First argument:
There are no infinite causal regresses or causal loops.
Every ordinary entity has a cause.
So, there is an extraordinary entity.
Second argument:
There is a causal explanation why there are any ordinary entities.
Causal explanations are not circular.
So, there is an extraordinary entity.
11 comments:
Could you expand on your justification for the claim that causal loops cannot exist
For further context, the reason I am asking this question is that I have seen your arguments against the possibility of an infinite regress of explanations that doesn't require an external explanation.
I am curious to see what your response would be to a circular closed system in which A explains B, B explains C, and C explains A not needing an outside explanation
Thanks for the help.
It seems obvious that going around a circle leaves the circle unexplained. :-)
Yet, Alexander R. Pruss, it doesn't appear to be obvious, that there are no unexplained circles. You seem to suggest otherwise to be the case. If so, then why is that the case or what is your justification and warrant for that assumption of yours?
What I think is obvious is that a circle of explanations would leave something unexplained -- namely, the circle. If I'm at the party because you're at the party and you're at the party because I'm at the party, it is quite unexplained why either of us is at the party.
What is not quite so obvious is that circles of explanation are impossible.
And yet, Alexander R Pruss, we are at the party because of each other. Maybe that's just destiny or there is really no explanation, why we are both at that party because of each other. But then why shouldn’t and couldn’t it be the case, that we both are at that party because of each other?
"Destiny" would be an explanation from outside of the circle. As for the absence of any explanation, this is precluded by plausible forms of the PSR (e.g. if we assume that contingent facts require explanations, and your presence at the party is a contingent fact, then there cannot be "no explanation" of the fact that you are at the party).
Yes, Jemes Reilly, "destiny" would be an explanation from the outside of the circle, only if that were truly an explanation. Is "destiny" an explanation for anything? If so, then why are things destined to happen? You see, James, the notion of "destiny" doesn't really explain anything and if that would explain anything, then that would be something similar to a Tautology (language) - making a statement, which just repeats an idea: "The circle should happen, since it is destined to happen." or "The circle is destined to happen, since it should happen.". It is really just borderlining on to be a "circular explanation". But hey, if you accept circular explanations for circular explanations, then I guess, that would be coherent with the theme of circular explanations.
As far as plausible forms of the PSR, well, if my presence at the party is only contingent upon the fact of Pruss being present at that party, then there is that fact/explanation, which such a plausible form of the PSR requires. Similarly if Pruss' presence at the party is only contingent upon the fact of me being present at that party, then there is that fact/explanation, which such a plausible form of the PSR requires. Am I understanding this correctly? If not, then how am I supposed to understand this plausible form of the PSR, since firstly the circular explanation doesn't appear to violate such a form of the PSR and secondly such a circular explanation appears to rather satisfy such a form of the PSR?
Really just from there being no such explanation for such a circular explanation itself doesn't follow, that there is "no explanation" of the fact of me being at the party, since the circular explanation itself explains the fact of me being at the party. Do I now need an explanation for the circular explanation itself? Why?
I don't get these objections with the PSR.
> Is "destiny" an explanation for anything? If so, then why are things destined to happen?
Well, assuming this "destiny" thing is correct, there are a number of explanations consistent with the PSR that I offered. Perhaps it's metaphysically necessary for things to be "destined," or maybe the Calvinists are right, and God has decreed in advance everything that is to take place. In both of these cases, everything contingent receives an explanation, which is all that my PSR demands.
> But hey, if you accept circular explanations for circular explanations, then I guess, that would be coherent with the theme of circular explanations.
I didn't accept a circular explanation. The entire point I was making was that "destiny" (as you put it) would be an EXTERNAL explanation, something which itself is not inside the explanatory circle. Let's call your presence at the party "A," Pruss' presence "B," and destiny "C." If A is explained by B, and B is explained by A, then this is an explanatory circle. But if BOTH A and B are explained by C, then there is no circle. Everything receives a non-circular explanation.
> Am I understanding this correctly?
I'm not sure. The point is that fact A (your presence) and fact B (Pruss' presence) both require an explanation. If it turns out that A is explained by B, and B is explained by A, then this is a circle, which is a problem. But if BOTH A and B are explained by a third fact C, then there ISN'T a circle, so there is no problem.
> Firstly the circular explanation doesn't appear to violate such a form of the PSR and secondly such a circular explanation appears to rather satisfy such a form of the PSR
A circular explanation DOES violate the PSR as I formulated it, because the circle itself still requires an explanation. If the explanation of A is B, and the explanation of B is A, then this leaves the circle itself unexplained: we could still ask why the conjunction of A and B obtained in the first place.
I don't think, James Reilly, that in the case of being metaphysically necessary to be "destined" to happen contingent things have or receive proper explanations or to say, that contignet things while being a "brute fact" have explanations. By the way wouldn't that "contingent thing explained by being a brute fact" be a self-contradiction like "square circle" or "married bachelor"?
Besides that, renaming "destiny" to "C" won't solve this issue. If A is explained by B and B is explained by A and the conjunction of A and B is explained by C, then given the PSR what is the explanation for C? Does C have or does it not have an explanation according to the PSR? Is that supposed to be God? Is that "destined" to be God? Is that just then a "God of the gaps''-argument? And what is the explanation for that God according to the PSR? Oh, I forgot that the circle and conjunction of A and B are supposed to be contingent and God itself is a non-contingent being, because of no other reason than "definitions". Then why can God be a non-contingent being and why can the circle and conjunction of A and B not be a non-contingent being? If God can, then what speaks against the circle or the conjunction of A and B being capable of similarly being non-contingent?
Am I understanding this correctly?
"I'm not sure. The point is that fact A (your presence) and fact B (Pruss' presence) both require an explanation. If it turns out that A is explained by B, and B is explained by A, then this is a circle, which is a problem. But if BOTH A and B are explained by a third fact C, then there ISN'T a circle, so there is no problem."
And what is that problem exactly? Your statement and claim of "there being a problem with the circular explanation", so your burden of proof of your claim of "there being a problem with the circular explanation".
"A circular explanation DOES violate the PSR as I formulated it, because the circle itself still requires an explanation. If the explanation of A is B, and the explanation of B is A, then this leaves the circle itself unexplained: we could still ask why the conjunction of A and B obtained in the first place.
No, as you have previously formulated the PSR, you and your PSR have only needed explanations for A and B and not necessarily for the circle or conjunction of (A AND B). Since the circle of (A and B) is accounting for the explanations of A and B [(A is explained by B) AND (B is explained by A), your PSR, as you have formulated it, have been satisfied with that circle of explanations. So what or where is that problem with that circle of explanation? Does it really need a seperate explanation? Why? Your statement and claim, so your burden of proof of your statement and claim.
NOT JUST STATE AND CLAIM SUCH AND SUCH. I need explanations for your claims and reiterations and repeats of statements and claims won’t do it for me.
Well, it’s not that I would need that explanation, since I’m not the proclaimer of the PSR here. But you are the proclaimer and proponent of the PSR here. So in order for you to be convincing in any given way, you have to give a bit more proper explanations than making unsubstantiated claims upon unsubstantiated claims.
I don't know what "destiny" is, but usually the word brings to mind some metaphysical or personal force that weaves the patterns of reality, something like the fates or a provident God or metaphysical necessity.
Whichever it is, on reflection, if A and B are both fated, I don't see how A can explain B and B explain A. Rather A and B are both explained by fate and destiny.
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