Monday, June 4, 2018

Distinguishing between properties

Some philosophers worry about “principles of individuation” that make two things of one kind be different from another. Suppose we share that worry. Then we should be worried about Platonism. For it is very hard to say what make two fundamental Platonic entities of the same sort different, say being positively charged from being negatively charged, or saltiness from sweetness.

However, the light-weight Platonist, who denies that predication is to be grounded in possession of universals, has a nice story to tell about the above kinds of cases. For here is a qualitative difference between saltiness and sweetness:

  • saltiness is necessarily had by all and only salty things, but

  • sweetness is not necessarily had by all and only salty things.

But for the heavy-weight Platonist to tell this story would involve circularity, for what it is for a thing to be salty will be to exemplify saltiness.

Of course, this story only works for properties that aren’t necessarily coextensive. But it’s some progress.


Speed Limit Forty said...

Wouldn't this be a general worry about fundamental entities, especially if we understand individuation in terms of grounding or dependence?

Alexander R Pruss said...

Is the thought something like this: If the individuation of a thing must be a partial ground of it, then a thing that is fundamental must have no grounds, not even partial ones, and hence cannot be individuated?

That's an interesting thought. I think that if the fundamental has no grounds, then there is only one fundamental entity, God.