This argument seems sound.
- It is wrong to hate a creature of God.
- It is wrong to hate God.
- Everything is either God or a creature of God.
- So there is nothing which it is permissible to hate.
But on the other hand, surely one should hate sin, vice, war, divorce, etc. (Note that one can say this even if one thinks that sometimes war and divore are permissible.) Thus there must be a sense in which sin, vice, war and divorce do not exist. In the case of sin and vice, and maybe divorce, this is handled by Augustine's old move: evils are privations. But war is not a privation, though it involves privations.
So our initial argument teaches us some ontology. It must be true to say that war does not exist. For this ontology not to be ad hoc, I think we need to say that there are no such things as situations, non-abstract states of affairs or events.
If we further think there are some artifacts which it is permissible to hate—perhaps there is nothing wrong with hating nuclear weapons or certain books—we will have to conclude that there are no such things as mere artifacts.[note 1]
Of course, we still have to be able to say things like: "There are wars and nuclear weapons." So we need a way of using existential language that isn't tied closely to the correct ontology.