If a part of x has dignity, x has dignity.
Only persons have dignity.
So, a person cannot be a proper part of a non-person. (1–2)
A person cannot be a proper part of a person.
So, a person cannot be a proper part of anything. (3–4)
If any nation or galaxy or ecosystem exists, some nation, galaxy or ecosystem has a person as a proper part.
So, no nation, galaxy or ecosystem exists. (5–6)
Less confidently, I go on.
If tables and chairs exist, so do chess sets.
If chess sets exist, so do living chess sets.
A living chess set has persons as proper parts. (Definition)
So, living chess sets do not exist. (4,10)
So, tables and chairs don’t exist. (8–9,11)
All that said, I suppose (1) could be denied. But it would be hard to deny if one thought of dignity as a form of trumping value, since a value in a part transfers to the whole, and if it’s a trumping value, it isn’t canceled by the disvalue of other parts. (That said, I myself don’t quite think of dignity as a form of value.)
4 comments:
I agree with you, premise 1 seems suspect. More generally, "If a part of x has y, x has y" is also suspect.
1. If a part of x has y, x has y
2. I have a soul (or mind if you like)
3. Galaxies exist
4. I am a part of a galaxy
5. Therefore, the galaxy has a soul
Between denying premise 1, 3 or 4, I would definitely choose to deny premise 1.
I agree that many things don't transfer from parts to wholes. But value seems to. If I inherit a chest, the chest's value includes the value of all of its parts (e.g., if the chest is made of gold or encrusted with jewels, its value include the value of the parts). But I did say "seems to". Sometimes value is canceled out by something. For instance, if I inherit a house-and-contents, and part of the contents is a box of gold bars, it's not automatically true that the value of house-and-contents is at least as big as the value of the box of gold. For the house-and-contents might also contain something of negative value, such as asbestos or mould, and so the total value might be less than that of the box of gold. So in the case of value, we should say that the whole has the value of the parts, unless there is something contained of sufficient negative value to cancel that value.
But assuming dignity is a value (at least, in some ways it behaves like a value), it is a value that is not canceled by disvalue--a mass murderer has much disvalue, but like every other human being they still have dignity, as no amount of disvalue can cancel dignity.
I think a distinction here should be made between 2 kinds of value. There is monetary value, and then there is something like intrinsic value. Monetary value is applicable to inanimate objects, while intrinsic value is arguably not.
Dignity, happiness, and even rights require a living being (or a soul) to be at the top of the chain so to speak. For instance, having established that galaxy doesn't have a soul, we can argue that it doesn't have dignity, because for something to have dignity, it must have a soul.
So then we could reformulate first premise to be something like: If a part of x has dignity, and if x has a soul, x has dignity. Since universe doesn't have a soul, it also doesn't have dignity.
On reflection, I just realized (see today's post) that given dualism, premise 6 is implausible in the galaxy case: given dualism, we are not a part of the galaxy. But we might still be a part of an ecosystem or a nation, so the argument still has some teeth.
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