One can only know a proposition when it is true.
One can only know a proposition when one exists.
Thus, one can only know a proposition if it ever happens that one exists while it is true. (1 and 2)
If the A-theory of time is true, the proposition that it is a Wednesday is true only on Wednesdays.
God knows all objectively true propositions.
If the A-theory is true, the proposition that it is a Wednesday is objectively true. [I am posting this on a Wednesday.]
If the A-theory is true, God knows that it is a Wednesday. (5 and 6)
If the A-theory is true, God exists on a Wednesday. (3, 4 and 7)
If God exists on Wednesday, God exists in time.
So, if the A-theory is true, God exists in time. (8 and 9)
I conclude that the A-theory is false.
The above argument is similar to one that Richard Gale gives in On the Nature and Existence of God, though Gale's purpose is to provide an argument against theism.
2 comments:
Small observation about 3: it seems to conflate tensed with tenseless truth. Because we can know truths like "The civil war happened" even though we weren't alive back then to know that. Perhaps it's better phrased as ‘has been true at least once.’
Also, 9 seems to assume that existing “on a Wednesday” (or whatever the current day is) automatically means existing within time. But existing “on Wednesday” doesn’t mean that God only exists during that temporal frame—if God exists in all temporal frames, he would necessarily exist in the present "Wednesday" one too. So I’m not sure if P9 is true because of that.
Zachary: On a tensed theory of propositions, which I think is implied by the A-theory of time, that the civil war happened is not a counterexample, because it is NOW true that the civil war happened. Also, I think existing in all temporal frames contradicts timelessness.
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