Here’s an interesting argument favoring presentism that I’ve never seen before:
Obviously, a being that fails to exist at some time t is not a necessary being.
If presentism is true, we have an elegant explanation of (1): If x fails to exist at t1, then at t1 it is true that x does not exist simpliciter, and whatever is true at any time is possibly true, so it is possible that x does not exist simpliciter, and hence x is not a necessary being.
If presentism is false, we have no equally good explanation of (1).
So, (1) is evidence for presentism.
I don’t know how strong this argument is, but it does present an interesting explanatory puzzle for the eternalist:
- Why is it that non-existence at a time entails not being necessary?
Here’s my best response to the argument. Consider the spatial parallel to (1):
- Obviously, a being that fails to exist at some location z is not a necessary being.
It may be true that a being that fails to exist at some location is not a necessary being, since in fact the necessary being is God and God is omnipresent. But even if it’s true, it’s not obvious. If Platonism were true, then numbers would be counterexamples to (6), in that they would be necessary beings that aren’t omnipresent.
But numbers seem to be not only aspatial but also atemporal. And if that’s right, then (1) isn’t obvious either. (In fact, if numbers are atemporal, then they are a counterexample to presentism, since they don’t exist presently but still exist simpliciter.)
What if the presentist insists that numbers would exist at every time but would not be spatial? Well, that may be: but it’s far from obvious.
What if we drop the “Obviously” in (1)? Then I think the eternalist theist can give an explanation of (1): The only necessary being is God, and by omnipresence there is no time at which God isn’t present.
Maybe one can use the above considerations to offer some sort of an argument for presentism-or-theism.
29 comments:
Perhaps on an unrelated note, but one other interesting and fairly new argument for presentism is Olley Pearson's argument from rationality (which can be found in his recently published book, titled, 'Rationality, Time, and Self' and earlier PhD thesis, titled, 'Rationality and Tense: A Reason to be an A-Theorist.') In short, Pearson argues that “the greatest argument for realism about tense is provided by the role tense plays in our lives.” Pearson essentially expands upon Arthur Prior's 'thank goodness that's over' argument by investigating the links between tense and rationality and attempts to deflate the common objection to Prior's argument: to distinguish the tensed beliefs we act for from the tenseless facts that they capture. According to Pearson, “reasons are facts, not beliefs, and one is rational in so far as the network of their beliefs and intentions is isomorphic with the network of reasons and the actions they promote.” For Pearson “[a]n agent's rationality therefore has little to do with the form their beliefs take, so if rationality demands tensed beliefs, this can only be because there is a demand for the tensed facts captured by these beliefs.”
But then that response would have to face the Gap Problem: showing that a necessary concrete being is God.
But then that response would have to face the Gap Problem: showing that a necessary concrete being is God.
That would at least make it different to argue that such a being must be immutable given that you’d then be positing no change existing, right?
I am not certain that 1. is true.
Consider the eternalist account. I do not see why it is impossible for there to be a being A where necessarily (A exists at t_0 and A does not exist at t_1).
In other words, A necessarily exists but isn't extensive throughout time. In a sense, it would "always" exist at t_0 and "always" exist at t_1 in the way a more intuitive necessary being would.
"always" *not exist at t_1
Atno: As I see it, to exist necessarily is to have no requirements at all for your existence (thus, you would exist in any "world" or configuration of how things are, because you have no necessary conditions and any state of affairs is sufficient). The best account of possibility is one that's grounded in powers of actual things. So, X possibly exists just if it either actually exists or its necessary and sufficient conditions were within the power of something else that actually did exist. The ultimate being which is possible because it exists and grounds all the other possible states of affairs, would itself exist no matter what the states of affairs were. Thus it has "aseity" and the extent of its powers is exactly coextensive with the extent of possible states of affairs (i.e. it is "omnipotent").This is what everyone means by God (a being who is omnipotent, exists "a se", and freely chose among the possible states of affairs to bring about this particular one).
With that in the background, it seems perfectly obvious why no non-God concrete being could exist necessarily: There would be a state of affairs in which God did not choose to bring that thing about. Its possibility (like all possibilities) would be grounded in God's powers, but its actuality would be dependent (read: "contingent") on whether He chose to exercise those powers.
Unknown: Does it not seem obvious that, if it is possible for me to truthfully say at t_1 "there is no X", then X does not exist necessarily? After all, a necessary truth is one that cannot possibly be false. And yet if someone says "X exists" at t_1, they have uttered a false statement. And, if X is possibly false, then it is not a necessary truth. This does seem to me to quite strongly hint at the incoherence of eternalism. Eternalism would have us treat time like space, and who cares of a necessary being has a spatial gap in it? Indeed, who cares of a necessary being exists spatially at all? But, we certainly do care that somehow X is supposed to be necessary and yet there have been circumstances under which I could truthfully have said "X does not exist".
Pruss: To see how a presentist deals with the existence of Platonic entities, like numbers, just take a look at William Lane Craig's work. It's interesting to me that he regards presentism as being more obvious than the existence of the external world or other such basic beliefs (because, of course, even the Solipsist's grand illusion changes over time). And so, even God must be temporal since the Creation. And, given God's unique aseity plus the truth of presentism, Platonism about numbers is off the table. So, he has written a bunch about alternatives to Platonism.
"because, of course, even the Solipsist's grand illusion changes over time"
Depends on just how counterintuitive the Solipsist wants to be. One could hold that the grand illusion is unchanging, but one has a constant and unchanging apparent memory of things having been different, thereby resulting in an illusion of change without any change of illusion.
Pruss: "One could hold that the grand illusion is unchanging, but one has a constant and unchanging apparent memory of things having been different, thereby resulting in an illusion of change without any change of illusion."
Which experience/illusion I'm "remembering" at a given moment is different from what it was. I can tell you from my firsthand (and thus properly incorrigible) experience that that is the case. Unless I have just the general impression of things "having been different", and am actually unchangingly experiencing just that general impression (not the sequence of experiences that I am in fact having), I don't see how to make a B-theory of Solipsism work.
Michael:
I do agree that it would be absurd for there a fact that is both necessary and changing. On this model however, the necessary fact does not change. “A exists at t_0” is true at all times t even A doesn't exist at t. To be necessarily existent B would just mean that at some time t there is no possibility for B to not exist.
I would just bite the bullet personally. As you say, no one cares whether a necessary existent being can have certain falsehoods attributed to it with respect to dimension. For example, let A a necessarily existent being of finite volume, then depending on the geometry we may still be able to say that A does not exist in all points in space even in presentism. This is just a natural generalization of this concept.
Unknown: We're on the same page. And I think this is the ultimate argument against eternalism (namely: on eternalism, there is no such thing as change; things are just eternally and unchangingly different shapes at different 4D locations).
But, I don't think it quite fixes the problem that Pruss' argument is presenting. And, perhaps, this reveals even more clearly the incoherence of eternalism. At t_1 it is true for me to say "X does not exist". This is different than what happens when I just move away from something in space. It would be false to say "X does not exist", just because I moved away in some spatial direction. I could, at best, say "X is not here". But the question of existence is quite different, and I think it is indeed obvious that a being which doesn't exist at t_1 can truthfully be spoken of at that time as not existing at all.
This is perhaps another good intuition pump to add to the arsenal of the anti-eternalist. It joins other arguments about the reality of change, the necessity of tense in our language (and, ergo, our basic conceptual scheme), the changing illusion of tense which is itself tensed, etc. We add to that, "on eternalism, at a given time, a thing can properly be spoken of as not existing at all just because of a dimensional gap, which we know isn't right by analogy to spatial gaps".
Michael:
We are more than fully on the same page, with the difference being that I don't accept that "a being which doesn't exist at t_1 can truthfully be spoken of at that time as not existing at all.", which I think presupposes non-eternalism.
I agree with everything else you say that not about that. This is a very good intuition-pump for presentists and anti-eternalists I think, and can make Eternalists work a little more uphill.
Michael,
I don't know if your argument from powers works. Granting there is a necessary being, and that possibilities are grounded in powers, perhaps there could be a multiplicity of necessary beings. NB1 grounds all possibilities of material things, NB2 grounds all possibilities of mental things, and so on. Or just that NB1 grounds possibilities X and NB2 grounds possibilities Y, etc. Together, they are omnipotent, in the sense that all possibilities are within their combined power. But there is no one being that just is omnipotent. I also don't know how you're inferring the NB is free.
Pruss,
Maybe there is a "Catholic" argument against B theory. It is de fide that God not only created the world but that He also conserves it in existence, and that if God ceased to sustain it in being, everything would cease to exist. The idea appears to be that God does not need to actively do anything to annihilate the world; He'd just have to "not cause", not conserve, things in being and they would immediately cease to exist as a result.
The A theorist can easily make sense of that: if all contingent things depend on God for their existence, if God stopped actualizing them, they'd just immediately cease to exist.
But the B theorist holds that even though God might be required to cause and explain why contingent things exist in the first place, no Divine Conservation is required for things to exist after God has created them, and past objects could keep later objects in existence even if God were to not sustain those later objects.
So, for a B theorist, God caused the universe at t0, but at t1 God might not actualize anything at all, and nevertheless things continue to exist because past contingent things cause and conserve later objects or parts. But this contradicts the doctrine of divine conservation traditionally understood.
The B theorist might have to reinterpret the doctrine of divine conservation. Whether that can be done, I don't know.
Atno:
I infer that NB is free because its powers are sufficient to ground all the possible worlds and yet only one is actualized. That requires choosing "like from like" as al-Ghazali says. It requires choice. It requires that the necessary and sufficient powers can be in place for any of the worlds to be actualized but only one is. It seems like the hallmark of freedom.
Or you could use Swinburne's distinction between agential and non-agential causation , if you like.
As for how I reason there aren't many NBs grounding different subsets of possibilities, I'd cite the following:
1) Ockham's Razor.
2) They all would make decisions, so the one grounding "mental possibilities" would ground the rest, in that particular case.
3) What grounds the possibility of their being 4 of them (for example) rather than 5? The grounding for the unrealized possibility of many must (like all other possibilities) lie in the powers of something beyond them, and that thing would be uniquely God.
I'll add a 4th argument that I know Pruss doesn't like. Lol:
4) If actual omnipotence is possible, then one or all of these NBs would need to ground it (thus being fully omnipotent himself/themselves). And I don't think more than one actually omnipotent being can coexist.
Atno:
But a Thomist says that all creaturely causation required divine concurrence. So even if objects existing at an earlier time cause objects to exist at a later time, that causation requires divine concurrence.
Michael,
But that assumes free actions are the only kind of indeterministic actions. There could be stochastic explanations, and then maybe the NB(s) just randomly actualize one world instead of another.
1- yeah, a single omnipotent being is simpler than an omnipotent collective, I think. But it would be better to have more than simplicity here.
2- only IF they make decisions. Maybe they are all impersonal. And why couldn't each ground his own possible decisions?
3- that doesn't seem to follow from any powers account. If there are 4 instead of 5, this is grounded in the fact that there are 4 - these 4 are necessary beings after all, so they are necessarily real. I do agree however there should be an explanation for why there are 4 instead of 5, as that would seem very arbitrary. In that case, maybe there's an infinity of NBs. Or maybe there is a principled reason for why there is a finite multiplicity of them - the only possible reason I could think of, in this case, would be if one NB causes material things and is material, and the other is spiritual and causes minds and so on.
4- that assumes actual omnipotence is possible, and that would be controversial, I think. Maybe one NB can cause all mental entities, but not any material ones, while another can cause all material entities but no mental ones.
1) Don't we normally take it as a sign that something is contingent if it stops existing at a given moment? It seems to me like we'd have no way of knowing whether something is truly contingent or not if for all we know it exists at alternate points in time in some other possible worlds.
2. In the context of cosmological arguments, say this necessary being exists at only t1 in world1, only t2 in world2, etc. What accounts for it existing at certain times and not others?
Atno:
On freedom: I think true randomness as an explanation is both controversial (it would be very hard to prove a cause is truly random and not just apparently so) and also not really explanatory. But even if I grant all of that, do you think it properly explains why these NBs aren't just constantly causing all sorts of possibilities, rather than just having initiated the chain's of causation which lead us back to their existence in the first place? That seems like a few too many brute facts.
2) They would ground their own decisions (if they're decision-makers, for which see the above paragraph); but they would be "mental entities", and so their very existence would depend on the one who creates mental realities, no? At least, if we want to make such a distinction. I don't think mental entities or mental realities exist. I think animate beings have various capacities which we describe with mind/mental talk. So the distinction of the NBs that you're proposing doesn't actually make sense to me. But, even if there are "mental entities", provided my argument for the NBs being decision-makers holds, they would all exist contingently on the one who explains mental entities.
3) Reasons for existing cannot be "because they serve as explanations for X, rather than Y". An NB exists for the same reason anything does: its necessary and sufficient conditions are met. The only difference is that it doesn't actually have any, and so any situation is sufficient. If there are just 4, or some other arbitrary number, then that is a fact which needs an explanation. The only reason we know there is at least one NB is because we need a terminus to the chain of explanations. To end in some arbitrary collection of them would need further explanation. Indeed, it would seem to be a contingent fact needing a more powerful being to ground it (if contingent facts are all taken to be grounded in powers).
4) This is interesting to me... It seems to me that, unless someone can show the impossibility or contradiction of a single NB whose powers are coextensive with all the possible states of affairs (and therefore, it can serve by itself as the end of the explanatory chain), then such a being is possible. But, if it is possible, it is only so because either it exists or it is caused by something else. But, it couldn't be caused by anything else, and therefore it is possible because it exists (a sort of back-door to the ontological argument). If this is so, then my argument against multiple omnipotent beings would shave away any other NBs. I would also add that (wholly apart from my rejection of the existence of "mental entities" at all) the idea of having sufficient power to produce everything material but not to produce everything mental requires some sort of unpacking. Is it that the being doesn't have "enough" power, in which case the one that produces the mental entities has "more" power? That can't be what's meant, because that would land us back with a single ultimate NB. Is it that they are just different kinds of power? But then, how so? It's quite opaque to me.
Why do you think a random cause would not really be explanatory?
"even if I grant all of that, do you think it properly explains why these NBs aren't just constantly causing all sorts of possibilities"
I've thought of this before. I think it's a good argument. But maybe there is a way to avoid the conclusion that NB is rational or personal here: if there are many NBs, they all could be causing random things all the time, but precisely because of that, their creative acts cancel one another and so no random things are ever created. Our world managed to exist because there was no space before it for the NB's causal acts to affect "the same space" and therefore cancel each other out.
Granted, it is convoluted, so the simplest explanation is that NB is rational. But I like challenging the arguments to make them more air-tight.
If there is only one NB, or if there is only one NB which can cause material realities, the objection does not even arise.
2- but they would be necessary beings, so their existence would be self-sufficient and they would necessarily have all their powers, no need for any external grounding. Besides, again, the argument only works if you assume NBs are personal in the first place;
3- again, I do think that a finite multiplicity would need an explanation (why 7 instead of more or less, etc). One could perhaps accept an infinity of NBs, to avoid these questions. Or one could try drawing a principled reason for why only a specific multiplicity. The best bet in this case imo would be if there is one NB which causes matter, and one NB which causes non-material things, and each cannot do the other's work.
4- I am sympathetic as I also have the intuition that one being could have all possible powers, but this might be blocked if there is a principled reason for why this couldn't be the case. Again, the best bet imo would be saying that one NB only has material/physical powers, the other has only non-physical powers.
To be clear, I think Theism is much simpler, and that there are serious problems with these maneuvers I'm suggesting (for instance, minds should have power to affect and interact with matter, so a spiritual NB should also have power over matter no?). I'm just challenging because I'd like to see the arguments get more airtight.
Atno:
Please don't think that I have any problem at all with you presenting objections and forcing me to tighten up my position (which may well need modification, for sure!). I really enjoy this, and I find it very helpful.
I think we've drilled down to the two main issues: Why would the NB be personal and why could there only be one?
On the question of personhood, I think we can say the following:
P1. As Swinburne emphasizes, we only actually know of two kinds of explanations: agential and scientific. There may well be others, but we have no reason to suppose it. In the absence of a system of laws and a physical arena, scientific explanations cannot work, and we are stuck by elimination with agential causes. One thing to bear in mind is that there is a reason why these are the only two we ever discuss: Our conceptual/linguistic scheme for even talking about causal explanation is based on our experience. The very concept of causation comes from our seeing ourselves as agents acting in the world and then seeing how chains of causes can have a domino effect. Without those as the basis, we would have no concept of causation at all. So, when we try to branch out into some categorically different idea of causal explanation, we'd better have very good reason.
P2. If there is a third category of totally random/stochastic causes, we'd need an explanation of why they don't just cause all sorts of things all the time. It could be found in the powers of fellow NBs ("cancelling out", as you say), but that's getting quite elaborate without justification. After all, total randomness on each of their parts just happening to line up with the total randomness of all the others.... I dunno. It seems rather insane to me.
P3. If we take time as finite, and believe that there has been an absolute beginning and a first event, then the cause of that most certainly must be personal. Even randomness won't do, since randomness has to do with probability and the probability that all necessary and sufficient causal conditions are in place but the effect is not is 0. Randomness could work if the situation kept changing and eventually hit on the right conditions; but there is no situation or change without time. Only a personal agent can be fully sufficient for its effect but only instantiate it when it chooses to.
On "why not many"?
S1. The issue of explanation has to do with dependence, and an NB cannot depend on anything else. So, we'd need a solid reason to think that actual omnipotence is impossible (not just "not actual", but actually impossible), or else we're stuck with all the candidate NBs being dependent on just one. It is precisely the possibility of omnipotence and the nature of necessity that lead me through the back door into something like an ontological argument in my own thinking.
S2. What does it mean for something to only have sufficient power to cause mental or non-physical things? And, again, NBs must all be non-physical, so the one with the power to cause non-physical things must be their source/explanation/cause. It's very hard to draw these lines without making one supreme. The churches of Christendom have had a similar problem with their many iterations of the Trinity doctrine (fortunately, Jesus made it clear when he called the Father "my God" and said he had a separate will from that of his God but always obeyed Him and owed his existence to Him). Without theology to bind us, we are stuck in conceptual gymnastics trying to avoid the consequence of a final link in the explanatory chain (rather than a final blossom of links at the end of the chain).
P1: but arguably there are non-deterministic scientific explanations, such as those involved in some quantum mechanics events.
P2: I agree it seems kinda crazy to think there are many NBs randomly creating things and they are cancelling each all out. A teleological explanation in terms of a rational NB would be simpler and better.
That said, couldn't we strengthen the argument? For instance:
A) why do our causal powers and actions "override" those of NBs? If NBs cannot create random things at location L because multiple of them are doing the same and cancelling each other out, why can we nevertheless move to L? Why don't we get cancelled out either?
B) Under A theory, one might wonder why NBs maintain contingent things in existence. Under B theory this might not work, but maybe there is another similar chaotic scenario for B theory;
P3) I don't see how, if there is a beginning, the probability that all the necessary and sufficient conditions are in place but the effect is not, is zero. If we are assuming a non-deterministic, "random" First Cause, then at most it has a probability of creating the world, not a deterministic, sufficient causal law. If this indeterministic cause had always existed, then the probabilities would add up and you could say it should've created everything from eternity (and thus the universe should be eternal). But if the First Cause is eternal as in timeless, I don't think the argument is so clear. If there is, timelessly, an indeterministic, random cause, must the effect be present too?
I'm focusing on these issues first.
Atno:
P1: I would say that Swinburne's argument, coupled with my point about the conceptual scheme undergirding causal explanations, counts against such views of QM. Moreover, randomness is not a capacity or a power, so wouldn't that put us right back at a brute fact for the beginning of the explanatory chain (ergo, not really an "explanatory" chain at all)?
P2: As far as I can tell, you are agreeing with me here. And, I'd add that we are either talking about beings with similar powers or beings with categorically different ones. If the latter (as you have suggested with the "mind" vs. "material" NBs), then they couldn't cancel each other out. If the former, then explanation has not reached a terminus at all. We are trying to explain why the contingent states of affairs obtained, and the explanation is in the powers of real things. But, if the end of the chain is at two beings who have equal power of the same sort and can cancel each other out, then we haven't really explained anything.
P3: You are quite right on the temporal case, and that was my point: It would have caused everything from eternity past. The question of timelessness would be an interesting twist, except I think the answer to your last question is "yes". Randomness has to do with which thing it causes; the question of whether it causes would be a simple yes or no, timelessly. So, the world would exist timelessly as well. Indeed, wholly apart from the discussion of NBs in general, I think Brian Leftow is right that, if God is timeless, then we are too.
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