We might call the following three statements "the Paradox of Charity":
In charity, we love our neighbor primarily because of our neighbor’s relation to God.
In the best kind of love, we love our neighbor primarily because of our neighbor’s intrinsic properties.
Charity is the best kind of love.
I think this paradox discloses something very deep.
Note that the above three statements do not by themselves constitute a strictly logical contradiction. To get a strictly logical contradiction we need a premise like:
- No intrinsic property of our neighbor is a relation to God.
Now, let’s think (2) through. I think our best reason for accepting (2) is not abstract considerations of intrinsicness, but particular cases of properties. In the best kind of love, perhaps, we love our neighbor because our neighbor is a human being, is a finite person, has a potential for human flourishing, etc. We may think that these features are intrinsic to our neighbor, but we directly see them as apt reasons for the best kind of love, without depending on their intrinsicness.
But suppose ontological investigation of such paradigm properties for which one loves one’s neighbor with the best kind of love showed that these properties are actually relational rather than intrinsic. Would that make us doubt that these properties are a fit reason for the best kind of love? Not at all! Rather, if we were to learn that, we would simply deny (2). (And notice that plenty of continentally-inclined philosophers do think that personhood is relational.)
And that is my solution. I think (1), (3) and (4) are true. I also think that the best kind of neighbor love is motivated by reasons such as that our neighbor is a human being, or a person, or has a potential for human flourishing. I conclude from (1), (3) and (4) that these properties are relations to God.
But how could these be relations to God? Well, all the reality in a finite being is a participation in God. Thus, being human, being a finite person and having a potential for human flourishing are all ways of participating in God, and hence are relations to God. Indeed, I think:
- Every property of every creature is a relation to God.
It follows that no creature has any intrinsic property. The closest we come to having intrinsic properties are what one might call “almost intrinsic properties”—properties that are relational to God alone.
We can now come back to the original argument. Once we have seen that all creaturely properties are participations in God, we have no reason to affirm (2). But we can still affirm, if we like:
- In the best kind of love, we love our neighbor primarily because of our neighbor’s almost intrinsic properties, i.e., our neighbor’s relations only to God.
And there is no tension with (1) any more.
4 comments:
Could we defend (5) by appealing to some sort of divine conceptualism about universals? Thus we could say that for a creature to have any feature F whatsoever is for them to (Bradley's regress aside) 'fall under' some divine idea.* I don't like any form of conceptualism about universals and this may somewhat trivialise (5), but would it do the work you need to be done?
Or maybe we should just deny that loving our neighbor primarily because of his intrinsic properties is the best kind of love by itself? You could easily say that the hierarchy of love is such that loving them because of their relation to God, or for God's sake, is first, and then second is loving them due to their intrinsic value. They don't compete with each other, but both have their place.
Another approach could be to say that loving others due to their intrinsic properties is good, and since all goodness is rooted in God who is infinite goodness, God also loves others in this way, and this itself is also a relation to God because that too reflects God's nature, albeit indirectly as it's not in relation to God simply but through the goodness of loving others due to intrinsic properties being also rooted in God.
As for intrinsicness, you say that:
"We may think that these features are intrinsic to our neighbor, but we directly see them as apt reasons for the best kind of love, without depending on their intrinsicness."
I think a plausible response to that would be that this by itself isn't enough to establish a foundation for loving your neighbor, but these things must also be possessed by your neighbor as well. These properties may be good reasons for love in the abstract, but they are only concretely actionable and fully realised justifications when they are indeed intrinsic to someone. They must be "intrinsicized" so to speak, otherwise we can't say the person has any value at all as the properties would just float outside of the person himself, so we wouldn't be loving the person as such but the external reasons for loving in the abstract, as related to the person.
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