When I think about McTaggart’s famous argument against the A-theory of time—the theory that it is an objective fact about the universe what time it is—I sometimes feel like it’s just a confusion but sometimes I feel like I am on the very edge of getting it, and that there is something to the argument. When I try to capture the latter feeling in an argument that actually has a chance of being sound, I find it slipping away from me.
So for the nth time in my life, let me try again to make something of McTaggart style arguments. Last night I gave a talk at University of North Texas. When I gave the talk, it was present, and afterwards it became past, and every second that talk is receding another second into the past, becoming more and more past, “older and older” we might say. There is something odd about this, however, since the talk doesn’t exist now. Something that no longer exists can’t change anymore. So how can the talk recede into the further past, how can it become older and older?
Well, we do have a tool for making sense of this. Things that no longer exist can’t really change, but they can have Cambridge change, change relative to something else. Suppose a racehorse is eventually forgotten after its death. The horse isn’t, of course, really changing, but there is real change elsewhere.
More generally, we learn from McTaggart that events can’t really change, but can only change relative to real change in something other than events. The reasoning above shows that events can’t really change in their A-determinations. And they can’t change in their intrinsic non-temporal features, as McTaggart rightly insists: it is eternally true that my talk was about God and mathematics; all the flaws in the talk eternally obtain; etc. So if events can’t really change, but only relatively to real change elsewhere, and yet all of reality is just events, then there is no change.
But reality isn’t just events, and in addition to events changing there is the possibility for enduring entities to change. Here’s perhaps the simplest way to make the story go. The universe is an enduring entity that continually gets older. My talk, then, recedes into the past in virtue of the universe ever becoming older than it was when I gave the talk. (If one is skeptical, as I am, that there is such an entity as the universe, one can give a more complex story about a succession of substances becoming older and older.)
Can one run any version of the McTaggart argument against a theory on which fundamental change consists in a substance’s changing rather than in the change of events? I am not sure, but at the moment I don’t see how. If a person changes from young to old, we have two events: their youth A and their old age B. But we can now say that neither A nor B changes fundamentally: A recedes into the past because of the person’s (or the universe’s) growing old.
If this line of thought is right, then we do learn something from McTaggart: an A-theorist should not locate fundamental change in events, but in enduring objects.
3 comments:
I’m not sure I follow why you conclude that events can’t change in their A-determinations. Whatever we define as an “event” we can conceptualize as static but for that event to transition into another event there must be some change within that event from which the new event arises. This change is associated with, in a causal sense, a change in the event’s A-determination.
It seems to me that you can also describe the above in another way that may seem incompatible with my previous sketch but is actually just an elaboration or clarification: Any change that occurs such that one event no longer exists and another does is marked by changes in the structure of properties of which the first event was composed. This change does not mean that the first event did not have its structure of properties when this first event was present. What it does mean is that this first event ceased to be present and associated with this ceasing of presence and the becoming of the following event was a change in the structure of the properties of the first event such that the second event acquired its structure of properties.
I think I agree with your last line, although I would draw the relation between events and enduring objects in a specific way I’m not sure you would; it hinges on what you mean by ‘fundamental’, but if you mean what I think you mean with ‘fundamental’, then we agree. I would say the following: Events are entities composed of a structure of particles and the fundamental change associated with the flow of time occurs in the composite particles or properties, to use more metaphysical language, and not in the transition between events. And this obtains quite simply, in my view, because an 'event', on this view, is a conceptual classifier corresponding to a macroscopic state and I don't see how causality could run in the direction of the macroscopic to the microscopic in this instance, but perhaps I'm exhibiting my ignorance in this regard.
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