Some people think that events are never causes, except in a derivative sense. It is substances that are causes (and when one or more substances are cause because they stands in some relations, then their standing these relations is an event, and we can derivatively count it as a cause). It seems very natural for someone who takes a substance-theory of causation to take an agent-causal theory of action. Doing so does not carry the cost that agent-causal theories of action normally carry, namely the cost of supposing two kinds of causation. So a substance-theory of causation would seem to be a great match for an agent-causal theory of action.
However, I think that the substance-causal theorist may lose one of the benefits of agent-causal theories of action. The traditional agent-causal theorist can make a neat distinction between my voluntarily doing something and my "doing" something in the non-agential way in which I depress the grass when I lie on it or circulate the blood throughout my body. The non-voluntary "doing" is a matter of event-causation, while the the voluntary doing is a matter of agent-causation. But on the substance-causal view, both the non-voluntary and the voluntary cases are instances of substance-causation, with one and the same cause--namely me. Granted, the substance-causal theorist can distinguish the voluntary doings from the non-voluntary "doings" by saying that reasons enter in a certain way into the explanation of the former but not into the explanation of the latter, but this is exactly the sort of thing the event-causalist would say--an advantage of agent-causation has been lost.
This isn't really an argument for or against any theory. The loss in this regard is balanced by a greater overall theoretical simplicity in having only one kind of causation.