Suppose a burner is turned on, a pot is heated, and the water in the pot is boiled. On occasionalism, the heating of the pot is caused only by God, and the same is true for the boiling of the water.
But there are two ways of understanding this:
God causes the water to boil because the pot is being heated. God causes the pot to be heated because the burner is on. God causes the burner to be on because….
God causes the water to boil just because God causes the pot to be heated. God causes the pot to be heated just because God causes the burner to be turned on. God causes the burner to be on just because God causes…
On type 1 occasionalism, God reacts to events in the world, and one has real but non-causal explanatory connections in the world: the water boils because the burner is on. On type 2 occasionalism, there are no real explanatory connections between events in the world: they are all just the effects of God’s plan. Leibniz has type 2 occasionalism in intermonadic causation. And that’s a problem.
I am not saying that type 1 occasionalism has no problems. But at least it makes for real explanatory connections between events in the world, even if these are not causal.
1 comment:
Doesn't 1) ultimately collapse into 2) though?
Because 1), when fully fleshed out, should read something like this:
God causes the water to boil because the pot is being heated (by God). God causes the pot to be heated because the burner is on (by God's power). God causes the burner to be on because….
Therefore, God causes the water to boil because God causes the pot to be heated. So in all links in the causal chain God is the one responsible for causal action.
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