Suppose for simplicity that everyone is a good Bayesian and has the
same priors for a hypothesis H, and also the same epistemic
interests with respect to H. I
now observe some evidence E
relevant to H. My credence now
diverges from everyone else’s, because I have new evidence. Suppose I
could share this evidence with everyone. It seems obvious that if
epistemic considerations are the only ones, I should share the evidence.
(If the priors are not equal, then considerations in my
previous post might lead me to withhold information, if I am willing
to embrace epistemic paternalism.)
Besides the obvious value of revealing the truth, here are two ways
to reason for this highly intuitive conclusion.
First, good Bayesians will always expect to benefit from more
evidence. If my place and that of some other agent, say Alice, were
switched, I’d want the information regarding E to be released. So by the Golden
Rule, I should release the information.
Second, good Bayesians’ epistemic utilities are measured by a
strictly proper scoring rule. But if Alice’s epistemic utilities for
H are measured by a strictly
proper (accuracy) scoring rule s that assigns an epistemic utility
s(p,t) to a
credence p when the actual
truth value of H is t, which can be zero or one. By
definition of strict propriety, the expectation by my lights of what
Alice’s epistemic utility for a given credence should be is strictly
maximized when that credence equals my credence. Since Alice shares the
priors I had before I observed E, if I can make E evident to her, her new posteriors
will match my current ones, and so revealing E to her will maximize my
expectation of her epistemic utility.
So far so good. But now suppose that the hypothesis H = HN
is that there exist N people
other than me, and my priors assign probability 1/2 to there being N and 1/2 to its being n, where N is much larger than n. Suppose further that my evidence
E ends up significantly
supporting hypothesis Hn, so that my
posterior p in HN is smaller
than 1/2.
Now, my expectation of the total epistemic utility of other people if
I reveal E is:
- UR = pNs(p,1) + (1−p)ns(p,0).
And if I conceal E, my
expectation is:
- UC = pNs(1/2,1) + (1−p)ns(1/2,0).
If we had N = n,
then it would be guaranteed by strict propriety that UR > UC,
and so I should reveal. But we have N > n. Moreover, s(1/2,1) > s(p,1):
if some hypothesis is true, a strictly proper accuracy scoring rule
increases strictly monotonically with the credence. If N/n is sufficiently large,
the first terms of UR and UC will
dominate, and hence we will have UC > UR,
and thus I should conceal.
The intuition behind this technical argument is this. If I reveal the
evidence, I decrease people’s credence in HN. If it turns
out that the number of people other than me actually is N, I have done a lot of harm,
because I have decreased the credence of a very large number N of people. Since N is much larger than n, this consideration trumps
considerations of what happens if the number of people is n.
I take it that this is the wrong conclusion. On epistemic grounds, if
everyone’s priors are equal, we should release evidence. (See
my previous post for what happens if priors are not equal.)
So what should we do? Well, one option is to opt for averaging rather
than summing of epistemic utilities. But the problem reappears. For
suppose that I can only communicate with members of my own local
community, and we as a community have equal credence 1/2 for the hypothesis Hn that our
local community of n people
contains all agents, and credence 1/2
for the hypothesis Hn + N
that there is also a number N
of agents outside our community much greater than n. Suppose, further, that my priors
are such that I am certain that all the agents outside our community
know the truth about these hypotheses. I receive a piece of evidence
E disfavoring Hn and leading
to credence p < 1/2. Since
my revelation of E only
affects the members of my own commmunity, depending on which hypothesis
is true, if p is my credence
after updating on E, the
relevant part of the expected contribution to the utility of revealing
E with regard to hypothesis
Hn is:
- UR = p((n−1)/n)s(p,1) + (1−p)((n−1)/(n+N))s(p,0).
And if I conceal E, my
expectation contribution is:
- UC = p((n−1)/n)s(1/2,1) + (1−p)((n−1)/(n+N))s(p,0).
If N is sufficiently large,
again UC
will beat UR.
I take it that there is something wrong with epistemic
utilitarianism.