There is an Aristotelian picture of knowledge on which all knowable things are divided exhaustively and exclusively into sciences by subject matter. This picture appears wrong. Suppose, after all, that p is a fact from one science—say, the natural science fact that water is wet—and q is a fact from another science—say, the anthropological fact that people pursue pleasure. Then the conjunction p and q does not belong to either of these science, or any other science.
One might cavil that a conjunction isn’t another fact over and beyond the conjuncts, that to say p and q is to say p and to say q. I am sceptical, but it’s easy to fix. Just replace my counterexample with something that isn’t a conjunction but is logically equivalent to it, say the claim that it’s not the case that either p or q is false.
2 comments:
One is tempted to say that the truth of the conjunction is from the science of logic, where conjunction is defined. Naturally, for the truth of the initial premises of the conjunction one appeals to the sciences in question.
For Aristotle, logic is not a demonstrative science but a tool used by all sciences. So if we want to be orthodox Aristotelians on that score, the Shadow’s solution won’t work.
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