible to lie under oath. I think oaths are just impermissibility-multipliers.

Steve:

The Christian tradition is, as far as I can tell, unanimous that denying Christ is wrong under all circumstances, whether to save one's own skin or to save the skin of other innocent persons.

steve said...

But that's an anti-intellectual response. There's a moral difference between denying Christ out of cowardice and feigning apostasy to protect the innocent. The prohibition against denying Christ has a typical context in which the apostate renounces the faith to save his own skin. But from a moral standpoint, that's a very different motivation than sparing the innocent. Just appealing to Christian tradition isn't a serious argument.

Walter Van den Acker said...

Alex

Indeed. I think it is sometimes morally permissible (and even morally obligatory) to lie under oath.

Alexander R Pruss said...

Steve:

"The prohibition against denying Christ has a typical context in which the apostate renounces the faith to save his own skin": I think that as a historical matter of fact, this is false. Cases where people's families were endangered by their adherence have been very common throughout Christian history. These were standard cases rather than outliers.

If it is permissible to lie to save an innocent neighbor, it is permissible to lie to save oneself, as long as one is innocent. After all, ideally one loves one's neighbor as oneself.

It is true that there is a difference between lying about one's adherence and apostasizing. But note that the main New Testament example is Peter's "betrayal" of Christ, which is precisely a lie about knowing Jesus in order to save an innocent person, namely Peter, from persecution.

If one thinks, on the basis of strong arguments, that the Holy Spirit guides the Christian tradition in moral matters, then appeal to the Christian tradition is just insistence on making use of all the evidence we have.

steve said...

Alex, there's often a morally salient difference between putting myself at risk and putting someone else at risk. Those aren't equivalent scenarios. Even if both of us are innocent, I generally have greater freedom or even obligation (in some cases) to endanger myself for a worthy cause than to endanger or obligate a second innocent party. The prima facie duty is to spare the innocent from harm rather than exposing them to harm.