Necessarily, if it is necessary that there is no God, then modal reality is bad. (Making the existence of God impossible is terrible!)
Necessarily, if something is bad, it is possible for it not to be bad. (The bad is a flaw in something that ought to be better than it is, and what ought to be can be.)
So, if modal reality is necessarily bad, then it is possible for modal reality not to be bad. (by 2)
So, if modal reality is necessarily bad, then modal reality is not necessarily bad. (by 3)
So, modal reality is not necessarily bad. (by 4)
So, possibly, modal reality is not bad. (by 5)
So, possibly, it is not necessary that there is no God. (by 1 and 6)
So, possibly, it is possible that God exists. (by 7)
So, it is possible that God exists. (by 8 and S4)
Necessarily, if God exists, it is necessary that God exists. (God is a necessary being and essentially divine.)
So, it is possible that it is necessary that God exists. (by 9 and 10)
So, God exists. (by 11 and Brouwer)
Thursday, September 16, 2021
An ontological argument from the possible nondefectiveness of modality
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28 comments:
But what if something is essentially bad? Then (2) would be false of that thing. But then, maybe naturalists can say (1) should actually be written as: Necessarily, if it is necessary that God does not exist, then modal reality is *essentially/necessarily* bad.
But then (2) would simply be false with respect to modal reality.
1 is wrong. It protect us from a wicked god.
And it is possible that god doesn't exist, so by s5 it doesn't.
2 is also wrong, as nature doesn't seems to care whatever something is "bad" for us, it is what it is, like 2+3 = 5 not 4 regardless of it could have been otherwise.
I do not want to agree with Mr Swaggerswaggmann, but surely 1 is wrong?
Suppose we begin from a position of knowing that, for all we know, God may or may not exist. And also that if She exists, then Her existence might be necessary in some other sense. Can we not also assume that if She does not exist, then Her nonexistence might be necessary in that other sense? That is, it may well be (for all we know to begin with) that it is necessary that there is no God.
The necessity of model reality being bad in that case has not, so far as I can see, been shown. You say parenthetically that it is terrible to make the existence of God impossible, but I have not made the existence of God impossible, have I? Rather, I have acknowledged that it is possible, for all I know for sure.
If it so happens that there is no God, then that would be bad, given that I want there to be a God. But would it much worse than that, if it also happened to be the case that, there being no God, but something else (at a basic metaphysical level), that something else existed of necessity (in that other sense)?
1. An evil god is not God.
2. In ontological arguments, the necessity and possibility are ontological, not epistemic.
It feels like this argument can be seriously shortened and there are good reasons for the Atheists to dismiss it.
One immediate flaw is the following: The Atheist need not accept P1 if they accept P2. P2 relies on an "Ought Implies Can" principle. But we need to notice that if we contrapose the principle we get that "If P cannot happen, then P ought not happen". But atheists already think God is impossible! Most, atleast. So the Atheist could just dismiss the argument this way - namely, by rejecting P1 WITH the ought implies can principle!
And again, it feels like this argument can be shortened down to 5 or less premises. Premise 1 translates to "God ought be possible", and premise 2 incorporates the same Ought implies Can principle. So, we get that God is possibly possible. This with S4 and B immediately gives that God exists.
Also, it seems like any reasons for thinking God ought be possible are mutatis mutandis reasons to think God ought be actual. The argument no longer needs S4 in that case and it's no different than Vallicella's argument.
1 no true scotsman
2 sadly I argue using reality, not unsupported assertions, you should try one day.
Dr. Pruss,
Just to clarify, I am not claiming that God is essentially evil: I am claiming that (2) is false of essentially bad things, and the atheist would likely posit that modal reality is just an essentially bad thing.
Hyku:
This seems dangerously close to objecting to the argument on the grounds of its being valid. Every valid argument has the property that the conjunction of its premises entails its conclusion, and hence the denial of its conclusion entails the negation of the conjunction of the premises.
Ibrahim (if I may):
The argument does presuppose a particular theory of badness, that badness is a falling short or a kind of failure.
If a pretty-cool-but-imperfect god necessarily existed, but no perfect God necessarily existed, then it seems that modal reality wouldn't be bad, but it wouldn't be all that good either.
Alex (if I also may :-) ):
That's fair. I think, then, this is actually a convincing argument that such theories of badness might plausibly entail that modal reality cannot be such that God's existence is necessarily impossible.
AS:
(2) would probably still apply to such a modal reality with a flawed god; 'bad' here is not an absolute term, it indicates an absence or privation of what ought to be. Such a god would still be considered 'bad'.
Think about it like this. If "(The bad is a flaw in something that ought to be better than it is, and what ought to be can be.)", this description will still apply to the pretty-cool-but-imperfect god.
No true Scotsman doesn't apply, God would be good if he is perfectly self-sufficient and doesn't need anything to be what he is. Badness in God would be lack of something intrinsic, thus making him deficient and thus not God.
Note that this formulation has nothing to do with morality or the from it following Problem of Evil.
Thus 1 can be rescued.
In disputing 2 you're applying an equivocation on the term "good". At the most primitive it's how a particular thing should be, it has nothing to do with "good for us". A perfectly good lion would still eat us. An imperfect lion who is a vegan can be made perfectly good when making him eat meat again, even if it's ours. And this is compatible with premise 2
Reflections upon the nature of necessary existence reveal that not any old thing can be necessary though? This thought experiment needs hefty support to even be considered
@Dominik, Could you now answer some of the questions about indeterminism I made a few weeks ago under Feser's comments, but which you weren't able to get to? Here:
Is indeterminism (as distinct from free choices) only about events, or can it also be applied to the way things perform their acts through their own causal powers?
I'm reminded of Alex Pruss' example of an indeterministic die that lands on any number indeterministically - the landing isn't just an event, rather the die has the ability to land on any of its numbers, and the landing is in a sense caused by the die as well in some way, insofar as the landing proceeds from the die itself, and presumably the way you throw it doesn't affect the result.
What would be the nature of causality for indeterministic acts like that?
And could you also explain how the explanans still entails the explanandum in indeterministic causation / events? I thought indeterminism is by definition the opposite of that.
Also, do you have any literature on the metaphysics of indeterminism in general to recommend? It seems scarce - the only thing I found after asking Pruss is Elizabeth Anscombe's paper on causality where she briefly states that causality needn't be deterministic, but she doesn't make any arguments in favor of it or describes the way it works in detial.
...
While there are some quantum events that are indeterminate with regards to when a certain thing will be done, others are about what action a particle will take - IIRC electrons can go either up or down, and which direction they go at any particular point is what's indeterminate; photons also have the ability to either go through an polarised film or not go through it, and whether they go through it is what's indeterminiate.
Would these things also be defined as temporal indeterminism, or is there another name for those?
Also, I wonder if this would apply to indeterministic dies - the amount of possible results that the die can show is 6, so it isn't just one but multiple results which can happen indeterminately.
No true scotsman apply, god is good for himself while being bad for us.
Not my fault if you only select a god you definite as good for you as God. I do not special plead here. Goodness is the lack of badness...
1 is then lost.
You just showed how a perfect god can be bad, good job destroying 2 an 1, notice ,how you didn't actually responded to my first argument with an exemple (like 2+3 = 5 not 4 regardless of it could have been otherwise) who doesn't talk about absolute goodness
So a modal that allows a god can be better by disallowing it, 2 refuted.
Hello Wesley,
Sorry for giving no response, I think I am able to do it now.
First of all the objections have pushed me back to the drawing board. If I remember correctly my claim was that there's a difference in between agency and mere indeterminate causation detectable in terms of the number of powers that are possible to be exercised. While I still believe this is true, I am not able to give a principled distinction as to which number qualifies for agency.
Still though there was a point to be made, I remember Kenneth Pearce arguing that physicalist causation, indeterminate or not, had the explanans entailing the explanandum. I have to revisit his paper to see how he formulates the argument, but we can at least see this entailment in terms of the kinds of things that exist (e.g. a specific field entailing a specific kind of particle), but without further development this isn't a problem.
Now to your questions.
Is indeterminism (as distinct from free choices) only about events, or can it also be applied to the way things perform their acts through their own causal powers?
From my perspective I would say that the event itself is very much determined, at least it's content. The indeterminancy is within the substance, namely in its possible actuation of a certain power alongside an uncertainty about when it's going to happen.
What would be the nature of causality for indeterministic acts like that?
Presumably a non-entailing one. Rasmussen talked about prior requirements in that context. The die will not be affected by the way thrown, but it's certainly needed that it is thrown at all. This is pretty much the issue I'm concerned with, how to formulate a way to differentiate mere indeterminacy from agency. Perhaps the difference is that in the latter there really can't be any probability or intelligible use of possible worlds?
For literature: "Getting Causes from Powers" by Stephen Mumford
Would these things also be defined as temporal indeterminism, or is there another name for those?
I think they're indeterminism in regards to the actualization of powers. They differ from decay of an atom
No true scotsman apply, god is good for himself while being bad for us.
Not my fault if you only select a god you definite as good for you as God. I do not special plead here. Goodness is the lack of badness...
1 is then lost.
You're making a subjective point about goodness however, I make an argument from an objective axiological account of goodness. 1 is thus not lost. God being perfect in himself while permitting evil doesn't entail that he is bad for us. It just means that a) he didn't inflict the badness upon us (the distinction by Brian Davies between evil suffered and evil done applies here) and b) that he didn't do evil since he wasn't obligated to prevent it in the first place.
A lion eating a human isn't a bad lion. He's a good lion, flourishing through the act of eating. God is perfect since he doesn't need anything beyond himself to fully actualize his nature/flourish.
So 1) is safe. You could make your objetions to people like Alvin Plantinga however.
You just showed how a perfect god can be bad, good job destroying 2 an 1, notice ,how you didn't actually responded to my first argument with an exemple (like 2+3 = 5 not 4 regardless of it could have been otherwise) who doesn't talk about absolute goodness
So a modal that allows a god can be better by disallowing it, 2 refuted.
Because there is nothing to respond. Not only is the example preposterous, being obviously absolutely impossible, it also has no bearing on the discussion, nor anything to do with goodness. Frankly, I have no idea what it is supposed to show.
And again, perfect goodness is in terms of axiology. It could also be understood as a grounding of normativity. To use David Bentley Hart's example, God can be said to be good for us, because he grounds the final causes to which we are directed in order to perfect our natures and ourselves. Only if God were to prevent this, e.g. through actively inflicting unjust harm or through preventing us from becoming fulfilled could he intelligibly be called evil.
You seem to make a subjective account of badness, which I reject and on which the argument isn't dependent upon. Thus unless you give other reasons for rejecting it, premise 2 is safe as well.
@Dominik,
1) About the difference between agency and mere indeterminate causation, I think what I laid out in the comments of this post about the possible metaphysical principles behind indeterminism might be helpful: http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2019/01/can-free-will-be-grounded-in-quantum.html?showComment=1631390707193
Basically, if the main reason why our free will is free is because our intellect is only necessarily attracted to universals which include particulars in them so any attraction to particulars can't be necessitating, and our will can only be necessarily satisfied by what is infinitely good, then similar principles may be behind physical indeterminacy.
The basic principle is having your specific effects under a more general / greater principle of unity - and for purely physical things this can be as simple as only having a general final cause, which includes particular ways of fulfilling it, so the particular direction an electron moves, the number a die shows, and the moment an electron spits out a photon are all indeterminate, as only something which fulfills the general purposes of "Moving either up or down", "Shooting a photon in the next 10 seconds" and "Showing a number between 1 and 6" could necessitate them.
And when I think about this more it seems a bit clunky, since there most likely isn't anything concrete that could be the fulfillment of these general final causes - nothing satisfies moving either up or down for the electron, for example. Except perhaps motion itself, so the electron is determined to move, but the particular direction isn't determined. Another question would be how exactly those general causes unify their particular solutions (up, down, photon-shot-at-the-5th-second, showing 3, etc.) into the umbrella of their generality.
But it seems this might work in some way - a cause is indeterminate because it possesses its effects in a more unified way. If so, one could view this as a basic metaphysical causative principle, like self-motion. And the higher you go up the chain of being, the more perfect that principle becomes - and since we are living beings who can immaterially possess the forms of things, our indeterminacy is likely of a higher ontological category than that of quantum particles. Kinda like the self-motion of living things is more perfect and of a higher category than that of non-living substances - the same general principle, but higher.
So agency is more perfect than physical indeterminacy because it possesses its ends in a more united way - living things in general have more unity than merely physical substances. This also touches on the idea that agency is categorically different because it has more possible effects - as living beings we consciously interact with the world and keep information about it in a way that non-living things can't, and our ends are more general and so of a much wider scope than physical susbtances; but even if you had a die with a million sides, and each side produced an additional effect unique to it, there would still be the important difference that we possess our effects in a more perfect way by being aware of them and even possessing them immaterially in our intellects.
What do you think of that model? I asked Alex Pruss what he thought of it, and he said it sounds fairly plausible, at least after the first reading of it.
@Dominik,
2) Do you have a link to Kenneth Pearce's paper? Sounds interesting; I'd like to see his explanation of how physical indeterminism is still entailing, but agency isn't.
3) You say, " I would say that the event itself is very much determined, at least it's content. The indeterminancy is within the substance, namely in its possible actuation of a certain power alongside an uncertainty about when it's going to happen."
Can you explain this a bit more, if you don't mind? How would free will in that case have undetermined content as well as having undetermined actualisation of its choices?
4) You say, "Presumably a non-entailing one." and "Perhaps the difference is that in the latter there really can't be any probability or intelligible use of possible worlds?"
Well, this gets into some other questions I've asked. Basically, indeterminism in general means that the causation is non-entailing. However, does this also imply that it's necessarily non-contrastive? For example, we sometimes make choices where we prefer one option over the other, so there seems to be a contrastive element there, yet we'd still say it's a free choice - I think Aquinas' account of the intellect/will only being determined towards the universal/infinite good, which means that the attraction and strength of choice for anything contingent can't be of a necessary nature and is finite and so non-entailing, is a good way of explaining this intuition. But this would then be different from saying that all indeterminism is necessarily non-contrastive.
So you can have non-entailing causation along with contrastivity in principle - so what about non-contrastive indeterminism? Do we use the same principle as before to explain how it's possible, along with some other principles to explain how non-contrastive acts are also possible as well - say, for Buridan's Ass decisions? I'd be interesting in what Pruss would say about this.
As for free will not having probability or possible-world distribution, I don't think that's necessary. We can easily imagine people preferring something such that they always choose that thing over another, no matter what situation they are in or how many times it's replayed, which would imply something roughly like probability - maybe not quantitative probability since higher thing such as qualities aren't quantities, but greater or lesser tendencies nonetheless.
Subjective? Young child, i simply assume he want to avoid sufferings, like making a perfect lion. Vegan as then no pain for anyone. If I were god I wouldn't let drow your child and send it a wire to save him, but a God that would let your child drown is perfection in your mind.. Something a man would be jailed to. Sad. Disgusting. Theist. Dominiki. 1 is lost.
Good to see that you are actually god, defining what is possible or not. Now please, go to wiki and complete wiki about mathematical conjectures, riemann true or false ? Now that you simply asserted, I simply reject your assertion. 2 is lost. See the peoples dying by drought, according to david god is evil, or impotent.
Your axioms seems to clash with common sense, anyone with empathy reject them. Knowingly or not.
Subjective? Young child, i simply assume he want to avoid sufferings, like making a perfect lion. Vegan as then no pain for anyone. If I were god I wouldn't let drow your child and send it a wire to save him, but a God that would let your child drown is perfection in your mind.. Something a man would be jailed to. Sad. Disgusting. Theist. Dominiki. 1 is lost.
This is the exact problem. You say that "if you were God", perfectly representing that what I am decrying, namely an uncalled for anthropomorphic version of God. God is no human, he has pretty much nothing in common with us. But yet you want to assign human obligations to him, just showing that you completely miss the mark and don't take into consideration how I defend the premise. Thus 1 isn't even touched by your argument.
Good to see that you are actually god, defining what is possible or not. Now please, go to wiki and complete wiki about mathematical conjectures, riemann true or false ? Now that you simply asserted, I simply reject your assertion. 2 is lost. See the peoples dying by drought, according to david god is evil, or impotent.
Your axioms seems to clash with common sense, anyone with empathy reject them. Knowingly or not.
Same problem here, hence I won't repeat myself any further. And the mathematical point doesn't apply, I have merely said that metaphysically, if "2", "3" or "5" designate something real and aren't merely symbols that can be changed in their reference, then it's absolutely impossible that an addition of 2 and 3 necessarily is 5. Everything else is sophistry and not worthy of discussion
Ok, I will let you with you sick ""god"", sadly as an atheist i have better opinions about him that you, you worship a demon. 1 is again lost, except perhaps for a satanist.
It is absolutely impossible for 2 and 3 to be 5 ? Lol.
"Every thing I don't like is sophistry!1!!!" Peak theism.
Again, please solve all maths problems, as you seems to know what is possible or not.
@Dominik,
So what do you think of my above two comments / questions?
@swaggerswaggmann
How has someone with as little depth into these discussions found his way on to this blog? I didn't think trolls went to intellectual blogs which presuppose a certain degree on competency in the fields detailed.
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