Suppose that it's possible for us to create genuinely intelligent computers. If we achieved genuine sapience in a computer, we would have the sorts of duties towards it that we have towards other persons. There are difficult questions about whether we would be likely to fulfill these duties. For instance, it would be wrong to permanently shut off such a computer for anything less than the sorts of very grave reasons to make it permissible to disconnect a human being from life support (I think here about the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means in the Catholic tradition). Since keeping such a computer running is not likely to typically involve such reasons, it seems that we would likely have to keep such a computer running indefinitely. But would we be likely to do so? So that's part of one set of questions: Can we expect to treat such a computer with the respect due to a person, and, if not, do we have the moral right to create it?
Here's another line of thought. If we were going to make a computer that is a person, we would do so by a gradual series of steps that produce a series of systems that are more and more person-like. Along with this gradual series of steps would come a gradation in moral duties towards the system. It seems likely that progress along the road to intelligence would involve many failures. So we have a second set of questions: Do we have the moral right to create systems that are nearly persons but that are likely to suffer from a multitude of failures, and are we likely to treat these systems in the morally appropriate way?
On the other hand, we (except the small number of anti-natalists) think it is permissible to bring human beings into existence even though we know that any human being brought into the world will be mistreated by others on many occasions in her life, and will suffer from disease and disability. I feel, however, that the cases are not parallel, but I am not clear on exactly what is going on here. I think humans have something like a basic permission to engage in procreation, with some reasonable limitations.