Inclusive vs. proper parthood

Contemporary analytic philosophers seem to treat the “inclusive” concept of parthood, on which each object counts as an improper part of itself, as if it were more fundamental than the concept of proper parthood.

It seems to me that we should minimize the number of fundamental relations that all objects have to stand in. We are stuck with identity: every object is identical with itself. But anything beyond that we should avoid as much as we can.

Now, it is plausible that whatever parthood relation—inclusive parthood or proper parthood—is the more fundamental of the two is in fact a fundamental relation simpliciter. For it is unlikely that parthood can be defined in terms of something else. But if we should minimize the number of fundamental relations that all objects must stand in, then it is better to hold that proper parthood rather than inclusive parthood is a fundamental relation. For every object has to stand in inclusive parthood to itself. But it is quite possible to have objects that are not proper parts of anything else.

On this view, proper parthood will be a fundamental relation, and improper parthood is just the disjunction of proper parthood with identity.