Friday, March 25, 2022

Requests and naturalism

If someone asks me to ϕ, typically that informs me that they want me to ϕ. But the normative effect of the request cannot be reduced to the normative effect of learning about the requester’s desires.

First, when you request that I ϕ, you also consent to my ϕ, and hence the request has the normative effects of consent. But one can want something done without consenting to it. For instance, if I have a lot of things on my plate, I might desire that a student give me their major paper late so that I don’t have to start grading yet, but that desire is very different in normative consequences from my agreeing to the lateness of the paper, much less my requesting that it be late.

Second, considerate people often have desires that they do not wish to impose on others. A request creates a special kind of moral reason, and hence imposes in a way that merely learning of a desire does not.

Moreover, we cannot understand requests apart from these moral normative effects. A request seems to be in part or whole defined as the kind of speech act that typically has such normative effects: the creating of a permission and of a reason. Moreover, that reason is a sui generis one: it is a reason-of-request, rather than a reason-of-desire, a reason-of-need, etc.

There is something rather impressive in this creation of reasons. A complete stranger has the power to come up to me and make me have a new moral reason just by asking a question, since a question is in part a request for an answer (and in part the creation of a context for the speech acts that would be constitute the answer). Typically, this reason is not conclusive, but it is still a real moral reason that imposes on me.

Consider the first time anybody ever requested anything. In requesting, they exercised their power to create a moral reason for their interlocutor. This was a power they already had, and the meaningfulness of the speech act of requesting must have already been in place. How? How could that speech act have already been defined, already understandable? The speech act was largely defined by the kinds of reasons it gives rise to. But the kinds of reasons it gave rise to were ones that had never previously existed! For before the first request there were no reasons-of-request. So the speech act had a meaningfulness without anybody ever having encountered the kinds of reasons that came from it.

This is deeply mysterious. It suggests an innate power of the human nature, a power to request and thereby create reasons. This power seems hard to reconcile with naturalism, though I do not have any knock-down argument here.

35 comments:

Walter Van den Acker said...

Alex

How many grains of sand does it take before it is a heap of sand?

Likewise, when exactly did some speech act become a request?
It seems that "the first time anybody ever requested anything" is not so easy to define. it is similar to "the first time we call a collections of grains a heap".

IanS said...

Consider the first time anybody ever requested anything.”

Chicks in the nest open their beaks and squawk. Their parents feed them. Anthropomorphizing, we say that the chicks ‘ask’ for food and that the parents ‘give’ it. But really, it’s instinct on both sides.

Clearly, the chicks are not ‘requesting’ in the sense of the post. But what precisely is this sense? Speech is not necessary – gestures will do. My suggestion: the act must be consciously intended as a request, with the expectation that it will be consciously read as one.

How could this first have happened? Given consciousness and a ‘theory of mind’ (in the psychologists’ sense) I don’t see that this is necessarily a puzzle. You could make up a just-so story along these lines: some of our ancestors noticed their own and others’ ‘instinctive’ requests (and the resulting instinctive responses) and adapted them into conventional signals.

The puzzle I see for naturalism is the beginning of consciousness itself. On the one hand, it feels all-or-nothing. On the other, it must (on a naturalist view) have evolved.

Alexander R Pruss said...

Ian:

My interest is on the normative side: generating the two distinctive normative consequences of a request--moral consent and a defeasible moral reason to perform the requested action. So it's clear that chicks don't do that because adult birds do not have moral reasons.

Now, on to your suggestion. To consciously intend something as a request, one must have a prir concept of a request. But where would one get the concept of a request if one had never run across requests before? One could have a concept of a request-lite, the kind of things chicks do. But a request-lite does not have the normative effects of a request. (Perhaps the clearest part here is that request-lite does not constitute valid consent. Human infants engage in requesting-lite, but nothing they do constitutes valid consent for anything.)

Walter Van den Acker said...

A 'request lite' becomes a real request once a collection of grains becomes a heap.

Alexander R Pruss said...

There is a radical difference in kind between the normative and the non-normative. So there should be a fact of the matter when some of that normativity appears.

Michael Gonzalez said...

Pruss:

I love this line of thinking. As you know, I think there is untapped potential in discussions of language, concepts, meaning, normativity, etc. vis-a-vis the existence of God. After all, the theist seems to have a ready answer to your question. The first person to request anything from a human may well have been God.

I think concepts in general are normative, but this specific one of "requesting" is very interesting indeed.

Walter Van den Acker said...

Is there a radical difference?
That is the question. I don't think a naturalist will agree there is one.

Michael Gonzalez said...

Walter:

I've been researching the origins of language rather heavily lately. Now, this is not a direct answer to your question, but I can at least say that many naturalists do indeed acknowledge a categorical difference between language and non-language (Steven Pinker, Ray Tallis, even Chomsky and his ilk). It is not merely a matter of degree. And normativity does sometimes come up (though it often comes up in really bizarre responses to Wittgenstein and Kripke on the philosophical side of things.... don't get me started!). I think the difference between normative and non-normative is has a very strong apparent difference, which would put the burden on the naturalist to first show that that appearance is mistaken.

Walter Van den Acker said...

Michael

There are several naturalistic theories that account for the (apparent) difference between the normative and the non-normative.
Besides, I am not claiming there is no difference, I am questioning whether the difference is radical.

Michael Gonzalez said...

Walter,

Could you please point me toward a naturalistic account of how the norms come to be? I'm genuinely interested in this, as it is my current research project.

Thanks!

Walter Van den Acker said...

Michael

There are several forms of normative ethics, as not everybody uses "norms" in the same way.
I don't know whether you are familiar with the works of John Dewey or Philippa Foot, but that seems a good starting point.

Michael Gonzalez said...

But, Walter, I don't think we're talking about ethics.... I was talking about normative conceptual usage/meaning.

Walter Van den Acker said...

Michael

Ethical norms are norms. Naturalist accounts of how ethical norms arise also apply to other norms.

Michael Gonzalez said...

Walter,

That seems a bit too quick. If, for example, the story of the origin of ethical norms involves an existing community of competent language users, then there won't be such a story for origin of conceptual norms, since these are prerequisites for competent language use (even in the most primitive languages).

Walter Van den Acker said...

Michael

The story of ethical norms does not necessarily involve an
existing community of competent language users.

Michael Gonzalez said...

Walter,

I didn't say it necessarily did. I was giving an example to show that your inference from "an account for these norms works" to "it will work for these other norms as well" is clearly flawed. It doesn't mean that's never true, but it does show that there's no such general rule.

Walter Van den Acker said...

Are there naturalistic accounts for the Origin of norms? Yes.
Do they all involve an existing community of competent language users? No.

I see no reason to think that other norms are so radically different from ethical norms that account for those norms wouldn't work.








Michael Gonzalez said...

I gave an example of where there would be a radical difference. Any account of ethical norms which presupposed the existence of a community of minds would be totally unhelpful to the kind of case Pruss and I are talking about. There really would be a radical difference. So, it is too quick to infer from merely "this sort of account works for this kind of norm" to "a similar account will work for any norms". My example shows that much more may need to be said, depending on the candidate account.

But, since we're discussing this particular comparison: Can you think of an account of ethical norms which doesn't presuppose a community of minds?

Walter Van den Acker said...

Michael

A community of minds is not the same as an existing community of competent language users.
Moreover, ethical norms like e.g. 'You shall not torture an infant for Fun do not require a community of mind.

Michael Gonzalez said...

Walter,

It would take us far afield, but I would argue that that's exactly what a community of minds is. In any case, just consider my own use of "minds" as shorthand.

There is a genuine question of the grounding for even such ethical norms as the one you mentioned. I agree that they don't require a community of minds, but only because I'm aware of a transcendent normative authority (God). I'm asking you for a naturalistic account of the normativity of ethical propositions (not just examples of propositions that we agree are normative and the bare assertion that they are). And it needs to be one that doesn't presume the existence of a community of minds. And even if you can give one, will it be an account such that something even remotely similar will work for the normativity of the concepts and linguistic frameworks themselves? I don't find this likely at all, but I'm open to being corrected.

Walter Van den Acker said...

Michael

Thé truth of 'You shall not torture an infant for fun' doesn't depend on God, it only depends on the possible existence of infants and potential torturers. Even God cannot torture infants for fun. He does torture and kill thousands of infants each day, but as long as it's not for fun, it doesn't count.
Let me also remind you that Alex is explicitly talking of moral norms.

Michael Gonzalez said...

Walter,

There are a great many moral philosophers who would disagree that you can have "you shall not" type statements without a sufficient authority, but there's no need for us to go down that rabbit hole. And if you don't have an answer for either of my questions, then that's fine, regardless of what Pruss was originally talking about. You and I have been having a discussion, and I've requested information. If you don't have it or don't want to bother, that's perfectly fine.

Walter Van den Acker said...

Michael

There is no possible authoriy for 'You shall not'. Moral (and other) norms follow from (necessary) truths about the beings Involved, in our case, human beings.
If you want a more elaborate answer, that is too complex for this blogpost. I suggest you read thé relevant literature on the subject, but if you start from the concept of An absolute authority, you won't find the naturalistic answers satisfactory

Michael Gonzalez said...

1) Just because something is necessary doesn't mean it isn't derivative on something else.

2) You can say moral duties are necessary truths if you want, but they are clearly not analytic (it is not contradictory of even incoherent to deny them or even be a moral nihilist). So some account has to be given.

3) The very concept of duty is tied up with the idea of authority, and it is by no means obvious that this is an exception. The candidate authority would need to exist necessarily, but that's already believed about God on separate grounds.

I have read quite a bit on this matter and continue to research it. But my question to you was about conceptual norms. If that's not something you want to engage with, just say that, please. There's no need to dive into this other matter of moral duties.

Walter Van den Acker said...

Michael

1) I have explained why 'You can't X' cannot be derivative.
2) 'God exists' is not an analytic truth either.
3) There cannot be an absolute authority. Nothing about what God thinks has any absolute authority. A morality based on authority is worthless.

A conceptional norm is a moral norm.

Michael Gonzalez said...

Walter,

1) No you haven't. You said it followed from necessary truths, but necessary truths can also be derivative.
2) I didn't say it was (though it may be, if certain forms of the ontological argument are right).
3) If the very concept of duty is tied to the concept of authority, then either an absolute authority can indeed work (and you are just mistaken), or else we have no moral duties. Besides, I never said the authority comes from what God thinks. What God thinks would necessarily be correct, but the authority could come from our complete dependence and indebtedness, from His always knowing best, from His holding our eternal accountability in His hands, or various other factors (or combinations of such factors). You are dismissing centuries of work without any argument.

No it isn't. Not necessarily. If I am using a concept incorrectly, that isn't necessarily a moral evil.

Walter Van den Acker said...

Michael

Something or somebody can only have authority over me if I consent. So, no authority can be absolute. God can only 'know best' if there is (necessarily) something to know best, that is He van only 'know best' that 'You can't do X' if that is a non-derivative necessary truth, like, e.g. 1+1 is 2.

Using a concept incorrectly is not what Alex is talking about here. Using your definition, 1+1is 2 is also a norm, but what accounts for such norms is a mystery on supernaturalism too.
.

Michael Gonzalez said...

Walter,

Your first statement is patently false on most moral theories, and would put an immediate end to governmental authority over criminals. The "knows best" can be a prudential matter, but even if it's moral it would still be the only way to transform a mere value (which is what He knows best how to maximize) into a duty (which a value does not automatically become, as can be seen by many easy examples).

1+1=2 cannot be coherently denied. A request can be (and, indeed, often is). But, where did we get the concept that requests (which produce a reason for acting and a consent to being acted upon) even exist? There is a genuine question of where such concepts come from, and how anyone could have used them the first time.

Walter Van den Acker said...

Michael

As long as you believe moral norms are duties, you will never understand any naturalist account of norms.

Governments have no absolute authority over criminals. If a criminal doesn't Care about Being published, what does authority even mean to him? Authority works as a social contract, which implies consent.
We get thé concept of requests like we get all other concepts, namely from experience and trial and error. There is nothing mysterious about that.

Walter Van den Acker said...

I meant 'punished', obviously.

Michael Gonzalez said...

I got your meaning. If a government can take life and liberty, it has authority. One doesn't have to care about the punishment or accept the authority.

Your highly dismissive ideas about concepts notwithstanding, there's way too much literature on this that's actually substantive for me to just blow it off as you do.

Walter Van den Acker said...

Michael

A government can take life and liberty because the people grant it this authority as a kind of a social contract. For someone that doesn't care about punishment, authority means nothing.
The bottom line is, nothing or nobody simply has authority and absolute authority is impossible. Authority is necessarily conditional.

There is nothing dismissive about my ideas. You cannot expect me to give a naturalistic account based on what you believe about norms and concepts. If you are truly interested, you should be open to other definitions.

Now I am going to bow out. thank you for the interesting discussion.

Michael Gonzalez said...

There are at least two non-sequitors in your reasoning about authority (it doesn't follow from "people" grant X authority that an individual "someone" can elect not to be under that authority, and it doesn't follow from not caring about the consequences that you weren't properly under the authority).

I'm wide open to other definitions, but not to equivocation. If what I (or Pruss) am asking about is not what you're answering then it doesn't matter that we could have asked about what you want to talk about instead.

Michael Gonzalez said...

Dr. Pruss:

I have just begun reading a book called "Origins of Human Communication", by Michael Tomasello, and I thought I should mention it to you, as the author takes on issues like the natural gestures (e.g. pointing) as well as this matter of requesting. I'm not very far into it yet, so I don't know how plausible his overall analysis will be; but I was struck by how early and how directly he started talking about these matters, and it reminded me of this blog post.

Michael Gonzalez said...

Pruss:

As an example from the very first chapter, he says: "Thus, when a whimpering chimpanzee child is searching for her mother, it is almost certain that all of the other chimpanzees in the immediate area know this. But if some nearby female knows where the mother is, she will not tell the searching child, even though she is perfectly capable of extending her arm in a kind of pointing gesture. She will not tell the child because her communicative motives simply do not include informing others of things helpfully. In contrast, human communicative motives are so fundamentally cooperative that not only do we inform others of things helpfully, but one of the major ways we request things from others is simply to make our desire known in the expectation that they will volunteer help. Thus, I may request a drink of water by simply stating that I want one (informing you of my desire), knowing that, in most instances, your tendency to be helpful (and our mutual knowledge of this) turns this act of informing into what is effectively a full-blown request."