I think the following two claims are plausible:
If God exists and there is a lot of evil, then we would expect that some of the evil is such that we cannot see its point.
If God doesn’t exist and there is a lot of evil, then we would expect that some of the evil is such that we cannot see its point.
Premise 2 is pretty plausible: without God, and given a lot of evil, we’d expect evils to be pretty much random, some of them connected to goods that give them a point and others not. Now, if God exists and allows for a lot of evil, then there will be a point to all the evil allowed. And it would be intrinsically good for us to see the point of any particular evil, since knowledge is intrinsically good. But given the assumption that God has allowed a lot of evil, it would be surprising if all of this evil was such that its point (a) could be understood by us and (b) it would be on balance good for us to understand its point. In regard to (a), we can cite our cognitive limitations. In regard to (b), we can cite the fact that it is likely that some of the justifications for permissions of evil would involve soul-building, whereas it is very plausible that some soul-building would require techniques that are hidden from its beneficiaries.
Thus, once one has already taken into account the fact that there is a lot of evil, observing that there are evils that we cannot see the point of does not yield much evidence for or against the existence of God. It may, of course, yield some evidence if the degrees of expectation in (1) and (2) are different, but not much.
If this is right, then Rowe-style “evidential” arguments from evil don’t accomplish much beyond the “naive” argument that God wouldn’t allow so much evil.
Of course, one might try to argue that it’s not just the existence of pointless evil that is relevant, but how common it is. But then one would need to get into a messy discussion of just how common it is, and how common one would expect it to be on theism and on atheism.
45 comments:
Alex
The argument that God would not allow so much evil is not "naive".
It follows from defining God as "the Good" that there would be no evil at all unless evil is necessary to accomplish the good. That's the only possible "point" evil can have if
God exists.
The probability that there is a point to all the evil allowed, that means, the probability that God, who is omnipotent and omniscient, whose capabilities include even outrageously absurd things like creating from absolutely nothing, is incapable of accomplishing the good without allowing the amounts of pointless evils we observe is infinitesimally small, that is, practically zero.
I also do not agree that that some soul-building would require techniques that are hidden from its beneficiaries. Actually, given what theists (and especially those of the Natural Law variety) (claim to ) know about God's nature and the human soul, 'soul building' is very easy to understand, as well as the "techniques" that would be required to "build" a soul.
Gratuitous Evil is fully defined within the Bible under the term Mystery of Iniquity.
There really should be no problem with this... one can even derive a computer simulation from it...
Walter, God is not a moral agent and certainly not judgable in a human way. So "the point" of evil, to accomplish another good, need not be appealing to us. Further more, you´d need to provide an objective account of good and evil in order to make the judgment that God could not allow the supposed evil and still act in accordance with the account of good. It is dubious that this can be done one a secular basis. Following Brian Davies, the problem as anything more than a puzzle for limited observers, becomes nonexistent.
Add to that the fact, that if something like the strong Leibnizian or the weaker Scholastic PSR holds, then it is guaranteed that the perceived evil has an explanation.
Dominik Kowalski
Your tabled position that:
God is not a moral agent and certainly not judgable in a human way.
is really interesting.... do you realise that the evil one's accusation against God is that God is NOT Just NOR Loving... very interesting...
The logic of Pruss' argument makes sense; but I don't see why we should think that each individual permitted evil needs to have an individual good that it accomplishes. The Bible's account is that there are two HUGE UNIVERSAL goods which can only be accomplished by permitting rebellious humankind and angelkind (Satan and his demons) to live for a time under their own rule. Once that's resolved, as at least a dozen Bible prophecies indicate, wickedness and wicked ones will be done away with and there will no longer be any evil at all. Even the so-called "natural evils" will be done away with, if Isaiah isn't completely off-base. So, if "soul-building" requires evil, then there will be no "soul-building" at that time. These small, individuated "goods" are not the point. At least, not according to the Scriptures.
Philip that doesn't follow and it is painfully obvious that you are not familiar with the relevant literature or the work of Davies. And discussing with you has already been proven to be futile on Fesers blog, so I wont bother here.
Michael Gonzalez
The Pruss argument is completely an Aristotelian (with some Pythagoreanism added) view of an hexis... it is not at all Biblical; nor is its foundation empirically grounded, i.e. "secondary issues".
To quote Feser concerning his book Aristotle's Revenge:
'One could even reject everything I say about these secondary issues while agreeing with my “big picture” thesis.' [Edward Feser]
Pruss's argument is simply to deflect one from secondary issues as Feser suggests is the point...
Dominik
If God is not judgable in a human way, no human should call Him "good", because that most certainly is a human judgment.
Furthermore, the obvious fact that an alleged omnipotent and omniscient being can accomplish whatever good may mean without the amount of evil and suffering we observe doesn't need any human judgement of God's character. "Omnipotence" has a clear definition, it means being able to do everything that is logically possible, and the logical impossibility of a world with far less suffering and evil that would still allow for the same goods is something that needs to be argued, not asserted. And as yet, there hasn't been anything remotely like a good argument to show that. So, until further notice, the evidential problem of evil remains lethal for theism.
Even if the strong Liebnizian or the weaker scholastic PSR hold (and that's extremely controversial), the explanation for evil may be that the necessary being doesn't care about human beings at all.
Is calling something good, or its simply being good same thing as judgeing something as good?
Red
Being good is not equivalent to judging good.
Red
Calling something good is the same thing as judging something as good.
Being good is not the same as judging something good. One can be good without being called good.
Walter Van den Acker
The "evidential problem of evil" cannot possibly be "lethal"...
You admit that "evidence of good" and "evidence of evil" co-exist.
This requires a transition-point existing between "good" and "evil", i.e. the system is bi-polar stable, right?
Since this is your own explanation... the "evidence" shows that the problem of evil is not lethal at all because in fact levels of good and evil make no difference whatsoever to the system.
Interestly, levels of good and evil on a universal scale can be calculated. The result is quite interesting...
Walter Van den Acker
You see, what defeats your argument, Walter, is that your argument assumes the regulation of good and evil... it is the acceptance of regulation that defeats your own argument...
Quite simple, really... but, only when one has solved the problem and sees where confusions arise...
I doubt that. As something could be called good without us having particular standards that it fulfills.
Red
If something is called good and it fulfills no standards, we could just as well call it evil, or anything else, for that matter.
That's a dubious claim, as whatever is intrinsically good: God or anything else, isn't good because of fulfilling some external standard.
Red
Being good is ontological.
Judging good is epistemological.
Calling something good is metaphysical.
Being evil is ontological.
Judging evil is epistemological.
Calling something evil is metaphysical.
Secular equivalent to the problem of evil:
Pleasure is ontological.
Judging Pleasure is epistemological.
Calling something Pleasure is metaphysical.
Suffering is ontological.
Judging Suffering is epistemological.
Calling something Suffering is metaphysical.
So, it is quite trivial to model the primative variables...
Red
Whatever is intrinsically good, isn't good because of fulfilling some external standard, but it is called good because of some external standard.
Calling something or someone good is always a judgement. The issue is whether it is a moral judgement.
" Whatever is intrinsically good, isn't good because of fulfilling some external standard, but it is called good because of some external standard"
Not sure If I really understand that statement. Something intrinsically good is good because its its just is. At least that's how it seems to me.
Red
Something or someone may be intrinsically motivated to caused harm to others.That's an intrinsic property. What would you call such property and why?
Walter Van den Acker
The intrinsic motivation is a perceptual property of prejudice.
I guess an evaluation of such a property would depend on the kind of being that grounds it and what it intends with it.
Red
So, you admit that your own prejudice undervalues your reasoning... interesting, what you chaps admit without observing it...
Red
"I guess an evaluation of such a property would depend on the kind of being that grounds it and what it intends with it."
How is this not a judgement?
Walter Van den Acker
The Red response is NOT a judgement because it is not based on epistemology. It is prejudice based on perception NOT reason.
Red's reasoning is undervalued. This is also the main problem with Feser (just read his blog and books... interminable jargon and exposition... always a sure sign of someone who does not know his topic).
Because no evaluation is made here.
Walter: that an argument is naive doesn't mean it's a bad argument. The argument that positivism is self refuting is naive but good.
Alex
The argument I presented may be bad, although I have never seen any decent rejection of it, but it isn't naive.
Red
A "guess" is a (crude) evaluation.
Moreover, calling God "good" is an evaluation.
Yes, but not all evaluations are made by same standard.
abd my guess wasn't about goodness or badness, but about what could determine it.
Red
You admit that: not all evaluations are made by the same standard.
Which means that you retreat to using double-standards in an evaluation in order to avoid empirical evaluative foundations because you do not wish to take responsibility for the evaluation.
This is the approach Feser takes with his confessed remit of his book Aristotle's Revenge... interesting... is it perhaps the Scholastic approach, i.e. ipse dixit?
Red
"What could determine" goodness or badness is an evaluation, and since you are (I presume) a human being, you are always judging in a human way. You simply cannot avoid it.
Anyway, this is but a minor point and the argument I presented doesn't hinge on it.
I think it would be pretty irrational to deny that obtaining the same goal without any harm to anyone is better than if harm is done.
It doesn't take any superhuman powers to figure that out.
Now here, I think either you or me are confused about what "evaluation" or "in a human way" means here. There can't be an evaluation if no judgement about actual value is made.
And by "In a human way" I mean having the same standards and obligations as a human.
"I think it would be pretty irrational to deny that obtaining the same goal without any harm to anyone is better than if harm is done".
I don't have any developed account here but, there might be cases where this doesn't apply.
Again I think considerations related to intentions and foresight are relevant here, although I have also read criticism of this account.
Red
I don't see how there can be cases where obtaining the same goal without any harm to others is not better. Considerations regarding intentions and foresight are included in "obtaining the same goals".
Yes, but they determine whether the outcome is better or not.
Another problem with your view is that sometimes we do not know whether same goals can be obtained without harm.
Red
Of course, sometimes we do not know whether same goals can be obtained without harm.
But, given an omnipotent and omniscient being, the default position should be that this being can obtain the same goals without harm.
Of course, we might be wrong sometimes, but the point is that it is simply irrational to claim that we are wrong all the time.
Not sure how that is true. We would need to know the full range of obligations( if any), intentions, and modal constraints such a being has, which we don't.
We do know that its intentions are good. Obligations have nothing to do with it and an omnipotent being has no modal constraints other than it can't do what is logically possible.
Right, we know that they are ultimately good but we don't know what they exactly are.
There could only be a problem if we observe that certain event is such that if God existed he would be obligated to prevent or bring about, so obligations are very relevant.
And I think God's actions are constrained by a narrower metaphysical modality.
Red
Knowing they are ultimately good is enough for the argument to work.
If someonee"s intentions are ultimately good, then they cannot entail harm if harm is evitable. So the only question is whether all the billions of cases of harm are inevitable for an omniscient and omnipotent being and the chance that that is the case is infinitesimally small.
There can be no narrower metaphysical modality for God's actions. That would mean there is something external to God that limits what God can do. Omnipotence is, by definition, only limited by logical possibility and by God's necessary good nature, but that is covered in the argument.
But if we don't know what they actually are and what sort of obligations( if any) such being has, we can't know what sort of end it seeks to achieve and what are it's means, whether any particular instanceo harm is evitable or impermissible.
And we can't make the sort of probability assessment you make here.
And I don't know why that would require something external to God. If logic don't, this won't either. But these are all complex issues and not things I fully understand.
Walter Van den Acker
The crux of your argument is:
So the only question is whether all the billions of cases of harm are inevitable for an omniscient and omnipotent being and the chance that that is the case is infinitesimally small..
For this to be the case then it means that favour must be greater, i.e.
Cases of Favour > Cases of Harm
Which suggests using your own model that the Favour/Harm system works like Muller's Ratchet.
Which defeats your argument.
Red
At this stage I fear I can only repeat myself, so I am going to bow out.
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