I used to think that:
- x is a substance just in case <x exists> is not grounded in any fact about any other entity other than x.
But it is plausible that a finite creature’s existing is its being created. And that Alice is created seems to be grounded in God creating Alice, which seems to be a fact about God.
There is a nice response to this worry. On standard medieval views, creation is a one-way relation. When God creates Alice, there is a relation of being-created-by-God in Alice but no relation of creating-Alice in God. We can say, then, that in an important sense the fact that God creates Alice is not a fact about God, but about Alice, where we say that a fact is about x provided the fact is in part a fact of x’s existing or there being some property or relation in x.
It’s interesting that the very plausible account (1) of substance combined with a theistically plausible view that the esse of a finite thing is its being-created yields the rather abstruse one-way relation thesis.
This line of thought does not, however, fit well with the claim that I made in The Principle of Sufficient Reason that for a caused entity, its esse is its being caused. For Alice is also caused by her parents. And while divine causation may be a one-way relation, it seems unlikely that creaturely causation is.
There are three ways out of this worry. (i) We could say that creaturely causation is also a one-way relation. (ii) We could say that I was slightly wrong, and for a caused entity, its esse is its being primarily caused, i.e., caused by God. (iii) We could modify (1) to:
- x is a substance just in case < x exists> has a grounding in a fact that is neither about any entity other than x nor grounded in a fact about any entity other than x.
For we can then say that while Alice’s being-caused is grounded in her parents’ activity, which is a fact about her parents, it is also grounded in God’s causing Alice, which is not a fact about God in the sense of being grounded in a relation or property of God’s.
I like both (ii) and (iii). What is especially attractive about (ii) is that if the esse of Alice is her being caused, then the esse of Alice is highly disjunctive, being multiply grounded—in God’s causing Alice, in her parents causing her, in her parents’ gametes causing her, maybe even in her grandparents’ causing her, etc. But it doesn’t seem right to say that Alice’s esse is highly disjunctive. So a focus on primary causation seems attractive. And I think—but without a careful examination—that the arguments in Principle of Sufficient Reason work with that modification still.
44 comments:
Alex
"God creates Alice" is both a fact about God and a fact about Alice.
God's intention to create Alice is without any doubt, a fact about God. And it seems obvious that God's intention to create Alice grounds Alice's creation and hence, Alice's existence.
Walter, what is an intention? Is it a mental state, or an end goal, or something else?
Don
An human intention is a mental state about an end goal, or at least, about a goal.
I do not know if it is appropriate to speak of God in mental terms, but it is obvious that God's intention to create X is a state of God. And it is also obvious that this state exists logically prior to X's existence.
So, there is no way it is just a fact about X. it is a fact about God and it becomes a fact about X once X exists.
Walter,
I guess the idea is that we must form intentions prior to doing things. But forming intentions is also something we do. So do we need to form intentions prior to forming intentions (which would lead to an infinite regress)? If not, why not?
Also, can we form an intention which doesn't result in an action?
Don
No, the idea is that we must form and intention logically before we act on that intention. Even if the intention is simply there without any reason whatsoever, it is still our intention, hence our intention is a fact about us, and whatever we do is also a fact about us.
I think we van indeed have an intention which doesn't result in z'n action.
.
Walter,
If you're saying intentions are only logical then this is similar to the position of Aquinas (that of mixed relations) in regards to God's relation to the world. The difference being that he wouldn't say intentions are mental states but that actions can be intentional. I don't know what it means to say that a mental state is logical.
If we can have intentions which don't result in actions then what is the cause of those actions which involve intentions?
Don
We form intentions logically before we act on them. That seems obvious.to me.
Walter,
Logical as opposed to real? What is the term logical doing in this instance?
And again: If we can have intentions which don't result in actions then what is the cause of actions which involve intentions?
Don
No, logically as opposed to temporally. God is claimed tp be a-temporal, so His intention cannot be temporally prior to creation.
As to your question, I don't see why the exact cause is relevant here. When God intends to create Alice and actually does create Alice, it is obvious that this involves facts about God as well as facts about Alice. The 'cause' of Alice is God and if he had not intended Alice, Alice would not exist, unless the creation of Alice by God was just a coincidence.
Walter,
My question wasn't in reference to God. It was in reference to intentions in general, including humans. And I see no reason to accept that a "logical", non-temporal mental state makes any sense.
I see no reason to posit the existence of intentions. Persons are the causes of actions (which they perform). But your claim is that persons are the causes of intentions (which have no temporal existence) and then those persons are the causes of actions (at least in the case of God), which makes positing the existence of intentions pointless as they have no causal influence and no temporal existence. Claiming that any of this is obvious (which you have done several times) is not a defense. That all of this is nonsensical is obvious to me.
Don
So, you are a person without intentions?
Of course human intentions have temporal existence because human beings are temporal beings.
God's intentions, however, cannot have temporal existence since God is claimed to be a-temporal.
I see no reason to accept that an a-temporal personal Bring makes any Sense, but. I am merely accepting this for the sake of the argument.
I hope you are aware that your position that persons are the cause of their actions without any intention whatsoever entails that you can just start shooting innocent people on the street tomorrow.
Walter,
Earlier you said, "An human intention is a mental state about an end goal, or at least, about a goal." Then you went on to clarify that intentions only exist logically, which you further clarified meant atemporally. Now you're saying that of course human intentions are temporal. You're answers, on top of being nonsensical, are inconsistent.
My position isn't that humans can't act intentionally. Your last sentence just begs the question by assuming the truth of your position. In any case, my position is irrelevant. You made a claim that God has intentions. I asked for clarification on what an intention is and your subsequent responses have been nonsensical (atemporal mental states having no causal influence) and/or inconsistent.
Don
I have never said that intentions only exist logically.
Sarcastic comment deleted.
Walter,
Intentions have logical, as opposed to real, existence. But they're also not only logical. And they're atemporal and also temporal. Can you please further clarify.
Don
I have never claimed that intentions have logical, as opposed to real existence. I have been talking about logical and/or temporal priority.
I think intentions in human beings are temporal, but since God is supposed to be a-temporal, I don't a priori rule out that His intentions may be a-temporal.
There is nothing contradictory about things being temorally as well as logically prior. If you hit a billiard ball,
thé movement of your cue is both temporally and logically prior to the ball moving..
Walter,
In reference to intentions I asked "Logical as opposed to real?" Your reply was "No, logically as opposed to temporally." So now they do have a real existence?
Don
Yes, I think intentions have real existence. And, by ' logically as opposed to temporally ' I simply mean that I am not presupposing temporality. I do not mean that logical priority cannot be also temporal priority.
Walter,
So when we form an intention we form something that has a real existence? If this (forming intentions) is something we do then is this an act? If not, why not?
I guess it''s an act,, but this is getting way off topic.
I think we need to think of it like this. God has all possible reasons for doing anything in His mind. God then creates. What God's intention is can be attributed to those conceptually distinct reasons which exist in God's mind which correspond to what He created. So, which reasons we can attribute as intentions are based on what God created.
Couldn't someone say that the relation of being-created doesn't strictly speaking exist IN Alice, but is also something that's true ABOUT Alive? My own intuition is that relations may not always be things existing IN beings as an attribute or modification in the usual sense, but are at least partially external, and not essentially intrinsic to the thing.
Heavenly Philosophy,
As I understand it (drawing all this from Gaven Kerr), God has a single reason or "intention" (intention is in quotes bc I don't think intentions exist in the way I see most people use that term) for doing anything, namely, to will the Good (which is Himself). That single reason/intention can produce many effects. In the same way my single "intention" to get a bottle of water can result in me standing up, walking to the refrigerator, and getting a bottle of water. But I don't form an intention to straighten my legs so that I might stand up, and another intention to bend them again so that I might begin my first step, and another intention to straighten then to complete that first step, and so on until I reach the fridge at which point I form another intention to move my arm toward the fridge, another intention to open my hand, and so on. Rather, all these subsequent effects are all done under the "intention" (ie, for the reason) of getting a bottle of water. In the case of God, the ultimate/final cause is the Good. He acts for this single reason/intention, but it results in many subsequent effects. Maybe we could speak about conceptually distinct reasons but in the end there is a single reason (even though it can result in truly distinct effects).
But if God has all possible reasons for doing anything in His mond, then those reasons imply reasons to create Jane instead of Alice.
So, in God's mind, there exist.reasons that correspond to what He creatief as well as reasons. that do not correspond to what He created.
Sure, after the fact, we van conclude that creatine Alice was His intention, but that still means His intention is a fact about God.
Don:
That seems like a very nice idea. I really like that. It also works well with causal finitism. Thank you.
Walter Van den Acker:
Just because facts that can be attributed about God can differ across possible worlds doesn't mean that God is intrinsically, really different across possible worlds.
Wesley,
(The following quote is from Nicholas Kahm comes from his article "Aquinas on Quality.") Kahm writes about Aquinas's logical method of deducing the 10 categories/predicaments: "He [Aquinas] argues that a predicate can be related to a subject in three fundamental ways: (a) the predicate is the subject, (b) the predicate is taken from something in [intrinsic to] the subject, or (c) the predicate is taken from something extrinsic to the subject. In the case of the first way, we can say ‘Socrates is an animal,’ and here the predicate signifies (1) first substance, which is a particular substance of which everything else is predicated. In the case of the second way, the predicate can be in the subject per se and absolutely considered either as following matter, that is, (2) quantity, or as following form, that is, (3) quality. The predicate can also be in the subject not absolutely, but with respect to something else, that is, (4) relation. The third way can be further subdivided...[and thus we get the rest of the categories]" (see also Aquinas's Commentary on Metaph, bk 5, lesson 9, #891-892).
https://isidore.co/aquinas/english/Metaphysics5.htm#9
Heavenly Philosophy
If those facts are truly facts about God, they cannot, per Divine Simpliicty differ across possible wolrds. That could only be true if the facts are not in any way intrisic to God.
And if God is to be in any control of what He creates, there is an intrinsic fact about God that differs across possible worlds.
If God's only "intention" is the will the Good, which is God Himself, then that single reason can produce many effects, but God has no control whatsoever over which effect will be actualized. Such a God does not even have to be personal, a kind of Big Bang can, allegedly also produce many effects.
The very reason why theists think God is necessry is percsily because, according to them, God is in control. If God wills Alice, He does not get Jane. A single reason producing many effects would mean that the creation of Alice is a brute fact, IOW, Alice is a matter of pure luck.
Now, it seems to me that If God's only "intention" is the will the Good, which is God Himself, there is no way he can get anything else but the Good, which is God Himself. In that case, any creation is impossible unless pantheism or panenthiesm is true, of course.
Walter,
You are mixing conceptions of intention. On your understanding "we must form [an] intention logically before we act on that intention" (keep in mind that "intentions have real existence"). Yet forming an intention "it''s an act". So prior to acting we must form an intention, and the forming of that intention is also an act; thus we must form an intention prior to forming an intention, and so on. Thus, on your view, there is an infinite regress prior to acting. So any action becomes impossible.
You have referenced but not properly addressed the alternative understanding of intentional action put forward. In the example put forward the single reason for acting (getting a bottle of water) produces many actions as a result (standing, walking, reaching, etc) over which the agent has complete control. What is denied is that the agent forms intentions (of your kind) at all and especially for each subsequent act performed for the sake of getting a bottle of water. This is descriptive of sequences of actions we perform constantly. In regards to the example given, you must either deny that we have control over the subsequent effects (standing, walking, reaching, etc) which are performed for the sake of getting a bottle of water or deny that we don't form intentions (of your kind) for each subsequent effect.
Don
You still misunderstand my point. We must form an intention logically before we act on that intention does not entail that prior to acting we must form an intention. That would only follow if every act is intentional, which is not what I claim at all.
Of course if we must intend to intend something, that would lead to an infinite regress.
Now I don't deny that we may performvarious acts for only one reason, but if we are to have control over those acts, there must be something intrinsic to us that makes us 'choose'one act over another
Walter,
Would you call an act intentional only if it requires (prior to the act) forming an intention? Or can acts be intentional which don't require (prior to the act) forming an intention?
In regards to the bottle of water example, you must either deny that we have control over the subsequent effects (standing, walking, reaching, etc) which are performed for the sake of getting a bottle of water or deny that we don't form intentions (of your kind) for each subsequent effect. Which are you denying?
Yes, an act is intentional only if there is a prior intention.
Hence I deny that we don't form intentions for each subsequent effect.
Walter,
Thanks for the clarity. Do we only have control over intentional acts? Or do we also have control over acts which aren't intentional?
That we form intentions for each subsequent act done for the sake of a singular reason is (imo) a claim that doesn't fit with experience.
Don
I don't think intentions are always conscious. Sometimes acts done for the sake of a singular reason follow semi-automatically from the reason itself, because we also form habits.
Walter,
Well that's an experientially unfalsifiable position. I claim we don't experience forming individual intentions for subsequent effects (standing, walking, reaching, etc). The counter is that we do so unconsciously (which, conveniently, is experientially unfalsifiable).
Setting that aside I would still like an answer for the following: Do we only have control over intentional acts? Or do we also have control over acts which aren't intentional?
Don
I don't see how we van have control over acts that aren't intentional.
Walter,
You have said that forming an intention is an act. Is it an intentional act?
Initially not.
Walter,
So we have no control over the initial formation of our intentions? Is this correct? If not, please clarify.
When does the formation of an intention become an intentional act? And why?
Are there other non-intentional acts which become intentional? Or only just the formation of an intention? If yes, can you give other examples. If no, why not?
Intentions are complex.Pinpointing when exactly the formation becomes an intentional act. When exactly do a number of grains of sand become a heap?
In any case, intentional acts always Involve the mind
Walter,
So we have no control over the initial formation of our intentions? Is this correct? If not, please clarify.
Are there other non-intentional acts which become intentional? Or only just the formation of an intention? If yes, can you give other examples. If no, why not?
No, we have no control over the initial formation of our intentions, because that would lead an infinite regress.
As for your last question, I do not know.
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