According to the principle of existential inertia:
- If x exists at t1 and t2 > t1 and there is no cause of x’s not existing at t2, then x exists at t2.
This sounds weird, and one way to get at the weirdness for me is to put it in terms of relativity theory. Times are spacelike hypersurfaces. So, then:
- If x exists somewhere on a spacelike hypersurface H1 and H2 is a later spacelike hypersurface and there is no cause of x’s not existing on H2, then x exists on H2.
This seems weird to me. Why should being in one specific area of spacetime metaphysically push one to exist in another specific area of spacetime? I can see how existing in one area of spacetime could physically push one to exist in another. But metaphysically? That seems odd.
4 comments:
Hey Alex! My co-author and I discuss a very similar objection in Section 7.3.9 of our book (Existential Inertia and Classical Theistic Proofs) -- I would love for you to check it out! And let know if you need access to the book -- I can help :)
Your post boils down to laying out the existential inertia thesis (EIT), calling it “weird,” then floating this vague idea of ‘metaphysical pushing,’ but it stops short of offering a real critique. What is a “metaphysical push” and why should EIT be interpreted that way?
Firstly, it's not immediately clear what a purely "metaphysical push" from one hypersurface to another would even entail, or why EIT must be interpreted that way. Part of the confusion might come from how ‘existential inertia’ is interpreted. The term is ambiguous between:
1. The Thesis (EIT): A descriptive claim that some temporal concrete objects persist without external sustenance or destruction
2. The Phenomenon (Inertial Persistence): The actual persistence of objects as EIT describes
Your post seems to engage with EIT as a thesis, but the “weirdness” might blur into assumptions about the phenomenon or its explanation. This ties into two common mistakes people make when discussing EIT: (a) assuming EIT explains persistence, (b) thinking EIT makes persistence brute.
(a) EIT isn’t an explanation, it’s a description. It says some objects persist without sustenance or destruction, but it doesn’t claim to tell us why they do. Your question about “why” existence in one area leads to another might assume EIT owes us an answer here, when really it’s silent on the cause. It leaves that to separate metaphysical accounts, e.g. tendency-disposition accounts, transtemporal accounts, law-based accounts, necessity accounts, no-change accounts.
(b) You don’t explicitly say this, but the unease with “metaphysical pushing” could suggest a worry that EIT leaves persistence unexplained or inexplicable. That’s not true, EIT is neutral on whether persistence has an explanation. It’s compatible with many inertialist-friendly accounts that explain persistence without external sustenance, e.g. tendency-disposition accounts, transtemporal accounts, law-based accounts, necessity accounts, no-change accounts.
Secondly, you’ve said it yourself in Infinity, Causation, and Paradox (p. 12): 'the strange and the absurd (or impossible) are different, as is proved by the strangeness of the platypus.' So unless 'metaphysical pushing' becomes a real objection, EIT stands up just fine.
I thought it was something like a principle that there is a tendency to persist. Perhaps I was misled by the term "inertia" which to me signals a tendency.
MoR: Or you could just send me the section? Thanks so much!
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