I have a weird view: when a dog or another substance ceases to exist, all its particles cease to exist, being replaced by new particles with very similar physical parameters (with the new physical parameters being predictable via the laws of nature). Similar things happen when a new substance comes into existence, and when a particle is incorporated into or leaves a substance: no particles survive such things.
I have good Aristotelian reasons for this view. Particles are not substances, since substances cannot have substances as parts, and hence ontologically depend on substances for their existence. Thus, when the substance perishes, the particles do as well.
The view seems preposterously unparsimonious. I disagree. Let’s compare the view to some competitors. First of all, it’s clear to me that some version of four-dimensionalism is true, so let’s start with four-dimensionalist views.
A standard four-dimensionalism is perdurantism: four-dimensional objects are made up of instantaneous temporal parts—infinitely many of them if time is continuous. These instantaneous temporal parts come in and out of existence all the time, with very similar physical parameters to their predecessors. My weird view is compatible with the idea that particles actually all exist only instantaneously, akin to the perdurantist’s temporal parts. Such a view could be more parsimonious than standard perdurantism for two reasons: first, it needn’t posit temporal parts of substances, and, second, it needn’t posit wholes made up of the instantaneous particles.
An alternate version of my weird view says that particles do not survive change of substance, but live as long as they recognizably remain in the same substance. Imagine a particle that is eaten by a dog and some months later sloughed off. On my view, there are three particle-like objects in the story: the pre-dog particle, the in-dog particle, and the post-dog particle. On standard perdurantism, there are as many particle-like objects as moments of time in this story. Granted, some may think it weirder that the temporal boundaries in the existence of particles are determined by their allegiances to substances rather than by instants of time. But there is nothing weird about that if one takes seriously the priority of substances to their parts.
My view is admittedly less parsimonious than a four-dimensionalist view on which substances and particles are temporally extended, have no temporal parts, and particles outlast their substances. But such a four-dimensionalist has an implausible consequence. Many people will find plausible the idea that in some exceptional cases substances can share parts: conjoined twins are a standard example. But on this version of four-dimensionalism, it is now a matter of course that distinct substances share parts. The dog dies and some of its particles become a part of a flower: so the dog and the flower, considered as four-dimensional entities, have these particles as common parts. You and I share probably share parts with dinosaurs. So while my weird view is less parsimonious than a no-temporal-parts four-dimensionalism with particles that outlive substances, it is not less plausible.
The main alternative to four-dimensionalism is presentism. Is a presentist version of my view less parsimonious than a typical competing presentist view? In one sense, not. For at the present time, my view doesn’t posit additional present particles over and beyond those present particles posited by competing presentist views. And only present particles exist according to presentism! But more seriously, my view does posits that particles cease to exist and come into existence more than on typical presentist alternatives. So in that sense it is less parsimonious.
Thus, parsimony cuts against my view on presentism, but it may actually favor it on four-dimensionalism.
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