Showing posts sorted by relevance for query contingent brute fact. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query contingent brute fact. Sort by date Show all posts

Wednesday, October 27, 2021

Are free actions a counterexample to the PSR?

I’ve argued somewhat as follows in the past:

  1. Necessarily, no one is responsible for a brute fact—an unexplained contingent fact.

  2. Necessarily, someone is responsible for every free decision or free action.

  3. So, it is impossible for a free decision or free action to be a brute fact.

But then:

  1. Necessarily, a counterexample to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is a brute fact.

  2. So, no free decision or free action can be a counterexample to the PSR.

One may imagine someone, however, arguing that although a free decision or a free action cannot be a counterexample to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, a contrastive report, such as that x freely chose to do A rather than B, could be a counterexample to the Principle of Sufficient Reason. But notice that if x freely chose to do A rather than B, then x is responsible for choosing to do A rather than B. Similarly if x freely chose to do A for reason R rather than B for S, then x is responsible for doing so. Freedom implies responsibility. But no one is responsible for a brute fact, so such contrastive reports cannot be reports of a brute fact.

Objection 1: Incompatibilism is true, and on incompatibilism it is obvious that no possible explanation can be given for why x freely chose to do A for R rather than B for S. Hence the Principle of Sufficient Reason is false.

Response: Given that no one is responsible for what has no explanation, if the “no possible explanation” claim is correct, then free will is impossible. Thus, rather than showing that the PSR is false, the argument would show that if incompatibilism is true, free will is impossible. As a libertarian, I think free will is possible (and actual). But it is important to keep clear on what it is that is really endangered by the argument: it is free will and not the PSR.

Objection 2: Freedom is a necessary but not sufficient condition for responsibility.

Response: I am not sure about this. When I think about what other conditions we need to add to freedom to yield responsibility, the only one I can think of is something like knowledge of what is at stake. But it is arguable that without knowledge of what is at stake, a choice is not free. Moreover, even if one does not know what is at stake with A and B beyond what is contained in the respective reasons R and S, one will still be responsible for choosing A for R rather than B for S if one chooses freely for these reasons. One just won’t be responsible for the further aspects, beyond those captured by R and S, that one does not know.

But let’s grant for the sake of argument that other conditions need to be added to freedom to yield responsibility. If so, then the claim has to be that free but non-responsible decisions or actions or contrastive reports thereof are a counterexample to the PSR although free and responsible ones are not. In other words, one has to hold that the alleged additional conditions that need to be added to freedom to yield responsibility are what secures explicability. But given that the most plausible candidate for the other conditions is knowledge of what is at stake, this is implausible. For a free action based on mistaken or limited knowledge is no less explicable than an action based on full knowledge, once one takes into account the agent’s epistemic deficiency.

Thursday, November 16, 2017

A version of the cosmological argument from preservation

Suppose that all immediate causation is simultaneous. The only way to make this fit with the obvious fact that there is diachronic causation is to make diachronic causation be mediate. And there is one standard way of making mediate diachronic causation out of immediate synchronic causation: temporally extended causal relata. Suppose that A lasts from time 0 to time 3, B lasts from time 2 to time 5, and C lasts from time 4 to time 10 (these can be substances or events). Then A can synchronically cause B at time 2 or 3, B can synchronically cause C at time 4 or 5, and one can combine the two immediate synchronic causal relations into a mediate diachronic causal relation between A and C, even though there is no time at which we have both A and C.

The problem with this approach is explaining the persistence of A, B and C over time. If we believe in irreducibly diachronic causation, then we can say that B’s existence at time 2 causes B’s existence at time 3, and so on. But this move is not available to the defender of purely simultaneous causation, except maybe at the cost of an infinite regress: maybe B’s existence from time 2.00 to time 2.75 causes B’s existence from time 2.50 to time 3.00; but now we ask about the causal relationship between B’s existence at time 2.00 and time 2.75.

So if we are to give a causal explanation of B’s persistence from time 2 to time 5, it will have to be in terms of the simultaneous causal efficacy of some other persisting entity. But this leads to a regress that is intuitively vicious.

Thus, we must come at the end to at least one persisting entity E such that E’s persistence from some time t1 to some time t2 has no causal explanation. And if we started our question with asking about the persistence of something that persists over some times today, then these times t1 and t2 are today.

Even if we allow for some facts to be unexplained contingent “brute” facts, the persistence of ordinary objects over time shouldn’t be like that. Moreover, it doesn’t seem right to suppose that the ultimate explanations of the persistence of objects involve objects whose own persistence is brute. For that makes it ultimately be a brute fact that reality as a whole persists, a brute and surprising fact.

So, plausibly, we have to say that although E’s persistence from t1 to t2 has no causal explanation, it has some other kind of explanation. The most plausible candidate for this kind of explanation is that E is imperishable: that it is logically impossible for E to perish.

Hence, if all immediate causation is simultaneous, very likely there is something imperishable. And the imperishable entity or entities then cause things to exist at the time at which they exist, thereby explaining their persistence.

On the theory that God is the imperishable entity, the above explains why for Aquinas preservation and creation are the same.

(It’s a pity that I don’t think all immediate causation is simultaneous.)

Problem: Suppose E immediately makes B persist from time 2 to time 4, by immediately causing it to exist at all the times from 2 to 4. Surely, though, E exists at time 4 because it existed at time 2. And this “because” is hard to explain.

Response: We can say that B exists at time 4 because of its esse (or act of being) at time 2, provided that (a) B’s esse at time 2 is its being caused by E to exist at time 2, and (b) E causes B to exist at time 4 because (non-causally because) E caused B to exist at time 2. But once we say that B exists at time 4 because of its very own esse at time 2, it seems we’ve saved the “because” claim in the problem.

Saturday, May 3, 2008

Philosophy needs the Principle of Sufficient Reason

I claim that much of philosophy depends on the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), namely the claim that all facts have explanations.

It is morally acceptable to redirect a speeding trolley from a track on which there are five people onto a track with only one person. On the other hand, it is not right to shoot one innocent person to save five. What is the morally relevant difference between the two cases? If we denied the PSR, then we could simply say: “Who cares? Both of these moral facts are just brute facts, with no explanation.” Why, indeed, suppose that there should be some explanation of the difference in moral evaluation if we accept the denial of the PSR, and hence accept that there can be facts with no explanation at all?

Almost all moral theorists accept the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral. But without the PSR, would we really have reason to accept that? We could simply suppose brute contingent facts. In this world, torture is wrong. In that world, exactly alike in every other respect, torture is a duty. Why? No reason, just contingent brute fact.

The denial of the PSR, thus, would bring much philosophical argumentation to a standstill.

Note: This, like the previous post and at least one earlier post, is an excerpt from a paper I am finishing on Leibnizian cosmological arguments.

Tuesday, February 10, 2026

Optimalism and mediocritism

We can think of the optimalist theory of ultimate explanation as the claim:

  1. Necessarily, that reality is for the best explains everything.

(I won’t worry in this post about two details. First, whether “reality” in (1) includes the principle of optimality itself—Rescher has suggested that it does, since it’s for the best that everything be for the best. Second, whether “reality” is all the detail of the world, or just the “core” of the world—the aspects not set by indeterministic causation.)

Given that only truths explain, (1) entails:

  1. Necessarily, reality is for the best.

Notice that one could accept (2) without accepting (1). One might, for instance, be a Leibnizian and think that there is a two-fold structure to ultimate explanation: first, God’s existence is explained by the ontological argument and, second, God creates the best contingent reality. On this account everything is for the best, but that everything is for the best is not the ultimate explanation, because it does not explain why God exists. Or one might think that reality is necessary and brute, and it brutely has to be like it is. And as a very suprising but non-explanatory matter of fact the way it is is in fact optimal.

I am emphasizing this, because I want to problematize (1). Grant (2). Why should we think that the fact that everything is for the best in fact explains everything?

Suppose that modal fatalism is true, and that it so happens that reality is exactly mid-way between the worst and the best possibility, and is in the only option mid-way between the worst and best. (I assume one can talk of options for reality even given modal fatalism. Otherwise, optimalism falls apart. The “options for reality” may be something like narrowly logically possible worlds.) Then:

  1. Necessarily, reality is exactly middling.

Now suppose a “mediocritist” said: “And that reality is necessarily exactly middling explains why reality is what it is.” But why would we buy that? Or suppose that reality is necessarily the only one that is exactly 56.4% of the way up between the worst and the best (where worst would count as 0% of the way up and best as 100%)? Surely we wouldn’t conclude that its being exactly at 56.4% explains why it is the way it is. But if not, then why should its being at 50% explain it, as on mediocritism, or its being at 100% explain it, as on optimalism?

I think what the optimalist ought to say at this point is that analogously to non-Humean pushy laws of nature, there are non-Humean pushy laws of metaphysics. One of these laws is that everything is for the best. It is the pushiness of this metaphysical law that explains reality. But there is something rather odd about pushy laws prior to all beings—they seem really problematically ungrounded.

Monday, October 22, 2018

The five minute hypothesis

Let S(t) be the state our universe actually has t units of time after the Big Bang.

Let’s suppose that our universe begins at time 0, i.e., at the Big Bang. Then we can ask this question:

  1. Why did the universe begin to exist in state S(0) rather than in one of the infinitely many states S(t) for t > 0?

If naturalism is true, the universe’s beginning as it does is probably a brute (unexplained) contingent fact. And while the state S(0) is rather different in physical arrangement from the states S(t) for t > 0, it does not seem different with respect to the likelihood of brutely coming into existence ex nihilo. So the question (1) is not easily to be dismissed, in the way that one might dismiss the question “Why is the third digit of the gravitational constant in SI units a 7 instead of some other digit?” by saying “Well, it had to something, and there is nothing special about 7.” For there is something special about S(0), namely that it is a singularity state that blocks retrodiction, but this something special does not seem relevant to the likelihood of brutely coming into existence—if only because brute coming into existence cannot be probabilistically quantified.

Theism, on the other hand, provides a satisfying answer to (1). First, as a warmup, we might have a good theistic story why the initial state isn’t S(t) for a very large t: perhaps the universe will no longer be habitable after t, and God has good reason to create a habitable universe. Second, we have a good reason why the initial state should be S(0): a singularity is a natural barrier to retrodiction, and so creating a universe whose past goes back to a singularity is creating a universe where the retrodictive knowledge of beings like us is maximized (cf. Robin Collins’ ideas on our world being optimized for science). And knowledge is good. So God has reason to create a world in initial state S(0).

Technical note: Perhaps there is no singularity state S(0), but instead there are states S(t) for t > 0. If so, then replace S(t) in the above argument by something facts about limits from above of S(t). Abstractly, we can form such units as disjunctions of shrinking conjunctions: let U(t)=⋁δ>0⋀0<ϵ<δS(t+ϵ), and say that the universe “begins to exist in state U(t)” provided that it doesn’t exist time t or earlier, but that U(t) correctly describes an opening interval of the universe’s existence. Then replace (1) with the question:

  1. Why did the universe begin to exist in state U(0) rather than in one of the infinitely many states S(t) or U(t)?