Divine hiddenness and a fallacy of practical reasoning

There is an old Soviet joke. A visitor arrives in the Soviet Union and by the airport he sees two workers with shovels. The first digs a hole. Then the second covers up the hole. He asks the workers what they are doing. They say: "The worker who puts the trees in the holes didn't show up."

The joke illustrates this fallacy of practical reasoning:

1. I have good (very good, excellent, etc.) reason to make p hold.
2. A necessary condition for p is q.
3. Thus, I have good (very good, excellent, etc.) reason to make q hold.

There is good reason to plant a tree. Digging a hole and filling in a hole are necessary conditions for planting a tree. But that only gives one reason to dig the hole when one expects a tree to be put in, and it only gives one reason to fill in the hole when the tree has been inserted.

One's reason to make p hold transfers to a similar weight reason to make the necessary condition q hold only when it is sufficiently likely that the other conditions needed for p will come to be in place.

I will call inferences like (3) instances of the Necessary Condition Fallacy.

Now consider this familiar line of thought.

4. If God exists, then for each sufficiently epistemically rational person x, God has an overriding reason to bring it about that x enters into a love relationship with him.
5. A necessary condition for a sufficiently epistemically rational x's entering into a love relationship with God is that x will believe that God exists.
6. A necessary condition for a sufficiently epistemically rational x's coming to believe that God exists is x's having evidence of God's existence.
7. So, a necessary condition for a sufficiently epistemically rational x's entering into a love relationship with God is that x have evidence of God's existence. (5 and 6)
8. So, if God exists, for any sufficiently epistemically rational human x, God has an overriding reason to bring it about that x has evidence of God's existence. (4 and 7)
9. But what God has an overriding reason to do always happens.
10. So, if God exists, every sufficiently epistemically rational person has evidence of God's existence.
11. But not every sufficiently epistemically rational person has evidence of God's existence.
12. So God doesn't exist.

But the derivation of (8) is a clear instance of the Necessary Condition Fallacy.

So the question now is whether there is a way of deriving (8) without making use of this fallacy. If it were the case that

13. every sufficiently epistemically rational creature would be very likely to enter into a love relationship with God upon receiving evidence that God exists,

then (8) would have some plausibility. (I say "some", because I am not sure the overridingness transfers from (4) to (8) given merely a high probability of success in producing a love relationship.) But (13) is not particularly plausible, especialy given that it seems likely that there are people who rationally believe in God but don't love him. (One thinks here of the line from the Letter of James about demons who know that God exists and tremble—but surely don't love.)

So, at least, further argument is needed for (8).