According to Rawlsians, it is wrong to make decisions in the public arena based on controversial comprehensive doctrines.
Here is a counterexample. We meet up with aliens who are incredibly truthful: not only have we never found one to lie, but we have never found one to even accidentally say the false. The aliens inform us that they have figured out whether controversial comprehensive doctrine D is true. We have very good reason to believe the aliens. The aliens inform us of a fanatical plan: Each state has two weeks to submit a statement to the aliens as to whether D is true. Those states that either fail to submit such a statement or who get the answer wrong will be completely destroyed. And then the aliens will leave.
It is obvious that the right thing for the state to do is to do its best to figure out whether D is true, and then on the basis of its best determination make the statement to the aliens. It is clearly wrong to refuse to answer, and it is also clearly wrong to simply guess without basing oneself on one’s best determination of the truth value of the comprehensive doctrine. It is clearly the right thing in this case to make a public decision on the basis of a controversial comprehensive doctrine.
Of course, this is a very special case: a case where what rides on the decision is so important that it trumps most other considerations. But we can lower the amount that rides on the decision and still keep the intuition. Suppose that instead the aliens promise to kill one per thousand people at random if we get the answer wrong. That should, I think, be enough to overcome any qualms we may have about using controversial comprehensive doctrines in public policy. But now there are real-world issues riding on controversial comprehensive doctrines where what is at stake is of a similar or greater magnitude. Abortion is a paradigm case.
12 comments:
Alex
In your example, which decision is made based on controversial comprehensive doctrines?
The decision to figure out whether D is true doesn't seem to be based on a controversial comprehensive doctrine.
It seems to me the decision is simply based on fear. It doesn't even seem to matter what the doctrine in question is.
Now, I do agree that every doctrine should be evaluated thoroughly before accepting or rejecting it. Ideally, fear should not enter the picture at all.
The decision to say "D is true" would be based on the doctrine D, and the decision to say "D is false" would be based on the doctrine not-D.
Alex
That seems viciously circular. The doctrine D exists and is either true or false, but if you base your decision solely on the doctrine, then it cannot be false.
Let's say D is "Thou shalt not kill". Is that true or false? Well , based on the doctrine D, it is clearly true, but then you are saying that D is true because it is a true doctrine.
BTW, I don't see why we have good reason to belive the aliens. They are clearly evil beings, so, what good reason do we have to trust evil beings?
Alex
Walter has a point about the aliens. A bad man might be very good at fooling other people. He is never found by them to have lied, and he can seem to them to be very careful with his words, so that he seems never to say anything false, even accidentally.
Walter:
Regarding circularity, presumably there is a fuller story. Let's say we decide in favor of D. Then it goes like this: "We shall tell the aliens D is true. Why? Because D *is* true. What are our reasons for thinking D is true? Well, here are the best philosophical and religious arguments for D, here are the best ones for not-D, and the ones for D look a little better."
Regarding truthfulness, one of the things we have learned from research on human virtue and vice is that in practice there is a kind of disunity of virtue and vice. It seems not at all surprising, for instance, to have a person who steals from an employer but would never be unfaithful to a spouse, or vice versa. Similarly, a religious fanatic who always honestly says what they think is true but who murders all who disagree with them seems quite easily imaginable. And in the case of aliens, we can have even more disunity. But if we want, we can also imagine that we've made contact with other alien races whose planets have been devastated by these aliens, and they testify that these aliens are indeed telling the truth---and indeed *are* right about the comprehensive doctrines they ask about. (Maybe they ask each planet they victimize about a different doctrine. Afterwards, the denizens of these planets look at which states survive and which are destroyed, and after much philosophical study they conclude that the evil aliens were in fact right about the comprehensive doctrine.)
Alex
"We shall tell the aliens D is true. Why? Because D *is* true. What are our reasons for thinking D is true? Well, here are the best philosophical and religious arguments for D, here are the best ones for not-D, and the ones for D look a little better."
Sure, but that's not the same as basing the decision to say "D is true "on D. The decision to say D is true is based on an assessment of D using the best arguments.
The point is, and I think Rawls would agree, that once you have figured out, by using the best arguments, that D is true, it is no longer a controversial doctrine.
If the arguments for not-D merely "look a little better", it would still be a controversial doctrine, because the chances of it being truye are only a little higher than the chances it is false. And in the case of the aliens, it still comes down to a guess, only your chancves of survival are a bit better.
But the actual decision to answer the aliens' question, is still simply fear. It has nothing to do with actually making a public decision based on a controversial doctrine.
But if the state is permitted to make decisions based on its best argument-informed guess about a controversial comprehensive doctrine D here, why shouldn't the state be permitted to make decisions based on its best argument-informed guess about controversial comprehensive doctrines in other cases where lives are potentially at stake, such as the case of abortion?
Maybe your point here is something that does worry me a bit, which is what counts as basing an action on a comprehensive doctrine.
Suppose I falsely believe that all and only dogs should be worshiped. Consider now two different courses of action based on this comprehensive controversial doctrine:
1. Saying that all and only dogs should be worshiped
2. Worshiping dogs.
I can feel the pull of the idea that 2 is based on the doctrine in a way in which 1 isn't. After all, the doctrine doesn't tell you that you should spread the doctrine. It only tells you that we should worship precisely dogs.
So, one could have a narrow view on which:
(*) To act on a comprehensive doctrine D is to do something that D says is to be done or to refrain from doing something that D says is to be refrained from because D says so.
But this seems too narrow to capture the Rawlsian idea. Suppose D says that dogs are gods. Then worshiping dogs is clearly acting on D, even though D doesn't say that dogs are to be worshiped. (Rather, that dogs are to be worshiped follows from D and the fairly uncontroversial doctrine that if there are any gods, they should be worshiped.) It seems to me that the story should instead be something like:
(**) To act on a comprehensive doctrine D is to act in a way the justification of which action depends on one's acceptance of D.
And then both 1 and 2 count as acting on the doctrine that all and only dogs are to be worshiped, and saying that a doctrine is true counts as acting on that doctrine.
Note, too, that if saying that a doctrine is true doesn't count as acting on that doctrine, then a state could teach a particular religion without violating Rawlsian constraints.
But as often, I must disclaim that I am not not a political philosopher.
Alex
Basing a decision on arguments for or against something is not the same as basing a decision on a controversial doctrine. In fact, it is quite the opposite.
So, a state (that is the people of the state) decides for or against abortion based on weighing the arguments for or against it.
Saying a doctrine is true counts as acting of the doctrine iff it is based on a conviction that the doctrine is true. It does not count as acting on the doctrine if saying it's true is based on fear. Saying, e.g. that the doctrine of the Trinity is true is only acting on that doctrine if you are really convinced that the doctrine is true, not if the claim is based on fear of being called a heretic (or worse). If someone threatens to kill your entire family unless you declare that Zeus is great, then your declaration does not count as acting on the doctrine that Zeus is great.
A belief in a comprehensive doctrine can be, and often is, based on arguments. So, in that case, one has a two step thing: the action is based on the doctrine (or in belief in the doctrine) and the belief in the doctrine is based on the arguments.
Alex
The main difference between a decison based on arguments and a decision based on doctrine is that a doctrine is static and can only serve as a basis for decisions if it is not controversial.
If, on the other hand, the decision is based on arguments and not on doctrine, it can be altered if necessary, e.g. when new arguments show that it wasn't such a good decision after all. The problem with doctrines is, that doctrines do not allow for this kind of flexibility.
They close the door on further arguments. That's what I mean when I say basing a decision on a (controversial) doctrine is the opposite of basing a decision on ar arguments.
Of course, I am not a political philosopher either, so this is only my two cents.
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