One of the main objections against Platonism is that it offends against Ockham's razor by positing a large number of fundamental entities. But the Platonist can give the following response: By positing these fundamental entities, I can reduce the number of fundamental predicates to one, namely instantiation. I don't need fundamental predicates like "... is charged" or "... loves ...". All I need is a single multigrade fundamental predicate "... instantiate(s) ...", and I can just reduce the claim that Jones is charged to the claim that Jones instantiates charge, and the Juliet loves Romeo to the claim that Julie and Romeo instantiates loving. In other words, the Platonist's offenses against Ockham's razor in respect of ontology are largely compensated for by a corresponding reduction of ideology.
Largely, but so far not entirely. For the Platonist does need to introduce the "... instantiate(s) ..." predicate which the nominalist has no need for. On pain of a Bradley-type regress, the Platonist cannot handle that predicate using her general schema.
(But maybe Platonist can go one step further. She can eliminate single quantifiers from her ideology, too, using the Fregean move of replacing, say, ∃xF(x) with Instantiates(Fness, instantiatedness). Extending this to nested quantifiers is hard, but perhaps not impossible. If that task can be completed, then it seems that our Platonist has gained a decisive advantage over the nominalist: she has only one fundamental predicate and no quantifiers other than names (if names count as quantifiers). Not so, though! For this move needs to be able to handle complex predicates F, and the property Fness corresponding to such a complex predicate will probably have to stand in various structural relations to other properties, and we have complication.)