Here's a theory: a material thing is something that has or is a causal power that is not a mental causal power. Variant: that is not a rational causal power.
I think it would be very hard to reach a wide consensus on that definition. Anybody who was a physicalist but not an epiphenomenalist would likely disagree with that definition.
I would think it would be possible for an immaterial being to have effects by virtue of that being’s beauty, and that the causal power in such cases would neither be a mental causal power nor a rational causal power. At the very least, the causal power in question would not be linked to a specific intention had by the immaterial being.
Yeah, it might turn out that, (A) necessarily every beauty had by immaterial beings is a mental beauty. That doesn’t sound like a logical necessity to me, but I could be wrong. Does it follow from (A) that (B) necessarily every causal power exercised by virtue of a mental beauty is a mental causal power. ?
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I think it would be very hard to reach a wide consensus on that definition. Anybody who was a physicalist but not an epiphenomenalist would likely disagree with that definition.
Sure, but I'm not looking here for a consensus, but the truth. :-) It's notoriously hard to come up with an account of matter.
I would think it would be possible for an immaterial being to have effects by virtue of that being’s beauty, and that the causal power in such cases would neither be a mental causal power nor a rational causal power. At the very least, the causal power in question would not be linked to a specific intention had by the immaterial being.
Maybe it could only be a mental beauty?
Yeah, it might turn out that,
(A) necessarily every beauty had by immaterial beings is a mental beauty.
That doesn’t sound like a logical necessity to me, but I could be wrong.
Does it follow from (A) that
(B) necessarily every causal power exercised by virtue of a mental beauty is a mental causal power.
?
Maybe.
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