Thursday, November 16, 2017

A version of the cosmological argument from preservation

Suppose that all immediate causation is simultaneous. The only way to make this fit with the obvious fact that there is diachronic causation is to make diachronic causation be mediate. And there is one standard way of making mediate diachronic causation out of immediate synchronic causation: temporally extended causal relata. Suppose that A lasts from time 0 to time 3, B lasts from time 2 to time 5, and C lasts from time 4 to time 10 (these can be substances or events). Then A can synchronically cause B at time 2 or 3, B can synchronically cause C at time 4 or 5, and one can combine the two immediate synchronic causal relations into a mediate diachronic causal relation between A and C, even though there is no time at which we have both A and C.

The problem with this approach is explaining the persistence of A, B and C over time. If we believe in irreducibly diachronic causation, then we can say that B’s existence at time 2 causes B’s existence at time 3, and so on. But this move is not available to the defender of purely simultaneous causation, except maybe at the cost of an infinite regress: maybe B’s existence from time 2.00 to time 2.75 causes B’s existence from time 2.50 to time 3.00; but now we ask about the causal relationship between B’s existence at time 2.00 and time 2.75.

So if we are to give a causal explanation of B’s persistence from time 2 to time 5, it will have to be in terms of the simultaneous causal efficacy of some other persisting entity. But this leads to a regress that is intuitively vicious.

Thus, we must come at the end to at least one persisting entity E such that E’s persistence from some time t1 to some time t2 has no causal explanation. And if we started our question with asking about the persistence of something that persists over some times today, then these times t1 and t2 are today.

Even if we allow for some facts to be unexplained contingent “brute” facts, the persistence of ordinary objects over time shouldn’t be like that. Moreover, it doesn’t seem right to suppose that the ultimate explanations of the persistence of objects involve objects whose own persistence is brute. For that makes it ultimately be a brute fact that reality as a whole persists, a brute and surprising fact.

So, plausibly, we have to say that although E’s persistence from t1 to t2 has no causal explanation, it has some other kind of explanation. The most plausible candidate for this kind of explanation is that E is imperishable: that it is logically impossible for E to perish.

Hence, if all immediate causation is simultaneous, very likely there is something imperishable. And the imperishable entity or entities then cause things to exist at the time at which they exist, thereby explaining their persistence.

On the theory that God is the imperishable entity, the above explains why for Aquinas preservation and creation are the same.

(It’s a pity that I don’t think all immediate causation is simultaneous.)

Problem: Suppose E immediately makes B persist from time 2 to time 4, by immediately causing it to exist at all the times from 2 to 4. Surely, though, E exists at time 4 because it existed at time 2. And this “because” is hard to explain.

Response: We can say that B exists at time 4 because of its esse (or act of being) at time 2, provided that (a) B’s esse at time 2 is its being caused by E to exist at time 2, and (b) E causes B to exist at time 4 because (non-causally because) E caused B to exist at time 2. But once we say that B exists at time 4 because of its very own esse at time 2, it seems we’ve saved the “because” claim in the problem.

2 comments:

Brandon said...

I'm not sure I understand the starting-point of this argument; it seems to be assuming that everything simultaneous is instantaneous, but there's good reason to think that time intervals can be simultaneous with each other, for instance, and thus already be diachronic.

Alexander R Pruss said...

The thought is that you can leverage synchronic causation to be diachronic by making use of non-instantaneous objects, but that the move doesn't work for the *persistence* of something non-instantaneous.