Francis of Assisi did not love nature excessively and Mother Teresa did not love the needy too much.
Francis loved nature as reflecting God and Mother Teresa loved the needy as images of God.
If God does not exist, then to love nature as reflecting God or to love someone as an image of God is to love something as better than it is.
To love something as better than it is is to love it excessively.
So, if God does not exist, Francis of Assisi loved nature excessively and Mother Teresa loved the needy too much. (2–4)
So, God exists. (1 and 5)
Friday, February 5, 2021
Loving excessively and the existence of God
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24 comments:
You say
"To love something as better than it is is to love it excessively."
This may be true though I would probably deny it, but even if I accepted it, you'd have to say that St. Francis or Mother Teresa loved their objects as better than they are, which I don't think is true.
So in other words, I would deny 3. I think the issue is it seems possible that if you love something for the wrong reasons, it may be not as accurate or maybe as noble of a love, but I think I'd hesitate to say that this makes it an excess if the object is deserving of a lot of love anyway.
Isn't there something wrong with the grammar in 3?
Should (3) read: “… as reflecting God, or to love the needy as images of God, is to love something as better than it is.”?
The argument equivocates. What is it to love something ‘excessively’? (a) To love it more that it deserves to be loved, judged by some external standard? (b) To love it more than is reasonable given one’s beliefs about it, true or not? (c) To love it more because of false (but sincerely held) beliefs about it than one would without the false beliefs.
An atheist could accept (1) in sense (a) or (b), but not in sense (c). But (4) requires sense (c).
Walter:
I fixed (3). Thanks!
Ian:
I was actually thinking about (a): to love more than the beloved objectively deserves to be loved. And I am thinking that to love someone as having a special extremely high dignity is to love it excessively, so that fits with (4).
That said, I do have a nagging worry not about the general line of argument, but about the specific formulation. We could perhaps imagine someone loving a tree as a fellow person, but being so weak in their personal love for the tree, that their personal love for the tree is not actually excessive--perhaps their weak personal love does not rise above the level of proper arboreal love. I am not sure we would count such weak love as really loving "as a fellow person".
I can get out of this worry by explicitating that by "loving x as being F" I mean "loving x in (at least approximately) the way that being F would call for". Then the person who thinks the tree is a fellow person, but whose love is far too weak for that belief, does not count as loving the tree as being a person. And in this sense I do not count as loving my neighbor as an image of God (mea culpa; may God have mercy on me).
I do not think this sense of "loving as" is particularly idiosyncratic. If we say "Alice loved Bob as a god", it's clear that Alice loved Bob excessively--we can imagine that an unpious pagan loves Apollo with an intensity so low as to be merely the degree of love appropriate to a a dog, but when we say that "Alice loved Bob as a god", we don't mean that Alice loved Bob with that kind of low intensity. Indeed, we would say that our unpious pagan doesn't really love Apollo as a god.
Here is a revised argument making this more explicit:
1. Francis of Assisi did not love nature far excessively and Mother Teresa did not love the needy much too much.
2. Francis loved nature as reflecting God and Mother Teresa loved the needy as images of God, and both loves were approximately adequate.
3. If God does not exist, then an approximate adequate love of nature as reflecting God or a person as an image of God is a far excessive love.
4. So, if God does not exist, Francis of Assisi loved nature far excessively and Mother Teresa loved the needy much too much. (2–3)
5. So, God exists. (1 and 4)
Behind my argument is the intuition that the kind of love a person who is in the image of God deserves is way higher than the kind of love that anything in an atheistic universe deserves.
Alex
"Behind my argument is the intuition that the kind of love a person who is in the image of God deserves is way higher than the kind of love that anything in an atheistic universe deserves."
A person "deserves" the highest possible "kind of love". There is no such thing as "too much" or "far too much" love.
The world would be a much better place if love were truly unconditional.
It's unfortunate that I am unfamiliar with both St. Francis and St. Teresa. Anyway, I'm not sure why an atheist can't just reject premise 1. Consider the case for St. Teresa.
Perhaps, feeding the poor whom you don't treat as created in the image of God is to not love excessively while feeding the poor whom one treats as an image of God is to love excessively.
Considering the case of Alice who loves Bob as a god, if Bob is sick and Alice took care of him while treating him as a god, that could be an excessive love, but it could be the case that the proper kind of love is when Alice took care of him without treating him as a god.
I am not sure what I am missing.
Alex:
Your discussion and revised argument highlight the difference between ideal Christian love and presumed atheist love.
But the revised argument won’t convince atheists that God exists. Atheists must think that Mother Teresa was mistaken to see the needy as images of God, and equally mistaken to love them as such. They may think that her love was ‘far excessive’, in which case they would reject (1). Or (contrary to the view expressed in your comment) they may think that her love, though based on a mistaken view, was not in fact far excessive. In that case they would accept (1) but reject (3). Similarly for Francis of Assisi.
I see it this way: Francis and Mother Teresa are models of Christian love. Their inspiring example may draw some atheists to faith, regardless of formal arguments.
Ian:
Perhaps the way to think about this is as a way of capturing how it is that the way people are drawn by models of Christian love to accept Christianity, or at least theism, can be quite rational. The draw pulls you to accept: "Yes, this is a good way to love!", and hence leads you to accept premise 1. This can be rational insofar as feeling that something is a good way to love is significant evidence that it IS a good way to love. And then the rest of the argument goes through.
In a way, this argument is a very personal argument. I used to show a clip of Mother Teresa holding a sickly child during my first Philosophy of Love and Sex lecture, to illustrate "physical acts of love". You see on her face this deep love. It's kind of like she's holding Jesus ("whatsoever you do to the least of my brothers..."). It's hard not to think two things:
1. To her, this child is more lovable than any child in a naturalistic uncreated universe would be.
2. This attitude of hers is admirable.
Putting these two things together, one concludes that the child *is* more lovable than any child in a naturalistic uncreated universe would be, and hence that we do not live in a naturalistic uncreated universe.
If one is left cold, and fails to feel both (1) and (2), the argument won't have any force.
Alex
I do not understand why to her, this child is more lovable than any child in a naturalistic uncreated universe would be.
Let's suppose for the sake of the argument that naturalistic processes can produce a child that is completely the same as the one in your example, then why would that 'naturalistic' child not be as lovable as the one created by God?
There is the value of the child in relation to God. This relation is both personal and ontological.
First, consider the personal. One of my possessions is my late grandfather's pocket knife. It is a useful tool, but its value goes beyond its tool-value: its value as *his* knife goes far beyond its value as a tool, because of the value of my grandfather. The added value is both agent-relative and agent-neutral. There is the agent-relative value to me of the fact that it is *my* grandfather's knife. And there is the agent-neutral value of its being the knife of a wonderful human being, a war hero, a physician of some renown, etc. Similarly, that the child is a child created by and in the image of God and beloved by God adds much personal value to the child, in light of the value of God.
Second, there is the ontological. As a warm-up, compare a pantheistic world with a naturalistic one. In a pantheistic world, everything has great "ontological" added value of being a part of God. Things are ontologically different in a pantheistic world: they are ontologically worthy of partial worship. My argument works great on a pantheistic conception of God.
But of course, I don't actually believe pantheism. But while I don't believe pantheism, classical theism--at least of the sort I accept--has a very strong doctrine of participation on which the ontology of the world is very different from the ontology of a naturalistic world. Somewhat as for Plato to have a fundamental positive property is to participate in the corresponding form, on classical theism, for a creature to have any positive property is for it to participate in God with respect to that property. This participation is a deeply mystical relation that makes classical theism of the sort I accept be somewhat close to some forms of panentheism. A rock whose hardness is a participation in God's immutability is ontologically very different from an ordinary naturalistic rock. An infant sweetness is a participation in God's goodness is ontologically very different from an infant in a purely naturalistic world. The difference is akin to the difference between a real person and an NPC.
Alex
I know you don't believe that naturalistic processes can produce a person/child that has the same intrinsic properties as a person created by God, but that was not my question.
My question was if a naturalistic child with the same intrinsic properties did exist, would it be as lovable as one created by God? An NPC does not have the same intrinsic properties as a real person, but I am not talking about an NPC.
A person is not an object. The value of an object is subjective. If I found your grandfather's knife somewhere, I would probably think it was a nice knife, but that's it.
But real love for a person should not be subjective. Every person is lovable, because love should not be conditional.
Participating in God is an intrinsic property if there are any intrinsic properties of creatures at all. I can't make sense of the question of the value of a person who participates in God in a world where God doesn't exist.
Alex
That's why your argument is question-begging as an argument for the existence of God. Of course if you start by presupposing that a person is only lovable if he participates in God, then loving something that doesn't participate in God is excessive.
I have a question, Dr. Pruss. Is it important to provide a premise that says that to "love excessively" is morally wrong or something like that? Or, is it implied? Or, is it not necessary to make such a move?
Thank you
Walter:
Consider, as an analogy, that I meet someone who I believe is my sister, and so, in addition to the affection I naturally feel for other people in general, I have an extra warmth toward her. If I then discover that she is not my sister, it is clear that that extra warmth was inappropriate. It was excessive. If this weren't the case, then there would be no special bond among family members as distinct from any other random person. This doesn't mean you have to be a family member for me to feel love and warmth toward you. But, all other things being equal, there is an extra specialness to family members, isn't there? Is this not analogous to "Teresa" having extra adoration for a person she takes to be a manifestation of God?
Pruss:
Is the tension in this argument supposed to be between "we can't love too much" and "we would have loved more, if..."? Because, if so, it would seem to also prove that the nature around us was constructed, molecule-by-molecule by transcendent aliens (or any other such story, which would have increased our love). It would seem to prove that every person I meet was fated to meet me in order to add something important to my life. Do you see what I mean? I don't think we can accept all the things that we'd need to in order to break the tension in the argument, can we?
Or is the point that the image and nature of God is greater than any of those other stories, and so we ought to accept it as the greatest conceivable tension breaker?
Michael
Feeling an "extra warmth" towards your sister is a subjective feeling. It has nothing to do with your sister being more lovable than someone else.
And no, the extra warmth towards the person you believed was your sister is not inappropriate.
Excessive love, to me, is a contradictio in terminis. Every person deserves the same amount of love, regardless of whether he/ she is a manifestation of God or not.
If Mother Teresa needed the belief that the child was a manifestation of God in order to love it, then Mother Theresa's love would be inferior to real love.
In reality, I am quite sure that, if Alex were to lose his belief in God, he would still love other persons in the same way he does now. That is, if his love is real and not a kind of surrogate love.
Dr. Alex Pruss,
This is not necessarily an original argument, and I am thinking that this could be a variant of your ontological argument based on the center of the motivational life of a person or community.
1. If a belief that p is within the center of the motivational life of a person or community, and that life is generally flourishing, then, p is admirable.
2. The belief that to love the needy as images of God is within the center of the motivational life of a person or community, and that life is generally flourishing.
3. So, the belief that to love the needy as images of God is admirable.
4. If God does not exist, then to love someone as an image of God is to love something as better than it is.
5. To love something as better than it is is not admirable.
6. So, if God does not exist, to love the needy as images of God is not admirable.
7. So, God exists.
Chris
In order for your argument to be valid, (1) should read
1'. If a belief that p is within the center of the motivational life of a person or community, and that life is generally flourishing and it does not involve loving something as better than it is, then, p is admirable.
The problem is still that someone who doesn't believe in God does not love someone as an image of God. Such a person loves someone else simply for who this someone else is.
So, people who don't believe in God do not love something as better than it is, they simply love something for what it is.
Now, surely, if God does not exist, to love the needy as images of God is a delusion and it would be "excessive" in the sense that without this delusion perhaps they would not love the needy. But people who love the needy for the needy's own sake do not have that problem.
I would personally admire Mother Teresa much more if I knew she loved the needy for the needy's sake.
Walter,
Thank you for your comment. I don't usually engage with someone else, especially in the comment section of the blog post, but I will just give some clarifications.
The argument that I raised is logically valid. You may disagree with the soundness of the argument, but the validity is different from the soundness of the argument.
Other than that, I don't see the need to add "and it does not involve loving something as better than it is" in the first premise. The first premise is true generally. If there are organizations whose center of their motivational life is academics, that's admirable. If there are groups whose center of their motivational life is loving the environment and loving people, that's admirable. This is a general principle applicable to different people or groups or organizations, etc. You said:
Take note that I am not making a similar argument from Dr. Pruss here. I am making a variant argument. The force of the argument that I raised above is whether loving the needy or human beings as created in the image of God is admirable, and the proof of that or defense of it is the fact that this is the center of motivational life as I raised in the first premise. At the same time, in your previous comments, one thing that I noticed is that you seem to think that to love everyone means that the degree of the love you give is necessarily the same as that of someone who thinks they are created in the image of God. I think that's a bit inaccurate. If I have a wife, I still love everyone, but I don't love everyone in the same way I love my wife. So, there is a difference in degree. And, even if you are an unbeliever, I think it's obvious that there is something intrinsic to a human being if such human being is created in the image of God, that is not present if, for the sake of argument, a human being is not created in the image of God. We can include the fact that we are created for eternal life to be with God in heaven, the fact that we have immortal souls, etc. In fact, even in a naturalistic worldview, it's natural to think that we should love human beings more than animals. It doesn't mean that we shouldn't love them, but the degree is just different because of the intrinsic worth of human beings, even in a naturalistic worldview. At the same time, you could say that we can love someone else for who they are. But, that's not really in contrast to the points that we make. I can love my brother for who he is AND because he is created in the image of God. Loving someone for who they are is not an alternative to what we really believe. You said:
"Now, surely, if God does not exist, to love the needy as images of God is a delusion and it would be "excessive" in the sense that without this delusion perhaps they would not love the needy. But people who love the needy for the needy's own sake do not have that problem."
I think that this is where I really have to disagree with you. The question is not whether the Christians would not love them if they were freed from such delusion. The question is the degree of love. If you think you don't have a problem with loving the needy for its own sake, I beg to differ. I believe that to love someone while rejecting that they are created in the image of God is not admirable. So, I don't think you escape the problem at all. Perhaps, loving them is admirable, but to love them AND reject that they are created in His image is not admirable, for the reason I stated on my first premise.
To finish my point, I combined some concepts found in Dr. Pruss's previous works. Besides the argument he raised in this blog post, I will recommend you to look at his previous blog posts and written article, specifically with regards to a person's or community's motivational life.
http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2007/11/defense-of-ontological-argument.html
http://alexanderpruss.com/papers/OntologicalMotivational.pdf
Thank you.
Chris
The reason why I think your argument is invalid is because, without my addition, (5) does not seem to follow.
Just one other thing. I am not talking about the degree of love. I am sure that there are various degrees in which I can love someone else. But I am talking about the degree of lovability.
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