Klaus: Sometimes how well or badly off you are at time t1 depends on what happens at a later time t2. A particularly compelling case of this is when at t1 you performedan onerous action with the goal of producing some effect E at t2. How well off you were in performing the action depends on whether the action succeeded—which depends on whether E eventuates at t2. But now suppose the future is open. Then in a world with as much indeterminacy as ours, in many cases at t1 it will be contingent whether the event at t2 on which your well-being at t1 depends eventuates. And on open future views, at t1 there will then be no fact of the matter about your well-being. Hence, the future is not open.
Opie: In such cases, your well-being should be located at t2 rather than at t1. If you jump the crevasse, it is only when you land that you have the well-being of success.
Klaus: This does not work as well in cases where you are dead at t2. And yet our well-being does sometimes depend on what happens after we are dead. The action at t1 might be a heroic sacrifice of one’s life to save one’s friends—but whether one is a successful hero or a tragic hero depends on whether the friends will be saved, which may depend on what happens after one is already dead.
Opie: Thanks! You just gave me an argument for an afterlife. In cases like this, you are obviously better off if you manage to save your friends, but you aren’t better off in this life, so there must be life after death.
Klaus: But we also have the intuition that even if there were no afterlife, it would be better to be the successful hero than the tragic hero, and that posthumous fame is better than posthumous infamy.
Opie: There is an afterlife. You’ve convinced me. And moral intuitions about how things would be if our existence had a radically different shape from the one it in fact has are suspect. And, given that there is an afterlife, a scenario without an afterlife is a scenario where our existence has a radically different shape. Thus the intuition you cite is unreliable.
Klaus: That’s a good response. Let me try a different case. Suppose you perform an onerous action with a goal within this life, but then you change your mind about the goal and work to prevent that goal. This works best if both goals are morally acceptable, and switching goals is acceptable. For instance you initially worked to help the Niners train to win their baseball game against the Logicians, but then your allegiance rightly shifted to the Niners. And then suppose the Niners won. Your actions in favor of the Niners are successful, and you have well-being. But it is incorrect to locate that well-being at the time of the actual victory, since at that time you are working for the Logicians, not the Niners. So the well-being must be located at the time of your activity, and at that time it depends on future contingents.
Opie: Perhaps I should say that at the time Niners beat the Logicians, you are both well-off and badly-off, since one of your past goals is successful and the other is unsuccessful. But I agree that this doesn’t quite seem right. After all, if you are loyal to your current employer, you’re bummed out about the Logicians’ loss and you’re bummed out that you weren’t working for them from the beginning. So, I admit, this is a little bit of evidence against open future views.
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