I do not see any way to avoid the conclusion that the correct ontology includes more than just simple substances. This is depressing and exhilarating. I think there are modes of substances. Very weird. I entertained the thought that it might come to this, but didn't expect it to be so soon (I didn't disbelieve in modes, but I also didn't believe in them). But I had to either believe in modes of substances, or parts of substances, or regions of spacetime, and modes of substances seem the most innocent. I need either parts or regions to make sense of claims like: "This person is red on his left side and green on his right side." But the kinds of regions I need—thanks to an argument by Josh Rasmussen—are regions that travel with a substance, because the person who is red on his left side and green on his right side doesn't change color as he moves through space. And the only way I see to define such regions is with the parts or powers of substances. So I had to believe in parts or powers. But parts are very mysterious, while I already believed that substances were powerful. So to believe in their powers seems the better move. And powers are modes. This makes Eucharistic theology a touch more straightforward, too.