One occasionally wonders what theism adds to Natural Law ethics. Here is one example.
- Q1: Why are artistic endeavors good?
Here, Natural Law answers by itself, without any help from theism:
- A1: Because they fulfill the human nature.
We can ask another question:
- Q2: Why do artistic endeavors fulfill the human nature?
Again, Natural Law answers by itself in a not very informative way:
- A2: Because necessarily the human nature teleologically directs its possessors to artistic endeavors.
But we can now ask a different question:
- Q3: Why are there beings with a nature that teleologically directs its possessors to artistic endeavors?
Natural Law by itself has no answer. Theism can go on to answer Q3:
- A3: God created beings with such a nature because artistic endeavors imitate God, who is the Good Itself.
One might say that Q3 is an etiological rather than normative question, and hence lies beyond the scope of value theory. But A3 also answers a value-theoretic variant of Q3:
- Q3a: What is it about artistic endeavors that makes them apt for being intrinsically good for a being, apt for being the telos of a nature?
To see the force of Q3a, imagine that we meet aliens and they spend a lot of time and energy on some activity that does not seem to conduce to or constitute any biological end of theirs, and does not seem to promote any end that we can understand. We ask the aliens about why they do this activity, and they say: “It’s good for us in and of itself, and our observation of your culture shows that you have no concept of this type of good.” They are otherwise smart and morally sensitive, so we trust that the activity is good for them, that it is a telos of their nature.
But even after we have learned that the activity is a telos of their nature and hence intrinsically good for them, we would be puzzled by the activity, and what makes it apt for being a good for them. A theistic story about how this good imitates God provides an answer to this kind of a question.
The question suggests, too, that not everything is apt for being good for a being, that not everything is apt for being the telos of a nature. And that, too, seems right. It does not seem that one could have a being for which the production of ugliness or the promotion of the suffering of others is intrinsically good. But I think only a theist can say something like that.
Indeed, this last point suggests another way in which theism helps Natural Law. Consider this objection to Natural Law:
- Cruelty would be wrong even for beings whose nature it was to be cruel, but according to Natural Law, if a being’s nature were to be cruel, cruelty would be right for that being.
But the theist can do something to help with this: cruelty is just not the sort of thing that a nature could aim at, since it is counterimitative of God. So the conditional about beings whose nature is to be cruel is a per impossibile one. And it is not surprising if strange results follow from impossible suppositions.
20 comments:
Alex
"It does not seem that one could have a being for which the production of ugliness or the promotion of the suffering of others is intrinsically good. But I think only a theist can say something like that."
If it is really impossible that one could have a being for which the production of ugliness or the promotion of the suffering of others is intrinsically good, then it is impossible even if God doesn't exist. So theism doesn't add anything of substance at all to Natural Law.
It may be nice to have an example, so that we can say, look, let us imitate God, because he is a perfect example of goodness. But unless one already knows that e.g. ugliness is not intrinsically good there is no basis on which to decide that imitating God would not entail ugliness.
Dr. Pruss, have you and Joshua L. Rasmussen ever made a response to Graham Oppys’ critiques of Necessary Existence? If not, do you plan on doing so.
https://philpapers.org/rec/OPPARP
Walter, I read Dr. Pruss as saying that a theist can provide justification or grounds for the natural law--by arguing that it is imitative of God. This grounding would be the substance theism adds to natural law.
Also: he seems to be concerned with metaphysical, not epistemological, grounding.
Don
Being imitative of God is not a metaphysical grounding of natural law. Natural law entails what is good for us and the truth of what is good for us is not dependent on God, just like 1 + 2 = 2 is not dependent on God.
Natural law being imitative of God would make some sense as epistemological grounding, but it doesn't work as metaphysical grounding.
Walter, natural law isn't necessary and involves teleology, neither of which applies to mathematics.
I read the alien scenario as specifically saying that regardless of our knowledge of it, the natural law itself can be grounded insofar as it is an imitation of God (God's nature or eternal law, however one wishes to put it). Dr. Pruss's imitation concept, as I read it, is not to be applied to specific actions but to the natural law itself. So, the natural law for any given nature (human, alien, etc) is grounded in being an imitation or manifestation of God's nature. I admit I may be misreading him though.
I should clarify: I don't think the imitation concept was intended to be applied to specific actions epistemologically. Again, that seems to be the point of the alien scenario.
Actually, I was thinking of particular kinds of actions.
Think of a partial list of the basic goods in human life:
- friendship
- knowledge
- play
- aesthetic appreciation.
We can ground why these are good for us by saying that our nature's teleology directs us towards them. But there is still another question: What is it about these things that makes them appropriate final targets for a nature's teleology, in a way in which, say, the production of ugliness is not? And the suggestion is that what makes them appropriate as final targets of a nature's teleology is that they image God in some way. This is easy to see for friendship, knowledge and appreciation. It's less clear for play, but I think I have a story.
Yeah, I confused myself early on but realized it later. The point of your post it seems is that a nature's teleology, which will play a vital role for specific actions, have metaphysical grounding--not epistemic grounding (at least not for this discussion).
Don
If natural law isn't necessary, then there is no reason why the production of ugliness would not be an appropriate final target for a nature's teleology.
You need the necessary proposition that ugliness is not good for that.
If there were a possible world in which ugliness was good, in that possible world, ugliness would be an appropriate target for a nature's teleology.
Walter, my initial point was to clarify Dr. Pruss's emphasis on metaphysically grounding a nature's teleology. Beyond that I don't think I can offer much.
In terms of natural law and necessity, I'm not sure what you mean when you say that natural law is necessary. Obviously it's not that humans, for example, need to exist. If you're saying that humans, if they exist, must have such and such a nature, I don't see how this escapes the need for grounding that nature. It would be like saying that the fact that coffee makers make coffee needs no explanation because coffee makers necessarily make coffee. If you're saying something else I'd need clarification. I'd rather not comment on ugliness in particular because I'm uncertain about it.
Don
It's not just that if humans exist, they must have such and such nature, it is that no sentient being could have a nature for which e.g. ugliness could be an appropriate final target. That's the necessary truths entailed by Alex's version of natural law.
And that truth cannot possibly be dependent upon God, just like "if there is a 1 and we add another 1, we get 2" is not dependent upon God.
Necessary truths need no other grouding.
Pretty much every classical theist will want to say that a world where the just suffer immensely for eternity and the wicked get delights for eternity is impossible. Why is it impossible? Because God wouldn't create such a world. So classical theists do want to say that at least some necessities are grounded in God.
On my account of modality, modality is grounded in the causal powers of substances, including especially God. So, yes, modal truths are dependent on God.
Walter, I don't know what to make of mathematical truths but I don't think they float about in some Platonic realm. Maybe such truths require "no other" grounding, but just stating them doesn't count as providing any grounding for them.
More importantly, it's the teleology of a nature, not propositions, that is being claimed needs grounding.
I can see the plausibility of making purely logical truths not need any grounding. But the mathematical truths that go beyond the merely logical (say, Goedelian unprovables, or set theoretic assertions independent of ZFC like the Continuum Hypothesis) which seem to me to very much call for a grounding.
Alex
A world where the just suffer immensely for eternity and the wicked get delights for eternity is impossible because it's impossible for God to create such a world, just like it is impossible for God to create square circles.
Modality cannot be grounded in the causal powers of substances. God cannot create square circles is not grounded in the fact that God lacks a certain causal power, but in the fact that square circles cannot exist regardless of causal powers.
Don
If the teleology is necessary it doesn't need grounding.
Walter, I don't grant that the teleology is necessary because I don't know what you mean by that. But even if granted, why does it follow that it doesn't need grounding? Again, if it's necessary in the coffee maker sense then it just doesn't follow that it doesn't need grounding, and that could just as well apply for other senses of that statement.
We're just going in circles now but I guess our difference is going to lie in the statement that "teleology is necessary" (which is a statement that applies to trees as much as humans) and what that means, and in the claim that necessity (which is not always taken in the mathematical sense) needs no grounding.
Don
I explained what I mean by the necessity in my reply to Alex.
It's not just that it doesn't need grounding, it simply cannot be grounded.
Something that is impossible cannot be made possible, not even by God, so if it is impossible that one could have a being for which the production of ugliness or the promotion of the suffering of others is intrinsically good, that already entails that a teleology that promotes the production of beauty and the well-being of others is necessarily intrisically good, whether God exist or not. God cannot make such things intrinsically bad.
Now, maybe you feel we are going in circles, but I don't see any other way to clarify my point, so we'll have to agree to disagree on this.
Walter, thanks for the clarification. Your argument seems to be that if morality necessarily aims at the good then morality cannot be grounded. Unless one claims Platonism, the good which moral beings desire (even if they desire it necessarily) will need to be grounded in something.
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