- (Premise) If p is true, and I can't prevent p from holding, and p entails q, then I can't prevent q from holding. (cf. Finch and Warfield's modified beta)
- (Premise) If Calvinism is true, and God sovereignly wills p, then I cannot prevent God from sovereignly willing p.
- (Premise) If Calvinism is true, then I do A only if God sovereignly wills that I do A.
- That God sovereignly wills p entails p.
- Therefore, if Calvinism is true, and I do A, then I can't have prevented my doing A. (1, 2, 3 and 4)
- (Premise) I am not responsible for what I can't have prevented.
- Therefore, if Calvinism is true, I am not responsible for anything I do.
- (Premise) I am responsible for something I do.
- Therefore, Calvinism is false.
Tuesday, November 23, 2010
Consequence argument against Calvinism
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22 comments:
In my experience, most Calvinists, most compatibilists in general actually, deny premise 6.
Of course if you have no control over what you will do, and you can't not do what you've been ordained to do, how can you be held responsible for what you do?
Until recently, I'd have seen 6 as a plausible thing to reject. But here's the kinds of cases that make me accept 6.
A. I see an assault: X is about to shoot Y. I can't stop X from firing, but I can push X so that his aim will be off and he won't hit Y. I don't bother, though. I bear a responsibility for Y's being shot, but no responsibility for a firearm being illegally discharged. I also bear no responsibility for my failure to turn the bullet into a butterfly. Why? Because I could have prevented Y's being shot and I couldn't have prevented the firearm from being illegally discharged and I couldn't turn the bullet into a butterfly.
B. I am in a Frankfurt case. I choose to vote fraudulently. If I didn't choose to fraudulently vote, the intervener would have made me fraudulently vote. I am responsible for choosing to fraudulently vote, but not for a fraudulent vote occurring, since there is nothing I could do to prevent a fraudulent vote from occurring.
Dan Johnson sent me, with permission to post, this reply:
I would accept (1) and (6) at the same time only if they equivocate on "can't prevent." (That may be the same move I make with respect to the ordinary consequence argument.) If you abstract away from all the causal factors that go through my intentions and desires, which is the way that God's decrees are executed when God decrees responsible action, then I can avoid doing it (and this is the sense of "able to do otherwise" or "can prevent" or "can avoid" that I think tracks responsibility); if you don't abstract away from those factors, then I can't avoid doing it, but that doesn't mean I'm not responsible.
I think the trick is to get straight on the "could have done" counterfactuals -- as you know, I think they are very context-sensitive. I'm not sure how to get straight on them, and I'm not sure I can pick out all the subtle ways in which the context affects them.
As it applies to Frankfurt cases, I've always thought the indeterministic world objection developed by people like Robert Kane and Carl Ginet was pretty strong. What are your thoughts on it?
Dan:
As I see it, your suggestion is that the "can prevent" in (6) should be taken to mean: can prevent, abstracting away from the intentions and desires, and their causal antecedents.
But it seems that our intuitions behind (6) are stronger than that. Here's a weird case. There is a machine set up to blow up a building in five minutes and the only way it can be defused is if you turn a knob while having no desire for personal happiness. Abstracting from your intentions and desires, you can stop the explosion. But in reality, you can't prevent the explosion, precisely because you can't prevent yourself, in the course of the available five minutes, from desiring personal happiness. (Given more time, you could have yourself brainwashed.)
Here's a less weird case. Your wife will be bitten by a mosquito in five minutes, unless you run to stop it. You're a mile away and have no vehicle. Now, to run a five minute mile psychologically requires a great deal of motivation. Let us suppose you would be able to run the five minute mile to save your wife's life. Likewise, you would be able to do it if you desired that she not be bitten by a mosquito as much as you desire to protect her life. But with the strength of desire you have, you can't. Abstracting from your intentions and desires, you can stop the bite. But in reality, you can't.
It is tempting to think that in this case the work is being done by how minor the harm to your wife is, so that you can say it would be unreasonable to ask that you run a five minute mile to prevent this harm. But I think that doesn't get at what's going on. Imagine a variant case where you can quickly self-induce a motive to run a five-minute mile, say by swallowing a motivation pill. But it's still true that you'll be utterly exhausted in a way that's disproportionate to the harm prevented. In this case, the right thing to say is that you are responsible for not swatting the mosquito, but you are not guilty. In fact, you might even be praiseworthy for your prudence. In the first version of the case, you're not responsible. And what makes for the difference between these two cases is that in the one you can prevent the mosquito bite and in the other you can't. And the relevant kind of prevention does not abstract from desires, since if we do abstract from them, then in both versions you can.
I wonder, though, whether a more promising move for you wouldn't be this. Take a leaf from the incompatibilist's book and distinguish agency-responsibility from outcome-responsibility (I keep on switching the terminology, as I keep on trying to find the best terminology). Then say: (6) is true, but only in the case of outcome-responsibility. Thus, you could say that in the Frankfurt case of my previous comment, you are agent-responsible for the action, but not outcome-responsible for the occurrence of an action of that type.
Agency-responsibility is compatible with unpreventability while outcome-responsibility is not. This would, however, have a costly conclusion: If Calvinism is true, we are not outcome-responsible for anything. But while the conclusion is costly, it is not utterly disastrous, as it is agency-responsibility that is tied to guilt.
I think I want to say the same thing about Markosian's cool agent-causal compatibilism. It doesn't have any hope of preserving outcome-responsibility, but it does have at least a prima facie hope of preserving agency-responsibility.
In law, criminal responsibility is like agency-responsibility, and civil responsibility is like outcome-responsibility. I can be criminally responsible for a death that would have occurred no matter what I did; but perhaps I am not civilly liable (IANAL).
I think those sorts of objections to Frankfurt cases are right. I was considering a limited Frankfurt case where it's up to you what you choose, but if you don't choose what the neurosurgeon wants you to do, she'll make you do what she wants you to do. So, whatever you choose, you'll do the same thing.
The proof, at the very least, fails on step 6. We are not responsible because we are free, we are responsible by Divine fiat -- because God says that we are.
"But that's not fair" is the usual response, but proof that it isn't usually isn't forthcoming.
Surely there are some logical constraints on that fiat, or else it won't count as reponsibility. For instance, as a matter of the logic of responsibility, one cannot be responsible for events that did not happen (one can be responsible for trying to produce them, but the trying is an event that did happen). Likewise, one can't be agency-responsible for something one didn't do, cause or contribute to. Likewise, one can't be negatively morally responsible for an altogether good action. etc. Once one drops such logical points, one is no longer talking of responsibility, but something else.
Maybe, though, you simply identify being responsible with God punishing or rewarding one for it? (But that can't be right. I can be responsible for a sin that I don't get punished for. Also, what makes the harsh treatment count as *punishment*, if it is not response to guilt.)
Alex wrote: Surely there are some logical constraints on that fiat, or else it won't count as responsibility.
Think of it this way. Characters in a book are responsible for their actions, even though their actions are directed by the author.
Characters in a book aren't responsible, but only responsible according to the book.
Moreover, even within a novel, there are rules. If I write in a novel: "Fred is a bachelor with three wives", I am either not writing literally, or I am using one or more of the terms in a sense different from that which is normally attached to it, or I am contradicting myself. Likewise, if I write a novel and describe a character as unable to prevent something and yet as outcome-responsible for it, then I am either not writing literally, or I am using one or more of the terms in an unusual sense, or I am contradicting myself.
Characters in a book aren't responsible, but only responsible according to the book.
Aren't responsible ... only responsible? They're one or the other. They are responsible according to the wishes of the author.
Likewise, if I write a novel and describe a character as unable to prevent something and yet as outcome-responsible for it, then I am either not writing literally, or I am using one or more of the terms in an unusual sense, or I am contradicting myself.
I think there's more to it than that. First, you have to clearly define what "unable to prevent" means. Remember, in this view of reality, there are two frameworks: the framework that exists inside the story, and the framework that encompasses both the author and the story being told.
We typically view "unable to prevent" only in the first framework and base our understanding of responsibility around that, where responsibility is intrinsic to the character. But we actually live in the second framework, where responsibility is assigned by the author.
Things that happen within a novel happen within the scope of a fictionalizing operator like "according to the story". Among private detectives we do not number Sherlock Holmes. Rather, Sherlock Holmes is a detective according to the story. One way to see the unreality implied by the fictionalizing operator is that you can write a story that includes characters who are also real people. Thus, Socrates was responsible for corruption of youth according to Aristophanes' Clouds, but Socrates was not (in fact) responsible for corruption of youth. Being responsible according to a story is not the same as being responsible.
"We typically view 'unable to prevent' only in the first framework and base our understanding of responsibility around that, where responsibility is intrinsic to the character. But we actually live in the second framework, where responsibility is assigned by the author."
I think you're taking the story analogy too far. All the doctrines of the faith are true in the story, too. (For if they weren't true in the story, then when we profess these doctrines we, as characters in the story, are not speaking the truth. But that is absurd.) In particular, if if it is a doctrine of the faith (as on at least some varieties of Calvinism it is) that I cannot prevent God from sovereignly willing what he wills, then this doctrine of the faith is also true in the story. But if it is true in the story, then it is true in the story that I couldn't have prevented myself from doing what I'm doing, and hence it is true in the story that I am not responsible.
If we take Calvinism to be, roughly, the view that whatever happens takes place because God sovereignly wills it to happen, then couldn't the Calvinist reject Premise (2)? He need only hold (2') If Calvinism is true, and God sovereignly wills p, then I won't prevent God from sovereignly willing p. With (2'),we avoid the conclusion that I can't have prevented what I did and the ensuing difficulty about responsibility.
Things that happen within a novel happen within the scope of a fictionalizing operator like "according to the story".
That's because we're outside the story looking in. To the characters, it isn't fiction. If you want to call our reality "fiction", then by all means you're free to do so. But it's real to us.
Being responsible according to a story is not the same as being responsible.
That's the point under contention. If I asked you, "Who was responsible for the death of Luke's aunt and uncle in Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope", would you answer "the Imperial stormtroopers" or "George Lucas"? Both answers are true.
I think you're taking the story analogy too far.
And I will likewise respond that you aren't taking it far enough. And we could continue along that vein all day. But it's an important issue: what is our reality, really? The only way we can know is what the Creator of our reality has told us -- and, IMO, he's only given hints. And, IMO, the story motif best fits the evidence we have. "In Him we live and move and have our being." We are the product of the Mind behind nature and that, first of all, is story.
In particular, if if it is a doctrine of the faith (as on at least some varieties of Calvinism it is) that I cannot prevent God from sovereignly willing what he wills, then this doctrine of the faith is also true in the story.
Is this really the case? Are the rules for the Author the same as the rules for the characters? I think you're assuming too much. After all, there are
Scriptural examples of God doing things He has forbidden man to do. So the rules aren't the same. But, I'll grant it for the sake of the argument.
But if it is true in the story, then it is true in the story that I couldn't have prevented myself from doing what I'm doing, and hence it is true in the story that I am not responsible.
Again, you're using the wrong definition of responsible. You are assuming man has free will (which Scripture nowhere teaches), and basing the definition of responsibility on that assumption. I think your view of reality is wrong, which leads to an incorrect notion of responsibility. I eagerly await your answer of who was responsible for the death of Luke's aunt and uncle.
'If I asked you, "Who was responsible for the death of Luke's aunt and uncle in Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope", would you answer "the Imperial stormtroopers" or "George Lucas"? Both answers are true.'
But if you asked Luke, he would say "the Imperial stormtroopers", and it would be false (in the story) for him to say that George Lucas did it. Facts about George Lucas aren't true in Luke's story.
But the case of God is different, since many facts about God are indeed true in our story. If they weren't true, we wouldn't be right in confessing them.
'In Him we live and move and have our being.'
The conjunction of the doctrines of omnipresence, continual creation and divine cooperation in all causality, perhaps as combined with the doctrine of all finite existence being a participation in God, seems to do as much justice to the verse as does the story analogy, without the dangers of pantheism. The story analogy does not appear very much if at all in Scripture, and is not particularly prominent in Tradition either.
But if you asked Luke, he would say "the Imperial stormtroopers",
First, Luke isn't the judge, so his opinion doesn't count. Second, Luke would be acting on incomplete information so, again, his opinion doesn't count.
and it would be false (in the story) for him to say that George Lucas did it. Facts about George Lucas aren't true in Luke's story.
That's certainly not the case. Whether or not Luke knows it, Lucas did, in fact, cause the stormtroopers to do what they did. We might question why Luke might make a statement about Lucas, but what Luke might say isn't necessarily right or wrong. It all depends on how much information Lucas put about himself in the story. In our case, Scripture says that God is sovereign and man is responsible. (Non-existent) free will is how many people resolve this dilemma, but this is reading into the story that which most definitely is not there.
The conjunction of the doctrines of omnipresence, continual creation and divine cooperation in all causality...
Any theories of "divine cooperation" are, IMO, based upon the incorrect notion of free will. You can't assume that which you wish to demonstrate.
The story analogy does not appear very much if at all in Scripture, and is not particularly prominent in Tradition either.
For we look through a glass darkly...
Once a person stops reading their prejudices into Scripture, free will disappears. For those who might be interested, here's an interesting take on the sovereignty of God in Ecclesiastes, of all places. Once free will is gone, the "reality as story" motif can make sense of responsibility, IMO, and this has some -- granted, not a lot -- support in Scripture.
Suppose I write a short story about God creating the world without human beings, but instead just angels. If one takes reality-in-a-story as seriously as your comments suggest, we get some absurdities:
1. I, as the author of the story, make God create angels in the story.
2. The angels both are and are not created by human beings. They are created by human beings as they are created by me. They are not created by human beings as it is false in the story that there are any human beings.
Surely the sane thing to do is to distinguish is true from is true in the story. Thus, the proposition that Luke's parents are killed by Imperial stormtroopers is not true, but is true in the story. On the other hand, the proposition George Lucas created a story according to which Luke's parents are killed by Imperial stormtroopers is true, but not true in the story.
As for cooperation, I don't see how I am presupposing free will. If free choices are deterministic, it is still true that God cooperates in free choices. By "cooperation", I mean the via media between deism (according to which God creates the universe and then its own causality is independent of him) and occasionalism (according to which there is no causality except God's): all instances of creaturely causality involve divine cooperation.
Sorry about the delay. On the road...
Suppose I write a short story... we get some absurdities.
Actually, you don't. In your scenario, there are three realities: the [prime] "reality" that God inhabits, the [secondary] "reality" that we inhabit (the story written by God), and the [tertiary] "reality" of your story. Your second point is false: in the tertiary reality, angels were created by God. There is only an absurdity if there is a point of intersection between the tertiary and secondary realities. That is, there is no way for the angels to know who created them, unless you tell them. For there to be an absurdity, you would have to say to them something to the effect that "I created you but I told you that God created you."
In our secondary reality, we have several points of intersection, most notably the Incarnation. If there are absurdities, it would be either because God created an inconsistent story (which I doubt, based upon His revelation of His nature to us), or because God told us something inconsistent with our reality. After all, this is why skeptics don't believe in miracles. They are inconsistent with the story as apprehended by our senses.
Surely the sane thing to do is to distinguish is true from is true in the story.
And how do you propose to do that? You have no way of knowing anything about the primary reality except through what God tells you.
Thus, the proposition that Luke's parents are killed by Imperial stormtroopers is not true, but is true in the story. On the other hand, the proposition George Lucas created a story according to which Luke's parents are killed by Imperial stormtroopers is true, but not true in the story.
How are you going to determine truth when God collapses the realities? When the sea of glass no longer separates heaven and earth, and when God "is all and in all"? [1 Cor 15:58]
When judgement occurs, wither responsibility? IMO, Scripture seems to say that both will be true.
I'm inclined to think those who oppose the argument should find the weakness in (1), or like Dan in some combination of (1) and (6). My own preference is for a classical-ish compatibilism which would falsify (1) and sometimes (6).
P.S. Alex, you show supererogatory patience with some of your commenters.
We can make (1) into a theorem if we define: "x can't prevent p" as "There is no action A such that x can perform A and were x to do A, p might not be true", and assume the plausible axiom that if (a) were q to hold, r might hold and (b) r entails s, then (c) were q to hold, s might hold.
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