The big problem for libertarian views of free will, especially agent-causal ones, is how to make the action come from both the agent and the agent's reasons. The compatibilist gives up on the agent part—or, more charitably, we should say that, roughly, she analyzes the action's originating from the agent in terms of the action's originating from the agent's reasons.
Here is a model. In the world, there is nomically explained causation. Maybe, charged particle A causes charged particle B to move away, because of the laws of electromagnetics. Maybe, massive particle A causes massive particle B to approach, because of the law of gravitation. Here is a very natural way to say what is happening here:
- A electromagnetically causes B to move away.
- A gravitationally causes B to approach.
Suppose now that Plato writes a book because of love of truth and Euthydemus fools Callias out of a desire to impress. Then, very roughly:
- Plato's love of truth Platonically causes Plato's writing of the book.
- Euthedemus' desire to impress Euthydemically causes Euthydemus' fooling Callias.
Strictly speaking, the analogy shouldn't be between the agent and the law, but between the agent and the lawmaker, or, even better, between the agent's form and the lawmaker.