Reasons and intentions

1. If an action has an intention, that intention is always a part of the full rational explanation of the action.
2. Only facts that are identical with or grounded in the agent's reasons are found in a rational explanation of an action.
3. Therefore, the intentions in an action are identical with or grounded in the agent's reasons for the action. ("The Grounding Claim")

Here, grounding is a relation stronger than supervenience. I think the Grounding Claim is very plausible even apart from the little argument for it. One nice thing about the Grounding Claim is that it helps demystify intentions. Once we get clear on the reasons for an action, there is nothing more to intentions.

The Grounding Claim is very abstract, but it has a concrete and controversial consequence:

4. It is possible to have two agents who differ in the foreseen consequences of an action but who do not differ in intentions.

This follows from the fact that a foreseen consequence only affect the reasons for an action when the agent cares about the consequences in some sense, and mere foresight does not entail care. When one agent finds out about a consequence of an action that she doesn't care about—either because the consequence is morally irrelevant or because the agent is morally insensitive—this does not by itself affect her reasons. Thus, two agents can have the same reasons but foresee different things, at least if they are things they do not care about. This, in turn, shows:

5. Foresight is not the same as intention.

The challenge for a theory of intention, then, is to figure out in what way an agent's intentions are grounded in (or identical with) her reasons—how to read her intentions off from her reasons.

I don't know how to do that.