P1 seems to beg the question, no? If materialism (which I'm taking to mean "objects have no parts in addition to their material/atomic parts") is true, then P1 would be like saying "a typical human being has much more intrinsic value than any human-sized object"....
I think materialism is false, and I’m not sure what to think about premise 1. What kind of value does my body (the arrangement of atoms) have on a hylomorphic view? Does it mainly have instrumental value? In general, if W is a whole with intrinsic value, do its parts (the xs) mainly have instrumental value, since they are for the sake of W? Or does the intrinsic value of the whole bleed into all of the parts?
Is this supposed to be a Denying the consequent [(X→Y∧¬Y) ⇒ ¬X] argument? Then where is the premise with ¬Y - a typical human being is not an 80 kg arrangement of atoms?!?
Otherwise from materialism doesn't follow a typical human being necessarily an 80 kg arrangement of atoms. But from humans being an arrangement of any amount of atoms follows, that materialism must be necessarily true. So if any human is an arrangement of atoms (- yes, even little or small humans not weighing typically 80 kg), then materialism must be necessarily true.
On reflection, it is easy enough to get around my worry just by eliminating the word ‘much’ from the first premise. I think the argument would go through just as well. But I’m still puzzled about how to think of intrinsic value in parts.
Unless otherwise specified, or contextually required, "if ... then ..." in my arguments is a material conditional. No claim is made that it *follows* from materialism that a human is an 80 kg arrangement of atoms.
Sure. "If X, then Y." in your arguments is a material conditional, which is logically equivalent to "Not X or Y." by material implication and also logically equivalent to "It's not, that X and not Y." by basically De Morgan's law. Further some material conditionals are true as some material conditionals are not true. So is your material conditional "If materialism is true, a typical human being is an 80 kg arrangement of atoms." or "Materialism is not true or a typical human being is an 80 kg arrangement of atoms." or "It's not, that materialism is true and a typical human being is not an 80 kg arrangement of atoms."?!? Is it justified or substantiated in any given way?!? I don't know and I don't see that being here is the case or made to be the case.
On the other hand my material conditional "If any human is an arrangement of atoms, then materialism must be necessarily true." is self-evidently true as the material conditional "If a drawn quadrilateral is a square, then that drawn quadrilateral is also a rectangle." is self-evidently true.
Also where exactly is ¬Y - a typical human being is not an 80 kg arrangement of atoms - in your argument here? Your premise 1 “A typical human being has much more intrinsic value than any 80 kg arrangement of atoms.” doesn't appear to constitute such a claim and statement by itself. Otherwise how are you exactly concluding from those two premises of yours, that ¬X is the case - that materialism is not true?!? Or is your argument supposed to be not a “Denying the consequent” argument? If so, what kind of an argument is it then?!?
The justification is empirical: The material aspect of the human being is scientifically known to be an 80 kg atomic arrangement. If materialism is true, the material aspect is the only aspect. So, if materialism is true, the human being is an 80kg atomic arrangement.
If they are merely weakly emergent, I don't see them making the value large enough to contradict 1. It's still just an arrangement of atoms, a really cool one, admittedly.
If strongly emergent, then it's hard to say if we still have materialism.
Pruss: I suspect I just don't know what "Materialism" means (which I already suspected, and now I'm more convinced). I'm not even entirely sure what "material aspect" means in a statement like "the material aspect of a human being is... an 80kg atomic arrangement"....
Does the Materialist have to believe the following (which I'll call "M1")?
The only accurate statements about a human being are statements that describe the particular arrangement of atoms in question.
If so, then the materialist surely cannot think that statements about, say, enzyme activity or blood pressure or DNA transcription are true of humans either, can she?
No, Alexander. That's basically MY justification for MY material conditional and not yours. Well, my material conditional is self-evidently true, but if one has to give an external justification for it, then because the material aspect of the human being is scientifically known to be an 80 kg atomic arrangement, therefore "if any human is an arrangement of atoms, then materialism must be necessarily true". It is also logically equivalent to "It's NOT, that any human is an arrangement of atoms and matter AND materialism is NOT true.", which is of course in itself true - this should be trivially and obviously true.
On the other hand your material conditional is logically equivalent to "It's NOT, that materialism is true AND a typical human being is NOT an 80 kg arrangement of atoms.", which is not necessarily true in the sense, that there are of course instances/"possible worlds", where it's true, that materialism is true AND a typical human being is NOT an 80 kg arrangement of atoms. Sooo... You are either question begging here with this material conditional and argument of yours here and or you are straw manning materialism. If you want to critique materialism as being bad for an ontological dogmatic description or explanation of reality, then please, critique it properly. But also please don't straw man it and don't question beg in this bad way with that material conditional of yours. If "any" person should know it by now, how to do this properly, then you, Alexander, should know this by now.
Apropos knowing things. I still don't know, which of your premises constitutes, that "a typical human being is NOT an 80 kg arrangement of atoms'', such that you could validly conclude with that dubious material conditional of yours and by a "denying the consequent" argument, that materialism is not true. So which premise of those two premises of yours here constitutes such a claim?!?
1. The material aspect of the typical human being is an 80 kg atomic arrangement. (Known by science.) 2. If materialism is true, a typical human being is identical with its material aspect. (By definition of materialism) 3. So, materialism is false or a typical human being is identical with its material aspect. (From 2 by definition of material conditional) 4. So, materialism is false or a typical human being is identical with an 80 kg atomic arrangement. (From 1 and 3) 5. So, if materialism is true, a typical human being is identical with an 80 kg atomic arrangement. (From 4 by definition of material conditional)
I assume that the typical materialist thinks that statements about enzyme activity and the like are statements about how atoms are arranged.
Imagine a perfect computer simulation of the behavior of the atoms in a human body. Either that simulation would include a simulation of enzyme activity or not. If it does not, then we have weird top-down laws that ensure that the microphysical laws have exceptions. I am open to that possibility but the typical materialist is not. But if automatically the simulation of the behavior of the atoms includes a simulation of enzyme activity, then the materialist has a very good case that enzyme activity just is behavior of atoms.
I think the main problem with this argument is the supposition that there can be such a thing as "intrinsic value", and it is independent of whether materialism is true or not. All values are by definition subjective (because they admit no justification, empirical or otherwise). They are not something humans come to know, but rather, humans make (conscious or subconscious) decisions to evaluate things according to their subjective perspective, emotions and preferences, and then project the values they generate onto entities.
@Aron Bean Isn't that just begging the question that values can't be "justified"? In what sense - just because it's not empirical doesn't mean there can't be other forms of justification. How do we rule out other forms of justification? And even if one can't justify this universally to others, that doesn't mean the justification isn't true. For example, one knows one's own existence immediately and uniquely through one's personal self-awareness, yet this type of justification isn't subjective and unjustifiable just because it's inherently inaccessible to others.
@Aron Bean Also it's kinda weird to say that there can be no such thing as intrinsic value...and any intrinsic value is just us evaluating things with a subjective perspective and projecting it to them. It's weird to think we actually have the ability to conceptualise something as simple and foundational as the idea of intrinsic value...all the while such a thing literally can't exist. Not just doesn't, but as a whole the realm of reality doesn't and even can't have such a thing in principle...
Because if the idea is by definition subjective, then we should be aware of this. Just as we know other subjective things as subjective, like preferences, because we know what a preference is, and know it doesn't inhere in all things even without knowing other persons with different preferences.
Yet stangely most if not all see intrinsic value not as something in the same category as preference, but as something found out and known in reality itself.
If all values are subjective, there is no objective reason to do or believe anything, because every reason expresses the value of the thing it is a reason for.
Pruss: Does the materialist at least grant that the vocabulary of atomic physics is insufficient to say everything that can truthfully be said? For example, statements about enzymes catalyzing particular reactions (or, worse yet, being "life-sustaining") are not sayable in the vocabularly of atomic physics.
I dispute step 3 "So, materialism is not true. (From 1 "A typical human being has much more intrinsic value than any 80 kg arrangement of atoms." and 2 "If materialism is true, a typical human being is an 80 kg arrangement of atoms." [- maybe by a modus tollens?!?])" from your original post. I also reject premise 2 "If materialism is true, a typical human being is an 80 kg arrangement of atoms." here as I reject premise 2 "If materialism is true, a typical human being is identical with its material aspect. (By definition of materialism)" from your previous comment of a red herring deviating from my second very trivial disposition of you being not capable of making and bringing together a simple syllogism. It's your "definition" and a straw man of materialism and not mine and besides that:
1. The material aspect of the typical human being is an 80 kg atomic arrangement. (Known by science.) 2. If the material aspect of the typical human being is an 80 kg atomic arrangement, then materialism is true. (Trivially and self-evidently true) 3. So, materialism is true. (From 1 and 2 by modus ponens)
Do you like it? No? Then how about a "compromise"? How about the Truth with the capitol T?
1. The material aspect of the typical human being is an 80 kg atomic arrangement. (Known by science.) 2. Materialism is true, if and only if the material aspect of the typical human being is an 80 kg atomic arrangement. (By dogmatic belief of physicalism) 3. So, if materialism is true, then the material aspect of the typical human being is an 80 kg atomic arrangement. (From 2 by biconditional implication) 4. So, if the material aspect of the typical human being is an 80 kg atomic arrangement, then materialism is true (From 2 by biconditional implication) 5. So, materialism is true. (From 1 and 4 by modus ponens)
Alexander R Pruss: "there is no objective reason to do or believe anything"
You cannot believe anything at will. Nor are your choices to do something are ever free, even if they seem to be so. All your beliefs and choices to act are predetermined by your genetic makeup and past experiences, which express themselves in the current emotional/cognitive (that is, biochemical) state of your brain. This hypothesis is simpler than to suppose some immaterial stuff, whose interaction with material things, including the brain, would be beyond comprehension. Also note that being rational is not somehow "inherently better" than being irrational or arational. Rather, it's just that rationality is the kind of attitude that pays off most of the time in the long run. And even this "paying-off" translates to things that support the survival of the individual, so it can be expressed in value-neutral terms.
"every reason expresses the value of the thing it is a reason for" This is false. For example, if you know that p, and also know that "if p, then q", then this knowledge, together with knowledge of the rule of inference "modus ponens" may be a reason for you to believe (and, also know) that q. But there is nothing that expresses the "value of q" in the state of knowing p, "if p, then q", or in knowing "modus ponens", nor in its application. They are just propositions, syntactic structures with semantic interpretation according to classical logic. And there are many other alternative systems of logic, even some where modus ponens is not a theorem.
"How do we rule out other forms of justification?" I don't want to rule out other justifications to start with, that's why I wrote "empirical or otherwise". "And even if one can't justify this universally to others, that doesn't mean the justification isn't true." I don't accept any justification that is not universal. This is a contradiction in terms. A justification must be repeatable and (in principle) universally accessible to all. "For example, one knows one's own existence immediately and uniquely through one's personal self-awareness." No, you doesn't know that, although this is admittedly tricky. To know is not an "achievement verb" expressing an instantaneous event, but a "state verb", which means that it is a state of an organism, and has a certain temporal duration. Knowing, and also self-awareness and self-perception for that matter, presuppose the correctness of memory, and because memory is fallible, there is a chance (meaning that you cannot rule it out) that you are mistaken in believing (and therefore you don't know) that you exist.
@Aron 1) Wow, you just buried yourself with your own arguments. If we can't even be sure we ourselves exist, and all knowledge / perception / thinking could just be false or irrational or even non-existent, then golly there can't be such a thing as justification either.
Certainly not individual but even less universal - other people could just not exist as well, or be illusions, or whatever. Even if other people existed, universal consensus or being convinced somethign is justified could also just as well be false or non-existent.
You should thereby become an absolute skeptic of everything.
2) As for self-awareness depending on memory...every single memory you have right now could just be false...but you'd still be aware you have those memories. All your beliefs could be false & illusory, yet you'd still have those beliefs.
So unless the Principle of Non-contradiction is false...we can be absolutely sure we have the memories / beliefs / experiences we actually have.
You either have memories / beliefs / thoughts / experiences or you don't.
25 comments:
P1 seems to beg the question, no? If materialism (which I'm taking to mean "objects have no parts in addition to their material/atomic parts") is true, then P1 would be like saying "a typical human being has much more intrinsic value than any human-sized object"....
I think materialism is false, and I’m not sure what to think about premise 1. What kind of value does my body (the arrangement of atoms) have on a hylomorphic view? Does it mainly have instrumental value? In general, if W is a whole with intrinsic value, do its parts (the xs) mainly have instrumental value, since they are for the sake of W? Or does the intrinsic value of the whole bleed into all of the parts?
Is this supposed to be a Denying the consequent [(X→Y∧¬Y) ⇒ ¬X] argument?
Then where is the premise with ¬Y - a typical human being is not an 80 kg arrangement of atoms?!?
Otherwise from materialism doesn't follow a typical human being necessarily an 80 kg arrangement of atoms. But from humans being an arrangement of any amount of atoms follows, that materialism must be necessarily true.
So if any human is an arrangement of atoms (- yes, even little or small humans not weighing typically 80 kg), then materialism must be necessarily true.
On reflection, it is easy enough to get around my worry just by eliminating the word ‘much’ from the first premise. I think the argument would go through just as well. But I’m still puzzled about how to think of intrinsic value in parts.
Kratsch:
Unless otherwise specified, or contextually required, "if ... then ..." in my arguments is a material conditional. No claim is made that it *follows* from materialism that a human is an 80 kg arrangement of atoms.
Alexander:
Sure. "If X, then Y." in your arguments is a material conditional, which is logically equivalent to "Not X or Y." by material implication and also logically equivalent to "It's not, that X and not Y." by basically De Morgan's law.
Further some material conditionals are true as some material conditionals are not true.
So is your material conditional "If materialism is true, a typical human being is an 80 kg arrangement of atoms." or "Materialism is not true or a typical human being is an 80 kg arrangement of atoms." or "It's not, that materialism is true and a typical human being is not an 80 kg arrangement of atoms."?!?
Is it justified or substantiated in any given way?!?
I don't know and I don't see that being here is the case or made to be the case.
On the other hand my material conditional "If any human is an arrangement of atoms, then materialism must be necessarily true." is self-evidently true as the material conditional "If a drawn quadrilateral is a square, then that drawn quadrilateral is also a rectangle." is self-evidently true.
Also where exactly is ¬Y - a typical human being is not an 80 kg arrangement of atoms - in your argument here?
Your premise 1 “A typical human being has much more intrinsic value than any 80 kg arrangement of atoms.” doesn't appear to constitute such a claim and statement by itself.
Otherwise how are you exactly concluding from those two premises of yours, that ¬X is the case - that materialism is not true?!?
Or is your argument supposed to be not a “Denying the consequent” argument?
If so, what kind of an argument is it then?!?
The justification is empirical: The material aspect of the human being is scientifically known to be an 80 kg atomic arrangement. If materialism is true, the material aspect is the only aspect. So, if materialism is true, the human being is an 80kg atomic arrangement.
what about emergent properties? ex. atoms, neurons, Brians, consciousness. Similar to other parts for what makes a human being
If they are merely weakly emergent, I don't see them making the value large enough to contradict 1. It's still just an arrangement of atoms, a really cool one, admittedly.
If strongly emergent, then it's hard to say if we still have materialism.
Pruss: I suspect I just don't know what "Materialism" means (which I already suspected, and now I'm more convinced). I'm not even entirely sure what "material aspect" means in a statement like "the material aspect of a human being is... an 80kg atomic arrangement"....
Does the Materialist have to believe the following (which I'll call "M1")?
The only accurate statements about a human being are statements that describe the particular arrangement of atoms in question.
If so, then the materialist surely cannot think that statements about, say, enzyme activity or blood pressure or DNA transcription are true of humans either, can she?
No, Alexander. That's basically MY justification for MY material conditional and not yours.
Well, my material conditional is self-evidently true, but if one has to give an external justification for it, then because the material aspect of the human being is scientifically known to be an 80 kg atomic arrangement, therefore "if any human is an arrangement of atoms, then materialism must be necessarily true".
It is also logically equivalent to "It's NOT, that any human is an arrangement of atoms and matter AND materialism is NOT true.", which is of course in itself true - this should be trivially and obviously true.
On the other hand your material conditional is logically equivalent to "It's NOT, that materialism is true AND a typical human being is NOT an 80 kg arrangement of atoms.", which is not necessarily true in the sense, that there are of course instances/"possible worlds", where it's true, that materialism is true AND a typical human being is NOT an 80 kg arrangement of atoms.
Sooo... You are either question begging here with this material conditional and argument of yours here and or you are straw manning materialism.
If you want to critique materialism as being bad for an ontological dogmatic description or explanation of reality, then please, critique it properly. But also please don't straw man it and don't question beg in this bad way with that material conditional of yours.
If "any" person should know it by now, how to do this properly, then you, Alexander, should know this by now.
Apropos knowing things. I still don't know, which of your premises constitutes, that "a typical human being is NOT an 80 kg arrangement of atoms'', such that you could validly conclude with that dubious material conditional of yours and by a "denying the consequent" argument, that materialism is not true.
So which premise of those two premises of yours here constitutes such a claim?!?
1. The material aspect of the typical human being is an 80 kg atomic arrangement. (Known by science.)
2. If materialism is true, a typical human being is identical with its material aspect. (By definition of materialism)
3. So, materialism is false or a typical human being is identical with its material aspect. (From 2 by definition of material conditional)
4. So, materialism is false or a typical human being is identical with an 80 kg atomic arrangement. (From 1 and 3)
5. So, if materialism is true, a typical human being is identical with an 80 kg atomic arrangement. (From 4 by definition of material conditional)
Which step do you dispute?
Michael:
I assume that the typical materialist thinks that statements about enzyme activity and the like are statements about how atoms are arranged.
Imagine a perfect computer simulation of the behavior of the atoms in a human body. Either that simulation would include a simulation of enzyme activity or not. If it does not, then we have weird top-down laws that ensure that the microphysical laws have exceptions. I am open to that possibility but the typical materialist is not. But if automatically the simulation of the behavior of the atoms includes a simulation of enzyme activity, then the materialist has a very good case that enzyme activity just is behavior of atoms.
I think the main problem with this argument is the supposition that there can be such a thing as "intrinsic value", and it is independent of whether materialism is true or not. All values are by definition subjective (because they admit no justification, empirical or otherwise). They are not something humans come to know, but rather, humans make (conscious or subconscious) decisions to evaluate things according to their subjective perspective, emotions and preferences, and then project the values they generate onto entities.
@Aron Bean Isn't that just begging the question that values can't be "justified"? In what sense - just because it's not empirical doesn't mean there can't be other forms of justification. How do we rule out other forms of justification? And even if one can't justify this universally to others, that doesn't mean the justification isn't true. For example, one knows one's own existence immediately and uniquely through one's personal self-awareness, yet this type of justification isn't subjective and unjustifiable just because it's inherently inaccessible to others.
@Aron Bean Also it's kinda weird to say that there can be no such thing as intrinsic value...and any intrinsic value is just us evaluating things with a subjective perspective and projecting it to them. It's weird to think we actually have the ability to conceptualise something as simple and foundational as the idea of intrinsic value...all the while such a thing literally can't exist. Not just doesn't, but as a whole the realm of reality doesn't and even can't have such a thing in principle...
Because if the idea is by definition subjective, then we should be aware of this. Just as we know other subjective things as subjective, like preferences, because we know what a preference is, and know it doesn't inhere in all things even without knowing other persons with different preferences.
Yet stangely most if not all see intrinsic value not as something in the same category as preference, but as something found out and known in reality itself.
Alex
You beg the question in your argument.
Your premise 1 is only true if materialisme is false, but it is false if materialism is true. Because in that case, a typical human being has just as much intrinsic value as the arrangement of atoms because he is thé arrangement of atoms.
Intrinsic values depend on how things (can) behave, not on their constituants.
And this particular arrangement of atoms behaves like a human being, hence has the intrinsic value of a human being.
If all values are subjective, there is no objective reason to do or believe anything, because every reason expresses the value of the thing it is a reason for.
Pruss: Does the materialist at least grant that the vocabulary of atomic physics is insufficient to say everything that can truthfully be said? For example, statements about enzymes catalyzing particular reactions (or, worse yet, being "life-sustaining") are not sayable in the vocabularly of atomic physics.
"Which step do you dispute?”
I dispute step 3 "So, materialism is not true. (From 1 "A typical human being has much more intrinsic value than any 80 kg arrangement of atoms." and 2 "If materialism is true, a typical human being is an 80 kg arrangement of atoms." [- maybe by a modus tollens?!?])"
from your original post.
I also reject premise 2 "If materialism is true, a typical human being is an 80 kg arrangement of atoms." here as I reject premise 2 "If materialism is true, a typical human being is identical with its material aspect. (By definition of materialism)" from your previous comment of a red herring deviating from my second very trivial disposition of you being not capable of making and bringing together a simple syllogism.
It's your "definition" and a straw man of materialism and not mine and besides that:
1. The material aspect of the typical human being is an 80 kg atomic arrangement. (Known by science.)
2. If the material aspect of the typical human being is an 80 kg atomic arrangement, then materialism is true. (Trivially and self-evidently true)
3. So, materialism is true. (From 1 and 2 by modus ponens)
Do you like it? No?
Then how about a "compromise"? How about the Truth with the capitol T?
1. The material aspect of the typical human being is an 80 kg atomic arrangement. (Known by science.)
2. Materialism is true, if and only if the material aspect of the typical human being is an 80 kg atomic arrangement. (By dogmatic belief of physicalism)
3. So, if materialism is true, then the material aspect of the typical human being is an 80 kg atomic arrangement. (From 2 by biconditional implication)
4. So, if the material aspect of the typical human being is an 80 kg atomic arrangement, then materialism is true (From 2 by biconditional implication)
5. So, materialism is true. (From 1 and 4 by modus ponens)
Sooo...
Which step do you dispute?
Alexander R Pruss: "there is no objective reason to do or believe anything"
You cannot believe anything at will. Nor are your choices to do something are ever free, even if they seem to be so. All your beliefs and choices to act are predetermined by your genetic makeup and past experiences, which express themselves in the current emotional/cognitive (that is, biochemical) state of your brain. This hypothesis is simpler than to suppose some immaterial stuff, whose interaction with material things, including the brain, would be beyond comprehension.
Also note that being rational is not somehow "inherently better" than being irrational or arational. Rather, it's just that rationality is the kind of attitude that pays off most of the time in the long run. And even this "paying-off" translates to things that support the survival of the individual, so it can be expressed in value-neutral terms.
"every reason expresses the value of the thing it is a reason for"
This is false.
For example, if you know that p, and also know that "if p, then q", then this knowledge, together with knowledge of the rule of inference "modus ponens" may be a reason for you to believe (and, also know) that q. But there is nothing that expresses the "value of q" in the state of knowing p, "if p, then q", or in knowing "modus ponens", nor in its application. They are just propositions, syntactic structures with semantic interpretation according to classical logic. And there are many other alternative systems of logic, even some where modus ponens is not a theorem.
Wesley C,
"How do we rule out other forms of justification?" I don't want to rule out other justifications to start with, that's why I wrote "empirical or otherwise".
"And even if one can't justify this universally to others, that doesn't mean the justification isn't true."
I don't accept any justification that is not universal. This is a contradiction in terms. A justification must be repeatable and (in principle) universally accessible to all.
"For example, one knows one's own existence immediately and uniquely through one's personal self-awareness."
No, you doesn't know that, although this is admittedly tricky. To know is not an "achievement verb" expressing an instantaneous event, but a "state verb", which means that it is a state of an organism, and has a certain temporal duration.
Knowing, and also self-awareness and self-perception for that matter, presuppose the correctness of memory, and because memory is fallible, there is a chance (meaning that you cannot rule it out) that you are mistaken in believing (and therefore you don't know) that you exist.
@Aron 1) Wow, you just buried yourself with your own arguments. If we can't even be sure we ourselves exist, and all knowledge / perception / thinking could just be false or irrational or even non-existent, then golly there can't be such a thing as justification either.
Certainly not individual but even less universal - other people could just not exist as well, or be illusions, or whatever. Even if other people existed, universal consensus or being convinced somethign is justified could also just as well be false or non-existent.
You should thereby become an absolute skeptic of everything.
2) As for self-awareness depending on memory...every single memory you have right now could just be false...but you'd still be aware you have those memories. All your beliefs could be false & illusory, yet you'd still have those beliefs.
So unless the Principle of Non-contradiction is false...we can be absolutely sure we have the memories / beliefs / experiences we actually have.
You either have memories / beliefs / thoughts / experiences or you don't.
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