Wednesday, November 18, 2026

Reverse constituent ontology

On constituent ontologies, properties are parts of the objects that have them.

It’s occurred to me that it’s worth exploring—surely someone has done this—reverse constituent ontologies on which objects are parts of the properties that they have.

Because formally the two are very similar, many problems for one theory are problems for the other. But there are a few advantages of reverse constituent ontologies.

For instance, take the problem of properties of parts: on constituent ontology, that my eye is blue, so blueness is a part of my eye, and my eye is a part of me, so by transitivity
blueness is a part of me, so I am blue. The analogous problem is that I am six foot tall, and so on reverse constituent ontology I am a part of six foot tallness, and yet my eye are a part of me, so by transitivity my eye is a part of six foot tallness, and hence my eye is six foot tall.

So far it looks like the theories are on par. And indeed the same solution can be given t both. We can distinguish two different kinds of parthood: my eye is an integral part of me, but the relation between properties and particulars—whichever direction it goes—is metaphysical parthood. But this solution is costly: it requires two different fundamental stories. Here, however, is a different solution that works only for reverse constituent ontology: we insist that substances are all simples (perhaps extended ones). Problem gone!

Here’s another slight advantage of reverse constituent ontology. There is a plausible Aristotelian intuition that substances are fundamental entities. But there is also a common intuition that parts are prior to wholes. Normally, Aristotelians deny this intuition. But with reverse constituent ontology, there is no need to deny that. We can just say that substances are parts of their accidents.

And another slight advantage. Suppose, pace Aristotle, we think properties are universals. Now many people think it is weird to suppose that the same object can be wholly located in many places at once. On constituent ontology, humanity is wholly located wherever there is a human, and hence in many places at once. Not so on reverse constituent ontology. There, humanity is not wholly located in many places at once. It is, instead, a scattered object that has all humans as parts.

A similar advantage for those who think properties are universals. It seems implausible to think that you and I overlap. But on constituent ontology with universal properties, we overlap on humanity. No such issue for reverse constituent ontology. (See also Ockham’s clever observation that on constituent ontology with universals, a part of Jesus is in hell, because humanity is a part of Jesus, but humanity is also a part of some human in hell.)

Another advantage. It seems intuitively right to say that all the parts of a rock are material objects. Not so on constituent ontology, since rocks have properties as parts, and properties are not material objects.

So why am I not a reverse constituent ontologist? Well, the best argument I can think of is an ethical one. I think that for ethical reasons we need a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic features—e.g., consent works differently for actions that affect someone’s intrinsic and extrinsic features. But now what parts you have is intrinsic. What you are a part of is extrinsic to you, at least if parts are prior to wholes which they probably would be on reverse constituent ontology. So all accidents you have are extrinsic features on reverse constituent ontology.

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