Saturday, November 23, 2019

Characterizing actions by the reasons against them

It is plausible that the reasons for which one chooses an action help determine the kind of action it is. Plausibly, an action is a murder if one performs it because it will kill an innocent.

But it is also interesting that the reasons against which one chooses an action also help determine the character of an action. This is true both in good and bad actions. Some actions are acts of courage in part because they are done contrary to reasons of one’s own safety. And some actions are acts of gross negligence in part because they are done contrary to reasons of the safety of another. If, on the other hand, the reasons of safety did not enter into deliberation at all, the act, in both cases, may well be a case of recklessness.


Philip Rand said...

Jumping to conclusions is always reckless...

The interesting question is: Why?

Interestingly, the answer has nothing to do with reasons but rather on the speed of the action and the type of space the action does work...

Philip Rand said...

The anomaly in an Aristotelian/Aquinas account of the above description is that such a model will attempt to use "motion" as the procrustean hinge to satisfy it.

The problem with this is that Aristotelain/Aquinas "motion" is delimited to two types:
1/ Natural Motion
2/ Violent Motion

Using this definition the Aristotle/Aquinas model is faced with grave difficulties with the following example;

Is the collision of two protons in the LHC a natural or violent motion?

The example reveals that both concepts Natural Motion and Violent Motion are non-formal terms and therefore un-intelligible.