Permissivism about lying

I am an absolutist about lying: I think it’s always wrong to lie. But even if I were a permissivist about lying, I would think that there are certain subject matters about which it is always wrong to lie, no matter the costs and benefits. It is completely clear to me, for instance, that it is wrong for Christians to lie about their allegiance to Christ, no matter what the cost. There are two grounds for this: first, the Christian tradition of martyrdom makes this clear and, second, it is clear that Peter’s lying three times that he doesn’t know Jesus is treated as a sin by both Peter and Jesus.

If lying isn’t always wrong, but it is always wrong to lie about one’s allegiance to Christ, where do we draw the line? Observe that it is similarly wrong for a Christian to deny that Jesus is God as it is to deny being a Christian. This is also clear from the Christian tradition on martyrdom. Thus, it is not only always wrong to lie about allegiance to Christ, but it is also always wrong to testify falsely about central Christian doctrines.

If we think lying isn’t always wrong, we now have a choice point: Do we say that all lies about religion are wrong or only lies about major theological matters?

Here is a reason to think that all lies about religion are wrong. Suppose you are a non-Christian friend who trusts me completely, so that I could get you to become a Christian by lying to you that I privately witnessed something that would be an undeniable miracle—say, when I was a kid my dog was crushed by a truck, and I prayed fervently to Jesus and the dog immediately came back to full health. If it is permissible to lie to save lives, it is permissible to lie to save souls. But it is clearly wrong to lie about the miracle. However, whether Jesus healed my particular dog is a religious matter of very little theological importance, and the lie is in support of an important theological truth (namely, that Jesus has the power of healing). So I conclude it’s always wrong to lie about religious matters.

But now notice this. Sometimes absolutists about lying offer clever solutions to cases like the Nazi at the door case. For instance, instead of saying “I do have a Jewish family in my basement” in response to the Nazi’s question whether there are any Jews in the house, one could say perfectly truthfully that one would never allow anyone into one’s house who is a member of a race that is opposed to the flourishing of the German people (one just omits one’s belief that there is in fact no such race). Permissivists about lying tend to respond by noting that it’s easy to modify the case so that such clever solutions don’t work. For instance, the cleverer Nazi could respond: “Whatever! But do you have anybody in your house whose ancestors prayed in Hebrew?” And now the absolutist likely has no clever answer. The absolutist, no matter how clever, has to admit there are times where moral restrictions on lying make it impossible to save people one is hiding from evildoers.

But this is also true if lying isn’t always wrong. For suppose that a clever Nazi says: “I know some Christians think that we are unjustly persecuting minorities, and that Jesus would want them be rescued from such persecution. Are you such a Christian?” Since it’s always wrong to lie about religious matters, you must say “Yes”, absent some clever way out which won’t always be available. But as soon as you say “Yes” to this, it seems quite unlikely that the Nazi will believe you if lie that, in fact, you aren’t hiding any Jews—they will want to search your house to be sure. Thus, even if the prohibition on lying is restricted to religious matters, there will be cases where moral restrictions on lying make it impossible to save people one is hiding from evildoers.

Or, suppose, that after you lied about who is in your basement, the clever Nazi went on to ask: “Do you think Christianity would permit you to lie about who is in your basement if you thought you were hiding innocent people?” Again, if lying about religious matters is always wrong, you must say “Yes”, and now there is no avoiding a search of the house.

I conclude that a Christian who is a permissivist about lying will still have situations where the prohibition on lying prevents saving people from Nazis at the door. One might respond that such cases are much less common than the ones the absolutist faces. Maybe. But there are also cases where absolutists are able to save people whom the morally upright permissivist cannot. Suppose a country where members of a minority are being executed for very minor crimes. A friend of yours is accused of a very minor crime, but they were with you at the time of the alleged crime. If you are a permissivist, you will say “They were with me”, but if the prosecutor were to go on to ask “But if they weren’t with you, would your religion allow you to lie about that in order to save their life?” you would have to say “Yes”, since it’s wrong to lie about religious matters.

Furthermore, the permissivist Christian needs an account of why it is that it is always wrong to lie about religious matters, even minor ones, if it is not always wrong to lie.

This post doesn’t prove absolutism, but I think does shift the evidence in favor of absolutism.

The above was predicated on this intuition:

1. Even if it is not always wrong to lie, it is always wrong to lie about one’s religion.

Here is another intuition in the vicinity, which could also be used in a similar way to my above arguments:

2. Even if it is not always wrong to lie, it is always wrong to lie about morality.